Moore v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Milner v. State

    329 Ga. App. 654 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 3 times

    See Singleton, 317 Ga.App. at 638, 732 S.E.2d 312. Finally, we have previously found that delays of similar length may be weighed against the State, but not heavily. See generally Moore v. State, 314 Ga.App. 219, 221(2)(a), 723 S.E.2d 508 (2012) (84–month delay not considered by trial court, but trial court should have “weighed it against the [S]tate”). This ad hoc approach confirms that a trial court's discretion is substantial and that a bright-line rule tied solely to the length of the delay, similar to what Milner appears to propose, runs contrary to the Barker analysis. It follows that Milner has failed to demonstrate an abuse of the trial court's substantial discretion on this factor.

  2. Richardson v. State

    318 Ga. App. 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 8 times

    Significantly, if the trial court enters a new order denying a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, the length of the pretrial delay runs to the entry of the new order rather than the original order, where an appellate court vacated the original order and remanded for the entry of a new order expressly applying the Barker–Doggett framework. See Goddard v. State, 315 Ga.App. 868, 870–871(1), 729 S.E.2d 397 (2012); Moore v. State, 314 Ga.App. 219, 221(1), 723 S.E.2d 508 (2012). The trial court thus erred in failing to calculate the length of the pretrial delay from Richardson's January 20, 2007 arrest to the trial court's September 29, 2011 new order denying his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, which would have added approximately 13 months to the length of the delay.

  3. Taylor v. State

    338 Ga. App. 804 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Discussing those prior appeals

    And in numerous other cases, we have concluded that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by weighing a lengthy delay caused by the State's negligence lightly or benignly against the State. See Milner , supra, 329 Ga.App. at 658–659 (2) (b), 765 S.E.2d 790 (no abuse of discretion in weighing ten-year delay benignly against State); Moore v. State , 314 Ga.App. 219, 221–222 (2) (b), 723 S.E.2d 508 (2012) (no abuse of discretion in weighing benignly against State an 84–month delay caused by its negligence); Stewart , supra, 310 Ga.App. at 555–556 (2) (b), 713 S.E.2d 708 (2011) (trial court did not abuse discretion by failing to weigh heavily against the State a five-year delay largely attributable to the State's negligence).Based upon the unusual facts and circumstances of this case and, in particular, the necessity for sophisticated software to conduct a forensic examination of Taylor's computers and the necessity for five trial judges to recuse, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to weigh this factor heavily against the State.

  4. State v. Takyi

    322 Ga. App. 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 2 times

    The four factors to be considered in the case of presumptively prejudicial delay are (a) the length of the delay, (b) the reason for the delay, (c) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (d) the prejudice to the defendant.Moore v. State, 314 Ga.App. 219, 220–21, 723 S.E.2d 508 (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted.) See also State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 525–26(2), 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011); Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 55(2), 663 S.E.2d 189 (2008).

  5. State v. Curry

    317 Ga. App. 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 4 times

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Moore v. State, 314 Ga.App. 219, 220, 723 S.E.2d 508 (2012). Curry was first arrested for the July 2006 incident on November 30, 2006, and the ruling on the motion to dismiss was filed on September 2, 2011. Therefore, counting from Curry's November 2006 arrest, the total delay here is approximately 57 months, which is uncommonly long, and as such, is a factor to be weighed against the State.

  6. Goddard v. State

    315 Ga. App. 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 8 times
    Vacating and remanding with direction in light of trial court's unsupported factual findings and misapplication of Barker factors

    Thus, the relevant interval of delay here was the time that elapsed between Goddard's December 16, 1992, arrest and the trial court's September 7, 2011, denial of Goddard's plea in bar on constitutional speedy trial grounds. Cf. Moore v. State, 314 Ga.App. 219, 219–221, 723 S.E.2d 508 (2012) (calculating pretrial delay through date that trial court entered new order denying motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds instead of date on which the trial court entered original order denying the same, where this Court had vacated the original order and remanded the case for the entry of an order expressly applying the analysis contained in Barker ). Based on these relevant dates, the pretrial delay in this case has spanned nearly 19 years. We further note that the presumptive prejudice “inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case[; for] ... example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.”