Moores v. City of Newburgh School District

11 Citing cases

  1. Whitfield v. Board of Education of the City of Mount Vernon

    14 A.D.3d 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that claim for failure to provide adequate supervision requires showing that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of dangerous conduct which caused injury

    We agree with the Supreme Court that the Board was entitled to summary judgment. In opposition to the Board's establishment of a prima facie case for judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the Board had actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct on the part of the kindergarten student in question ( see Williams v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Mount Vernon, 277 AD2d 373; Kennedy v. Seaford Union Free School Dist. No. 6, 250 AD2d 574; Moores v. City of Newburgh School Dist., 237 AD2d 265). The plaintiffs' remaining contention is without merit.

  2. Siegell v. Herricks Union Free School Dist

    7 A.D.3d 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 67 times
    In Siegell v Herricks Union Free School Dist. (7 AD3d 607 [2d Dept 2004]), one student pushed another during a frisbee relay race.

    In this case, the plaintiff's injuries were caused by a "spontaneous and unforeseeable act committed by a fellow * * * student" ( Sangineto v. Mamaroneck Union Free School Dist., 282 A.D.2d 596; see Capotosto v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., supra; Wuest v. Board of Educ. of Middle Country Cent. School Dist., 298 A.D.2d 578; Shabot v. East Ramapo School Dist., 269 A.D.2d 587). Further, Moshe Pergament's prior disciplinary problems were insufficient to place the District on notice that he would intentionally run into or push the plaintiff into a wall during a frisbee relay race ( see Calabrese v. Baldwin Union Free School Dist., 294 A.D.2d 388; O'Neal v. Archdioceses of N.Y., 286 A.D.2d 757; Kennedy v. Seaford Union Free School Dist. No 6, 250 A.D.2d 574; Moores v. City of Newburgh School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 265). Therefore, the District was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claim insofar as asserted against it ( see Tanon v. Eppler, A.D.3d [2d Dept, Mar. 22, 2004]; Calabrese v. Baldwin Union Free School Dist., supra).

  3. Calabrese v. Baldwin Union Free School

    294 A.D.2d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 11 times

    A plaintiff must also establish that the alleged breach of the duty to provide adequate supervision was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained (see Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d at 50). We agree with the Supreme Court that the District established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment and that none of the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs raised an issue of fact as to whether the District had actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct on the part of Schneider (see O'Neal v. Archdioceses of N.Y., 286 A.D.2d 757; Convey v. City of Rye School Dist., 271 A.D.2d 154; Kennedy v. Seaford Union Free School Dist. No. 6, 250 A.D.2d 574; Moores v. City of Newburgh School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 265). Accordingly, the District was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it. FLORIO, J.P., O'BRIEN, McGINITY and H. MILLER, JJ., concur.

  4. O'Neal v. Archdioceses of New York

    286 A.D.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 16 times

    Prior conduct of the assailing student, however, need not have been directed against the plaintiff. Predicate acts of violence against any students may suffice (see, Moores v. City of Newburgh School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 265; cf., Convey v. City of Rye School Dist., 271 A.D.2d 154, 159-160). The record is replete with information about William Cook, the assailant who broke the infant plaintiff's jaw in the instant case. From the examinations before trial presented by the moving defendants there emerge ample facts to destroy their prima facie case on the issue of notice.

  5. Hernandez v. Christopher Robin Academy

    276 A.D.2d 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 16 times

    ss act by which one pupil may injure another" (Lawes v. Board of Educ., 16 N.Y.2d 302, 306). "In determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated" (Mirand v. City of New York, supra, at 49). The defendant sustained its burden of establishing that it had no actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct by the 10th-grader who pushed the plaintiff, and that it could not have reasonably foreseen that the 10th-grader would try to break up a fight between fifth-graders by pushing the plaintiff to the ground (see, Gibiser v. LaSalle Ctr., 258 A.D.2d 439; Kennedy v. Seaford Union Free School Dist. No. 6, 250 A.D.2d 574; Danna v. Sewanhaka Cent. High School Dist., 242 A.D.2d 361; Moores v. City of Newburgh School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 265). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the supervising teacher had "notice of a particular danger at a particular time" (Lawes v. Board of Educ., supra). Under these circumstances, the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted.

