Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-4036.
July 21, 2006
MEMORANDUM
Anthony Morabito, appearing pro se, is suing his former union, its president, and the union's international arm for an alleged breach of the duty of fair representation because they refused to take his discharge grievance to arbitration in July, 2003. Two of the three Defendants move to dismiss Morabito's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing he brought this lawsuit well after the expiration of the applicable six-month statue of limitations. I agree with movants and will grant their motion.
On July 28, 2005, Morabito filed a lawsuit against United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 56 ("UFCW Local 56"), United Food and Commercial Workers International Union ("UFCW International"), and Anthony Cignalia, the alleged president of UFCW Local 56. The original Complaint did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), so I granted UFCW Local 56's motion for a more definite statement and permitted Morabito to amend his pleading. On February 9, 2006, Morabito filed an Amended Complaint from which the following facts are taken.
Defendant Anthony Cignalia has never been served with the Complaint or Amended Complaint.
In February, 2000, Morabito began employment with Kraft Foods at its Dover, Delaware facility. The following year, in March, 2001, Morabito was elected Alternate Chief Steward of UFCW Local 56. After his election, Morabito exposed union leadership's involvement in an "illegal land transaction" and "creat[ed] a union reform platform to run against established powers. . . ." (Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) Morabito was subsequently discharged from Kraft Foods at some point in the first half of 2003, but the date is not included in the pleadings. In the Amended Complaint, Morabito avers: "The action arises because defendants . . . refused to take plaintiff's discharge case to Arbitration in July, 2003, refused to assist in Unfair Labor Practice charges against the employer and intentionally deceived NLRB investigators in the Unfair Labor Practice charges against the defendant." (Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) Morabito's pleadings provide no details on the facts giving rise to the unfair labor practice charges, but, in a copy of a "Charge Against Labor Organization" form signed by Morabito on September 15, 2003, he claims UFCW Local 56 failed to represent him "[s]ince on or about June 24, 2003 . . . by refusing to take his grievance to arbitration." (Defs.' Br. Ex. H.) Thus, the unfair labor charge and the duty of fair representation claim arise out of the same event: the Defendants' alleged refusal to submit Morabito's discharge grievance to arbitration. Morabito attributes Defendants' refusal to his "union reform" activities. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 9.)
A court should not dismiss a pleading under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). UFCW Local 56 and UFCW International move to dismiss Morabito's lawsuit as untimely, arguing that, even if this Court accepts all of Morabito's well-pled allegations as true, he can prove no set of facts that would place the initiation of this action within the six-month statute of limitations for a duty of fair representation claim. "While the language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) indicates that a statute of limitations defense cannot be used in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, an exception is made where the complaint facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative defense clearly appears on the face of the pleading." Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Trevino v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 916 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1990)). Here, after accepting all well-pled factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of Morabito, Pryor v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n., 288 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 2002), I conclude the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Morabito's noncompliance with the limitations period is apparent from the face of the pleading. In reaching this conclusion, I held Morabito's pleadings to a less stringent standard than those received from the Defendants, who are represented by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
The Amended Complaint relates back to the date on which Morabito filed the Complaint because "the claim . . . asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2).
To clarify a procedural matter, even though movants attached exhibits to their motion, I should not convert it to one for summary judgment. According to Third Circuit precedent:
As a general rule, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings. However, an exception to the general rule is that a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment.In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal citation and quotations omitted). In ruling on this motion, the only exhibit I have considered, the "Charge Against Labor Organization" form, is one such document because Morabito avers the Defendants engaged in unfair labor practices. Additionally, a district court should not convert a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment when it elects to "examine an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Prop., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). The "Charge Against Labor Organization" form, labeled "Exhibit H," satisfies this criteria, so I have treated the motion here as it is styled.
Duty of fair representation claims are governed by a six-month statute of limitations derived, in part, from Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, which requires unfair labor practice charges be submitted to the National Labor Relations Board within the same time period. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-72 (1983); 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). In adopting the six-month limitations period from Section 10(b), the Supreme Court reasoned "all breaches of a union's duty of fair representation are in fact unfair labor practices." Id. at 170. Simply put, "duty of fair representation claims are allegations of unfair, arbitrary, or discriminatory treatment of workers by unions — as are virtually all unfair labor practice charges against unions." Id. Here, Morabito contends the Defendants' refusal to take his discharge grievance to arbitration arose from his "union reform" activities, so, upon a fair reading of Morabito's Amended Complaint, he has presented a cognizable claim.
"As a general matter, a duty of fair representation claim accrues and the six month limitations period commences when 'the futility of further union appeals becomes apparent or should have become apparent.'" Bensel v. Allied Pilots Assn., 387 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Scott v. Local 863, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., 725 F.2d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 1984)). According to the Amended Complaint, the Defendants refused to take Morabito's discharge grievance to arbitration in July, 2003 because of his union reform activities. Thus, by his own admission, Morabito was aware of the allegations in support of his duty of fair representation claim approximately two years before he filed this lawsuit. Additionally, Morabito submitted an unfair labor practices charge dated September 15, 2003 to the NLRB about the same refusal. To summarize, taking all well-pled allegations as true, it was (or should have been) apparent to Morabito that his duty of fair representation claim accrued in the summer of 2003. This lawsuit was filed on July 28, 2005, approximately eighteen months too late.
The six-month limitations period may be tolled if there are "'rays of hope' that the union can 'remedy the cause of the employee's dissatisfaction.'" Id. (quoting Childs v. Pa. Fed'n Bhd. of Maint. Way Employees, 831 F.2d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 1987)). Here, though, Morabito alleges nothing other than an outright refusal by the Defendants to take his discharge grievance to arbitration. In the absence of any "rays of hope" to toll the statute of limitations, I am compelled to rule in favor of movants UFCW Local 56 and UFCW International. An appropriate order follows.
The Amended Complaint contains an allegation that Morabito "was verbally threatened by agents of defendant Anthony Cignalia in both Dover and at regional meetings, at plaintiffs [sic] place of employment and at the Cherry Hill pre-arbitration board meeting in July 2003." (Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Although Morabito properly invoked federal-court jurisdiction in his pleadings, this averment implicates a state-law tort cause of action over which I now decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. This case is in its procedural infancy and with the dismissal of Plaintiff's sole federal cause of action against UFCW Local 56 and UFCW International, consideration of such factors as "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants" weigh heavily against exercising federal jurisdiction at this juncture. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).