Moore v. Vincent

11 Citing cases

  1. State v. McMaster

    259 Or. 291 (Or. 1971)   Cited 75 times
    Rejecting a vagueness claim to the Oregon statute for termination of parental rights

    "Civil as well as criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear as to give a fair warning of the conduct prohibited, and they must provide a standard or guide against which conduct can be uniformly judged by courts and administrative agencies." Among other cases holding other statutes or opinions to be invalid for vagueness, however, see Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 72 S Ct 1002, 96 L ed 1359 (1952), holding invalid an ordinance authorizing denial of a license for the showing of a motion picture deemed to be "of such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people of said city"; Moore v. Vincent, 174 Okla. 339, 50 P.2d 388 (1935), and State ex rel Spriggs v. Robinson, 253 Mo 271, 161 S.W. 1169 (1913), both holding statutes invalid which authorized revocation of professional licenses for "unprofessional conduct." See also Cline v. Frink Dairy, 274 U.S. 445, 463, 47 S Ct 681, 71 L ed 1146 (1927); and A.B. Small Company v. American Sugar Refining Company, 267 U.S. 233, 239, 45 S Ct 295, 69 L ed 589 (1925).

  2. Morrison v. State Board of Education

    1 Cal.3d 214 (Cal. 1969)   Cited 267 times
    Holding that the Board of Education could not characterize the petitioner's conduct as immoral or unprofessional and revoke his teaching certificate unless the conduct indicated he was unfit to teach

    See Report of the Subcommittee on Personnel Problems of the Assembly Interim Committee on Education, Appendix to the Journal of the Assembly (1965) vol. 2, pp. 25-26. Prohibitions against "unprofessional conduct" by licensees have been struck down as void for vagueness in at least four states. Moore v. Vincent (1935) 174 Okla. 339 [ 50 P.2d 388] (embalmers); State v. Robinson (1913) 253 Mo. 271 [161 S.W. 1169, 1174] ("Our learned Attorney General earnestly insists that it was impossible for the General Assembly to designate the numerous acts and things which would constitute 'dishonorable and unprofessional conduct'. . . . We are . . . unwilling to believe that the physicians of our state . . . are guilty of such a multiplicity of wrongful acts that their conduct may not safely be regulated by a single legislative enactment.") Czarra v. Board ofMedical Supervisors (1905) 25 App. D.C. 443 (physicians); Matthews v. Murphy (1901) 23 Ky. L.R. 750 [63 S.W. 785] (physicians).

  3. Protective Health Serv. v. Vaughn

    2009 OK 61 (Okla. 2009)   Cited 26 times

    ¶ 10 This Court has consistently acknowledged: "Where it is necessary to procure a license in order to carry on a chosen profession or business, the power to revoke a license, once granted, and thus destroy in a measure the means of a livelihood, is penal and therefore should be strictly construed." State ex rel. Okla. State Bd. of Embalmers and Funeral Dirs. v. Guardian Funeral Home, 1967 OK 141, ¶ 19, 429 P.2d 732, 736 (quoting Moore v. Vincent, 1935 OK 763, ¶ 8, 174 Okla. 339, 50 P.2d 388, 389). The loss of a license which is required to work in a given field negatively impacts both a person's livelihood and reputation. Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered Dentists, 1996 OK 41, ¶ 19, 913 P.2d 1339, 1345.

  4. Vann v. Dist. of Col. Bd. of Funeral Directors

    480 A.2d 688 (D.C. 1984)   Cited 5 times

    2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.17-47.18 (4th ed. 1973); see Moore v. Vincent, 174 Okla. 339, 50 P.2d 388 (1935). See also Vann v. District of Columbia Board of Funeral Directors Embalmers, supra, 441 A.2d at 251-252.

  5. State ex Rel. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam. v. Myers

    1969 OK 184 (Okla. 1970)   Cited 2 times
    Governing board revoked practitioner's Oklahoma license for misrepresentation in practitioner's application to Alabama governing board; on review, District Court found Oklahoma board decision unsupported by evidence; in affirming the Trial Court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that board "arbitrarily attempted to go behind Alabama law," and held board's "action revoking [applicant's Oklahoma] license, without regard for the fact the [applicant's] Alabama license was effective and not subject to revocation," to be arbitrary and capricious.

    Where the law requires procurement of a license in order to carry on a chosen business or profession, the power to revoke that license when once granted, and thereby destroy the licensee's means of livelihood is penal, and must be strictly construed. Moore v. Vincent, 174 Okla. 339, 50 P.2d 388, and authorities cited. In Boyle v. Rock Island Coal Mining Co., 125 Okla. 137, 256 P. 883, "arbitrariness" is defined as consisting of conduct or acts based upon one's will alone, and not upon any course of reasoning and exercise of judgment.

