Opinion
B325296
08-12-2024
MARLON MORA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HAUL AWAY RUBBISH SERVICE, CO., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Heidari Law Group, Saman Ryan Heidari and Giorgio Cassandra for Plaintiff and Appellant. Horvitz &Levy, Karen M. Bray, Emily V. Cuatto; Armijo, Morovati &Shields and Christina Y. Morovati for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 20STCV12977, Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Heidari Law Group, Saman Ryan Heidari and Giorgio Cassandra for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Horvitz &Levy, Karen M. Bray, Emily V. Cuatto; Armijo, Morovati &Shields and Christina Y. Morovati for Defendants and Respondents.
STONE, J.
INTRODUCTION
While driving a truck in the course of his employment, David Beliakoff had a seizure and crashed into Marlon Mora's car. Mora sued Beliakoff and his employer Haul Away Rubbish Service, Co. (collectively, Defendants) for negligence. Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment, claiming they could not be held liable for negligence because Beliakoff suffered "sudden incapacitation" from a seizure secondary to his diagnosis of multiple sclerosis (MS). Given the evidence of Beliakoff's medical history and symptoms prior to the accident, we conclude there are material factual disputes as to whether a reasonably prudent person in Beliakoff's position would have foreseen he could become physically incapacitated and unable to control the truck. Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Accident
On March 13, 2019, Beliakoff was driving a truck westbound on 7th Street in Los Angeles. He worked as a scout driver for Haul Away, a family business owned by his father and uncles. Beliakoff lost consciousness, side swiped another car, and hit Mora's car head on. Mora's car spun out and hit defendant Oscar Garcia's car. Garcia had been going the wrong way on 7th Street.
2. Mora's Complaint
In April 2020, Mora filed a lawsuit with one cause of action for negligence. In addition to Beliakoff, Haul Away, and Garcia, Mora sued Un Bug Me Pest Control, Inc. and its employee, Juan Juarez, who Mora claimed was involved in the accident.
3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Evidence
A. Summary judgment motion
Beliakoff and Haul Away moved for summary judgment, contending Beliakoff suffered a "sudden and unforeseen physical illness"-a seizure-while driving, and therefore was not liable for negligence. Defendants argued the same analysis applied to Haul Away as Beliakoff's employer, whom they correctly contend could only be held vicariously liable if Beliakoff was negligent.
Garcia, Un Bug Me Pest Control, and Juarez did not join Beliakoff and Haul Away's motion for summary judgment and are not parties to this appeal.
See Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1159 ("No matter how negligent an employer was in entrusting a vehicle to an employee . . . it is only if the employee then drove negligently that the employer can be liable for negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention.").
Defendants claimed that before the accident, Beliakoff "had no inkling or warning that a seizure or loss of consciousness was imminent," had never been told by a doctor or anyone else that he was at risk of a seizure or could not drive a car, and had never experienced symptoms he recognized as a seizure. Defendants conceded Beliakoff was diagnosed with MS in February 2018, but they proffered evidence that seizures are an extremely rare side effect of MS and that MS patients are not routinely placed on anti-seizure medication or told not to drive. Although they acknowledged Beliakoff had experienced numbness in his lower extremities making it difficult to walk, they proffered a medical opinion that such numbness was not a precursor to a seizure.
B. Evidence in support of defendants' motion
1. Florin Declaration
Defendants submitted a declaration from board-certified neurologist Jack H. Florin, M.D. Florin is certified by the Consortium of Multiple Sclerosis Centers as an MS specialist.
Florin first treated Beliakoff in March 2019, soon after the accident, when Beliakoff was 20 years old. Florin diagnosed Beliakoff with "relapsing [MS]," and he saw Beliakoff again on May 9, 2019 and August 6, 2019 for evaluation and treatment. Based on the imaging and medical records from Beliakoff's prior treating facilities, as well as an oral history provided by Beliakoff and his family, Florin opined Beliakoff's loss of consciousness during the accident "was caused by a seizure, secondary to a diagnosis of [MS]." Florin stated only 3 percent of diagnosed MS patients experience seizures as a symptom of MS. Accordingly, MS patients "are not routinely placed on anti-seizure medication, and it is not the standard of care to routinely eliminate driving" when a patient is diagnosed with MS.