  6. Checchia v. Port Washington U.F.S.D

    253 A.D.2d 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 4 times

    The infant plaintiff was allegedly injured when another student collided with her during a basketball game. The injury resulted from a spontaneous and unforeseeable act committed by a fellow student, which, under the circumstances, could not have been anticipated in the reasonable exercise of the school's legal duty to the infant plaintiff ( see, Illa v. St. Brigid's School, 245 A.D.2d 487; Broad v. Patico Corp., 243 A.D.2d 434; Danna v. Sewanhaka Cent. High School Dist., 242 A.D.2d 361; Moores v. City of Newburgh School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 265; Ceglia v. Portledge School, 187 A.D.2d 550; Hauser v. North Rockland Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 166 A.D.2d 553). The plaintiffs failed to raise any issue of fact requiring a trial after the defendant had demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

  7. Johnsen v. Cold Spring Hbr. Cen. Sch. Dist

    251 A.D.2d 548 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 7 times

    We find that the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of any issue of fact regarding the School District which would require a trial. "Schools * * * cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students [and] are not to be held liable `for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another'" (Mirand v. City of New York, supra. at 49, quoting Lawes v. Board of Educ., 16 N.Y.2d 302, 306; see also, Borelli v. Blind Brook Unified School Dist., 244 A.D.2d 305; Moores v. City of Newburgh School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 265). Bracken, J. P., Altman, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.

  8. Illa v. St. Brigid's School

    245 A.D.2d 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    The record establishes that the infant plaintiff was injured as the result of a spontaneous and unforeseeable act committed by a fellow student. The alleged inadequacy of the supervision furnished by the defendant's employees cannot, under these and all the other circumstances presented, be considered a cause of the injuries suffered by the infant plaintiff ( see generally, Broad v. Patico Corp., 243 A.D.2d 434; Danna v. Sewanhaka Cent. High School Dist., 242 A.D.2d 361; Walsh v. City School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 811; Moores v. City of Newburgh School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 265; Ceglia v. Portledge School, 187 A.D.2d 550; Hauser v. North Rockland Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 166 A.D.2d 553). The plaintiffs failed to raise any issue of fact requiring a trial after the defendant had demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The defendant's motion should therefore be granted.

  9. Borelli v. Blind Brook Unified School Dist

    244 A.D.2d 305 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    The injured plaintiff and her husband commenced the instant action, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant was negligent in its supervision of the students. "Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision * * * Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students; therefore, schools are not to be held liable `for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another [person]'" (Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49). Under the facts presented, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint "because no triable issue of fact was presented as to the school's liability for this spontaneous and unanticipated act" (Ceglia v. Portledge School, 187 A.D.2d 550; see, Moores v. City of Newburgh School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 265; Hauser v North Rockland Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 166 A.D.2d 553). Mangano, P. J., Copertino, Joy, Florio and Luciano, JJ., concur.

  10. Danna v. Sewanhaka

    242 A.D.2d 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 26 times

    ird-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated" ( Mirand v. City of New York, supra, at 49). Here, in support of its motion for summary judgment, the appellant submitted the examination before trial testimony of the two girls involved in the fight, which revealed that neither had previously been involved in a fight or disciplined for fighting. Furthermore, the only prior dispute between the girls consisted of a brief verbal exchange in a home economics class at least one month prior to the subject incident, which the infant plaintiff did not report. Under these circumstances, the appellant sustained its burden of establishing that it had no actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct by the student who struck the infant plaintiff, and that it could not have reasonably foreseen that this student, who was not a member of the infant plaintiff's music class, would enter the music classroom while the teacher was absent, and engage in behavior precipitating a fight ( see, Moores v. City of Newburgh School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 265; McLoughlin v. Holy Cross High School, 135 A.D.2d 513). Furthermore, the undisputed evidence that the infant plaintiff voluntarily entered into the fight and struck the first blow precludes her from recovering for negligent supervision since her own conduct was a direct cause of the incident ( see, Ruggerio v. Board of Educ., 31 A.D.2d 884, affd 26 N.Y.2d 849; see also, DeMunda v. Niagara Wheatfield Bd. of Educ., 213 A.D.2d 975; Borelli v. Board of Educ., 156 A.D.2d 903). Thompson, J.P., Pizzuto, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.