  6. Roberts v. State Bd. of Embalmers and Funeral Directors

    78 N.M. 536 (N.M. 1967)   Cited 10 times
    In Roberts v. State Board of Embalmers Funeral Dir., 434 P.2d 61 (N.M. 1967), that court said: "... It is a well-established rule that, where a statute authorizes the revocation of a license for certain named reasons, a license cannot be revoked upon grounds other than the reasons specified."

    See also, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304, 291 P.2d 607; Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755; Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724; Gilchrist v. Bierring, 234 Iowa 899, 14 N.W.2d 724. Concerning the revocation of this right to practice, the rule regarding its construction is that such legislation is highly penal in its nature and is to be strictly construed. Abrams v. Jones, supra; State ex rel. Johnson v. Clark, 288 Mo. 659, 232 S.W. 1031; State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson, 253 Mo. 271, 161 S.W. 1169; Moore v. Vincent, 174 Okla. 339, 50 P.2d 388. Accordingly, we are brought to the crucial issue of this case, whether or not an administrative agency, having once issued a license to an applicant who has made full disclosure of all pertinent facts, may revoke that same license for reasons that would not have permitted issuance of the license in the first instance.

  7. State v. Guardian Funeral Home

    1967 OK 141 (Okla. 1967)   Cited 24 times

    See Byas v. United States, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 309, 182 F.2d 94, 97, and Harwood v. Dysart Consol. School Dist., 237 Iowa 133, 21 N.W.2d 334, 336. In Moore v. Vincent, 174 Okla. 339, 50 P.2d 388, 389, it is stated: "Where it is necessary to procure a license in order to carry on a chosen profession or business, the power to revoke a license, once granted, and thus destroy in a measure the means of livelihood, is penal and therefore should be strictly construed.

  8. Hodge v. Stegall

    242 P.2d 720 (Okla. 1952)

    The statute directs the State Board of Education to promulgate rules and regulations governing the issuance and revocation of certificates. In Moore v. Vincent, 174 Okla. 339, 50 P.2d 388, this court held that the State Embalming Board, under the general power to revoke licenses, did not have the power to revoke such a license under its rules, except for specific acts specified in the rules. In the case at bar the power to revoke is specifically granted by the statute and also the power to make rules for such purpose.

  9. Meyer v. Jones

    219 P.2d 620 (Okla. 1950)   Cited 4 times

    To place his name on said ballot would constitute the exercise of power not authorized. Such a board can exercise only such power as is conferred upon it by law. On the points see: Moore v. Vincent et al., 174 Okla. 339, 50 P.2d 388; Yocham v. County Election Board, 198 Okla. 588, 180 P.2d 831. Writ denied.

  10. Rose v. Arnold

    183 Okla. 286 (Okla. 1938)   Cited 11 times
    In Rose, supra, the accusations were filed, withdrawn, and refiled prior to notice to defendants but jurisdiction was not wanting for that reason.

    her decisions of this court, in many cases where prohibition has been granted to arrest improper action, or orders, or their enforcement in trial courts constitute a complete answer to the contention of respondent here that a remedy by prohibition should not be granted to these petitioners. See Baker v. Carter, 180 Okla. 71, 68 P.2d 85: Payne v. Speakman, 96 Okla. 170, 221 P. 9; State v. District Court, 122 Okla 69, 250 P. 1023; Gilmer Oil Co. v. Ross. 178 Okla. 125, 62 P.2d 76; State ex rel. Tankersley v. District Court, 168 Okla. 426, 33 P.2d 632; Redcorn v. District Court, 141 Okla. 237, 284 P. 1113; Fleet v. Hooker, 178 Okla. 640, 63 P.2d 988; Frensley v. Frensley, 173 Okla. 321, 49 P.2d 731; Atchison, T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Love, 29 Okla. 738, 119 P. 207; Martin v. O'Reilly, 81 Okla. 261, 200 P. 687; Yarhola v. Duling, 86 Okla. 171, 207 P. 293; Davis v. District Court, 129 Okla. 236, 264 P. 176; State ex rel. Spigner v. Superior Court of Okmulgee County, 175 Okla. 632, 54 P.2d 317; Moore v. Vincent, 174 Okla. 339, 50 P.2d 388, and Colby v. Jacobs, 179 Okla. 170, 64 P.2d 881. See, also, these decisions from other jurisdictions, viz.: Burke v. Knox (Utah) 206 P. 711; Parker v. Morgan (Utah) 160 P. 764; Peters v. Buckner (Mo.) 17 A. L. R. 543, 232 S.W. 1024; State ex rel. McAllister v. Slate, Judge, (Mo.) 8 A. L. R. 1226. 214 S.W. 85; Edson v. Superior Court (Cal.App.) 277 P. 194, and Ferguson v. Superior Court (Cal.App.) 147 P. 603.