Florin also described Beliakoff's past symptoms and treatment. Florin stated that in 2018, Beliakoff's legs went numb, and he had trouble walking for three days. Florin explained that "[n]umbness of the legs and difficulty walking are not a precursor or a warning sign of a possible seizure, as numbness of the legs is usually localized to the spinal cord and seizures are generated from the brain, not the spinal cord." After he had these symptoms in 2018, Beliakoff went to the doctor. An MRI of his cervical spine in February 2018 showed "abnormal findings" and "confirm[ed] the impression" that Beliakoff's numbness "originated from the spinal cord and not the brain."
An MRI of Beliakoff's brain from February 2018 "revealed findings consistent with a diagnosis of [MS]."
Florin recounted that after Beliakoff was diagnosed in 2018, Beliakoff declined to treat his MS with injectable disease modifying therapies (DMTs), which "may have reduced Mr. Beliakoff's risk of experiencing numbness of the lower extremities but would not have prevented a seizure." Florin opined that Beliakoff's decision against injectable DMTs was not a "substantial factor" in causing Beliakoff's seizure. He also stated that prior to the accident, "Beliakoff had no actual or constructive notice that he could have a seizure as a result of his diagnosis of [MS]."
2. Beliakoff Deposition Excerpts and Declaration
Beliakoff testified in a deposition that on the day of the accident, he did not feel anything was wrong with his health. He stated he felt slightly dizzy and realized something was wrong "probably two seconds" before the accident. The next thing Beliakoff remembered was waking up in an ambulance.
In a declaration, Beliakoff stated, "Prior to the Subject Incident, I had never been informed by any medical professional or any other individual that I was at risk of having a seizure" or "that I should not or could not drive a motor vehicle." Beliakoff stated he had never experienced any symptoms he recognized as a seizure and had never been told by any medical professional that he had experienced a seizure. He also stated that immediately prior to experiencing the seizure while driving, he had "no inkling or warning" that he was "about to have a seizure and/or lose consciousness."
3. Declaration from Beliakoff's Father
Defendants also submitted a declaration from Beliakoff's father, the co-owner and vice president of Haul Away and Beliakoff's supervisor. His father stated, "Haul-Away had never been informed by any medical professional or any other individual that Defendant Beliakoff was at risk of having a seizure . . . or could not drive a motor vehicle."
Beliakoff's father's declaration was not included as part of the record on appeal. On our own motion, however, we augmented the record to include the declaration, and requested and received the declaration from the superior court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A); Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1261, fn. 5.)
4. Mora's Opposition and Supporting Evidence
A. Opposition
In opposition to Defendants' motion, Mora contended there were triable issues of material fact as to whether Beliakoff "had no reason to anticipate or foresee the alleged condition that created the purported medical emergency which contributed to [his] negligence in causing the subject motor vehicle accident." Mora pointed to evidence that Beliakoff experienced intermittent dizziness and numbness of his lower extremities in the days before the accident. To dispute Beliakoff's contention that he had not experienced symptoms that he recognized as a seizure and had not been informed by anyone that he had experienced a seizure, Mora contended the evidence showed Beliakoff had experienced seizure-like symptoms multiple times, but Beliakoff "consciously chose not to see a physician or undergo any form of treatment" despite these events. Mora contended the issue of foreseeability was typically a jury question, and here the issue was indeed disputed.
B. Mora's supporting evidence
1. Florin Neurological Re-Evaluation and
Mora chiefly relied on Florin's "Neurological Re-evaluation" reports and accompanying notes and medical history for Beliakoff. Florin reported that Beliakoff first experienced symptoms when he was eight years old. His symptoms were "right arm numbness, gait ataxia, and dysarthria." Beliakoff had trouble seeing the board at school, focusing, and finishing tasks, and had some headaches, which he described as "burning my head inside." The treating physician determined a diagnosis of MS could not be confirmed because Beliakoff had suffered only one episode, and thus he diagnosed Beliakoff with "clinically isolated syndrome." The MRI of Beliakoff's brain from this time showed "multiple hyperintensities in the white matter" and "enhancing lesions." He was treated with intravenous steroids, and his symptoms resolved over three months.
Beliakoff then "did well for many years with no recognized symptoms," until he relapsed 10 years later in early 2018. At that time, he experienced numbness of his legs and difficulty walking for a three-day period. An MRI of his brain in February 2018 "showed multiple enhancing lesions in the brain and one in the cervical spine." Beliakoff was then diagnosed with MS and "advised to start on an injectable [DMT]," but Beliakoff "chose not to treat." Beliakoff had not had a "recognized relapse" since then, but "had some mild cognitive impairment over the years and moderate fatigue." Beliakoff was "otherwise healthy," and he ran several miles a day, played basketball weekly, and rode a skateboard.
Florin's physician assistant noted that "1-2 days prior to the motor vehicle accident, the patient recalls intermittent dizziness and numbness of the lower extremities." On the day of the collision, March 13, 2019, Beliakoff reported experiencing a "brief moment of dizziness" before the accident and then losing consciousness. He was amnesic until in the hospital.
Florin began treating Beliakoff's relapsing MS, including with DMTs and oral medication. Florin noted Beliakoff's brain MRI from after the accident "showed extensive white matter lesions consistent with MS." Florin's notes from March 2019 stated, "Because of recent episode of loss of consciousness need routine EEG. It is possible for MS to cause seizures. He is not to drive for now."
Florin's notes document an episode after the accident, on May 8, 2019, in which Beliakoff's father left Beliakoff in the car and returned to find him" 'non-responsive' and drooling." Beliakoff had several similar episodes for the remainder of the day. Beliakoff's mother reported that while he was sleeping, he was "grunting, snoring and drooling" and was "incontinent of urine 4 times." "At one point he fell out of bed and his mother found him sitting by the bed with a blank stare." His mother called Florin's office and was instructed to take Beliakoff to the emergency room for "probable status seizure." Florin noted that before this episode, Beliakoff "did miss doses of [his anti-seizure medication] over the weekend."
Florin recounted that Beliakoff's mother "says he has had episodes similar to this in the past, frequency unknown, and she always assumed it was because of extreme exhaustion." She stated during the past episodes, Beliakoff had been" 'non-responsive' during sleep and his parents have been unable to wake him." Florin's notes do not state when Beliakoff had these episodes.
2. Beliakoff's Deposition Testimony
Beliakoff testified that he had never seen a neurologist prior to the accident. Further, between the ages of 16 and 20 (when the accident occurred), he had not seen a primary care doctor.
5. The Summary Judgment Ruling
The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment following a hearing. The court credited Florin's opinion that it was not within the standard of care to eliminate driving for a patient with MS because seizures only affect 3 percent of diagnosed MS patients, and MS patients are not routinely placed on anti-seizure medication. The court noted that although Beliakoff felt numbness in his legs, "an MRI confirmed that the numbness originated from the spinal cord and not the brain where seizures are generated." The court noted that the injectable DMTs, which Beliakoff had been prescribed but declined, "would not have prevented the seizure." The court cited Beliakoff's assertion that he had never been told he was at risk for a seizure, had never experienced symptoms he recognized as a seizure, and did not feel anything was wrong with his health on the date of the accident.
The court determined Defendants had submitted evidence "that the cause of the subject collision was defendant Beliakoff suddenly suffering a seizure and that Beliakoff had no reason to anticipate that he was at risk of a seizure." Accordingly, the court found Defendants had met their initial burden on summary judgment.
The court concluded Mora failed to meet his burden "to demonstrate a triable issue concerning whether defendant Beliakoff had reason to anticipate that he was at risk of a seizure." The court noted Mora relied on Beliakoff's (1) symptoms of intermittent dizziness and leg numbness in the days before the accident, (2) diagnosis of clinically isolated syndrome at age eight, and (3) choice not to receive DMT treatment in 2018.
Regarding the numbness, the court noted, "Florin declares that the numbness originated from the spinal cord, not the brain where seizures are generated.... [Mora] submits no evidence, including the declaration of a medical professional or otherwise, to dispute Dr. Florin's assertion." As to Beliakoff's admission that he had been experiencing dizziness, the court stated Mora did not submit any evidence "indicating that such dizziness was a sign of a seizure or would otherwise have reasonably put Beliakoff on notice." Regarding the decision not to obtain treatment earlier, the court stated Florin "declare[d] that the medications that Beliakoff declined would not have prevented the seizure that Beliakoff experienced prior to the subject collision.... [Mora] submits no evidence to the contrary." The court therefore found Mora failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact concerning Beliakoff's sudden incapacitation.
The court also denied Mora's request for a continuance in order to depose Florin. Given our decision to reverse, we need not reach Mora's contention that the trial court erred in denying the continuance request.
DISCUSSION
Mora contends the trial court erred in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment because there are genuine disputes of fact as to whether Beliakoff's physical incapacitation was foreseeable. We agree. Defendants failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Beliakoff could not have reasonably foreseen that he could experience a medical emergency that would affect his ability to safely operate the company truck.
1. Applicable Law
A. Summary judgment standard and standard of review
"Summary judgment is appropriate only 'where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c) &(f).) We review a ruling on summary judgment de novo. (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 39.) In so doing, we" 'liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.'" (Ibid.)
A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of presenting evidence that a cause of action lacks merit because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the cause of action or there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) If the defendant satisfies this initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at p. 850.) "In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
B. Negligence standard
"To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show that the 'defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.'" (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213.) Under general negligence principles and Civil Code section 1714, a person ordinarily is obligated to exercise due care, or ordinary care, in their own actions so as not to create an unreasonable risk of injury to others. (Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 716.)
While the existence of a legal duty to use reasonable care in a particular factual situation is a question of law for the court to decide, "the elements of breach of that duty and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury's determination." (McGarry v. Sax (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 983, 994.)" 'What is ordinary care depends upon the circumstances of each particular case and is to be determined as a fact with reference to the situation and knowledge of the parties.'" (J.H. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 123, 140 (J.H.).)
Proximate cause" '" 'exists if the actor's conduct is a "substantial factor" in bringing about the harm and there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability.'" '" (Lombardo v. Huysentruyt (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 656, 665-666.)"' "The doctrine of proximate cause limits liability; i.e., in certain situations where the defendant's conduct is an actual cause of the harm, he will nevertheless be absolved because of the manner in which the injury occurred. Thus, where there is an independent intervening act which is not reasonably foreseeable, the defendant's conduct is not deemed the 'legal' or proximate cause." '" (Ibid.; see also Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 411 ["an intervening act does not amount to a 'superseding cause' relieving the negligent defendant of liability [citation] if it was reasonably foreseeable"].)
C. The sudden incapacitation doctrine
Every driver owes a duty "to use reasonable and ordinary care to prevent increasing the danger of injury to a passenger, or others, from operating or maintaining the automobile." (Twohig v. Briner (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1106.) However," 'one who is suddenly stricken by an illness, which he had no reason to anticipate, while driving an automobile, which renders it impossible for him to control the car, is not chargeable with negligence.'" (Waters v. Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 789, 792 [quoting Cohen v. Petty (D.C. Cir. 1933) 65 F.2d 820, 821]; see Hammontree v. Jenner (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 528, 530-532 [upholding jury verdict for defense where defendant became unconscious during an epileptic seizure and lost control of his car; although the driver had a medical history of epilepsy, he had controlled his condition for 12 years through medication and "had no inkling or warning that he was about to have a seizure prior to the occurrence of the accident"]; Ford v. Carew &English (1948) 89 Cal.App.2d 199, 203 [jury verdict in favor of defendant driver upheld where substantial evidence supported the jury's implied finding that the driver's sudden loss of consciousness, caused by strained heart muscles, was unanticipated]; Bashi v. Wodarz (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1318-1320 [declining to expand sudden incapacitation doctrine to incapacity caused by mental as opposed to physical illness].) In other words, a driver cannot be held liable for negligence if the driver could not reasonably foresee that he or she might become physically incapacitated and thus lose control of the vehicle.
The key inquiry here is whether triable issues remain as to whether Beliakoff should have foreseen that he could become physically incapacitated while driving the truck. This determination "depends on what information was available to the actor indicating that at some uncertain point in the future the actor might suffer an instance of incapacitation while engaging in a potentially dangerous activity such as driving." (Rest.3d Torts, Disability: Phys. &Emot. Harm (2010) § 11, com. (d); see J.H., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 140 [" 'Foreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances and does not require prior identical events or injuries.' "].) Where the driver had some known or suspected health issues, "[e]vidence bearing on reasonable foreseeability includes: the number and frequency of episodes of incapacitation in the past; the circumstances of those episodes, insofar as those circumstances bear on the likelihood of a recurrence; the extent to which medical treatment the actor is receiving can be expected to control the underlying medical problem; and whatever advice the actor's physician has provided." (Rest.3d Torts, Disability: Phys. &Emot. Harm, supra, § 11, com. (d).) "If the defendant's health was such that a reasonably prudent man would not risk driving a car, then the defendant is negligent by merely undertaking the task of driving, regardless of subsequent events [i.e., loss of consciousness or other physical incapacitation]. If, on the other hand, a person is not negligent in choosing to drive his car, then he is not negligent when he loses control of that car due to a heart attack [or other sudden incapacitation]." (Goodrich v. Blair (1982) 132 Ariz. 459, 461.)
The fact-intensive determination whether a driver reasonably should have foreseen that he or she might suddenly become incapacitated and lose control of a vehicle is ordinarily a jury question. (Rest.3d Torts, Disability: Phys. & Emot. Harm, supra, § 11, com. (d) [noting foreseeability of sudden incapacitation is "commonly a question to be decided by the jury"]; see Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. &Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49, 56 ["Ordinarily, foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury."].) A court may decide the issue of foreseeability on summary judgment only if "under the undisputed facts there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion." (Kumaraperu v. Feldsted (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 60, 69.)
2. There Are Genuine Disputes About Whether Beliakoff's Incapacitation Was Foreseeable
Defendants have failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Beliakoff had no reason to anticipate that he could suffer an incapacitating medical event while driving. (Bashi v. Wodarz, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1319.)
First, although Beliakoff testified that he felt fine on the day of the accident and did not feel anything was wrong with his health, he admitted to his treatment team that "1-2 days prior" to the accident, he experienced "intermittent dizziness and numbness of the lower extremities." Approximately one year earlier, Beliakoff had suffered numbness of the legs and difficulty walking, and he was advised these were symptoms of his MS. Nevertheless, he had declined the prescribed course of treatment that could have ameliorated his leg numbness, and he had not sought any further treatment from a neurologist or primary care physician.
Defendants suggest that the symptoms of leg numbness and dizziness that Beliakoff experienced in the days leading up to the collision are irrelevant because they did not medically correspond to the seizure that ultimately caused him to lose control of the company truck.
With respect to the symptom of numbness, Defendants point to Florin's testimony that the numbness of Beliakoff's lower extremities did not correlate to a seizure. Florin explained: "Numbness of the legs and difficulty walking are not a precursor or a warning sign of a possible seizure, as numbness of the legs is usually localized to the spinal cord and seizures are generated from the brain, not the spinal cord." Further, Florin stated the injectable DMTs Beliakoff declined in 2018 "may have reduced Mr. Beliakoff's risk of experiencing numbness of the lower extremities but would not have prevented a seizure."
Defendants narrowly focus on whether Beliakoff reasonably should have foreseen that he could have a seizure while driving. However, it was sufficient if Beliakoff should have anticipated that he could suffer some physical incapacitation that would affect his ability to control the truck. Based on Beliakoff's trouble walking in 2018 due to the numbness in his lower extremities, a reasonable juror could infer that such numbness could affect Beliakoff's ability to control a vehicle. Thus, a juror could conclude that when Beliakoff experienced numbness in his legs in the days before the accident, he was on notice that he was at risk of suffering a medical event while driving that could affect his ability to safely operate a vehicle. (See Goodrich v. Blair, supra, 132 Ariz. at p. 461 ["If the defendant's health was such that a reasonably prudent man would not risk driving a car, then the defendant is negligent by merely undertaking the task of driving, regardless of subsequent events"].) The test is not whether the exact medical event that transpired - here, a seizure - was foreseeable.
As for the dizziness Beliakoff was experiencing in the days before the accident and just prior to losing consciousness while driving, Florin did not address this symptom at all in his declaration, and Defendants did not otherwise submit evidence as to the significance (or lack thereof) of this symptom. Defendants failed to carry their burden of presenting evidence that Beliakoff's dizzy spells did not put him on notice that he could become physically incapacitated while driving. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Rosenblum v. Safeco Ins. Co. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 847, 856 ["The moving party bears the burden of establishing, by declarations and evidence, a complete defense to plaintiff's action or the absence of an essential element of plaintiff's case."].)
Even if we were to accept Defendants' construct that it had to be reasonably foreseeable that Beliakoff could have a seizure, summary judgment still would not be appropriate. Although Beliakoff stated he had never experienced symptoms he recognized as a seizure, there was evidence from which a juror could reasonably infer that Beliakoff had knowledge that he previously experienced seizure-like events. After the accident, Beliakoff had episodes in which he was found non-responsive, drooling, and incontinent, and had fallen out of bed and was sitting on the ground with a "blank stare." While that evidence post-dated the accident, Beliakoff's mother reported he had "episodes similar to this in the past as well, frequency unknown," in which he had been" 'non-responsive' during sleep and his parents have been unable to wake him." Although the evidence is vague as to when these prior events occurred, we must resolve any ambiguities in favor of Beliakoff, as the non-moving party. (Gonzalez v. Mathis, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 39.) We thus assume for purposes of this motion that the episodes were not remote in time from the accident. A reasonable juror could infer that Beliakoff's mother would have informed her son that she had found him in a non-responsive state on multiple occasions.
Defendants presented no evidence that Beliakoff relayed to a medical professional that he had experienced these episodes or that he sought treatment or advice on the associated risks. Particularly given that Beliakoff drove a truck for a living, a reasonable juror could conclude he should have sought medical attention for seizure-like symptoms prior to the accident, even if no medical professional had ever specifically advised him that he was at risk of seizures due to his MS, and even if he did not know that the episodes he was experiencing were called "seizures." A rational juror could find that Beliakoff should have foreseen that a seizure-like episode could occur while he was driving the truck.
We conclude there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Beliakoff had reason to anticipate that he could become physically incapacitated while driving. As such, the court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
We in no way suggest that Beliakoff's MS diagnosis alone made his sudden incapacitation while driving foreseeable. Florin indicated that seizures are a rare MS symptom, and it is not the standard of care to routinely eliminate driving when a patient is diagnosed with MS. Moreover, it appears the likelihood of seizures may be controlled by medication in many cases. Similarly, it appears numbness of the extremities may also be controlled by medication. The jury question that remains in this case is whether Beliakoff had been experiencing particular symptoms that would have led a reasonably prudent person in his situation to avoid driving the company truck on March 13, 2019, absent having sought medical attention.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate its order granting the motion for summary judgment and enter a new order denying the motion. Mora is entitled to recover his costs on appeal.
We concur: MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J.