In the prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly distinct, independent and separate from that for which he is on trial even though it be a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible unless there be some logical connection between the two from which it can be said that proof of one tends to establish the other. See Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 637 ( 146 S.E.2d 895); Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261 ( 71 S.E.2d 615); Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 75 ( 235 S.E.2d 515). Here the evidence established the defendant as the perpetrator of the independent crime. There was considerable similarity in the modus operandi as between the two even though generally the other crimes were performed with an accomplice, Ronnie Lewis. The totality of the evidence here was sufficient to show identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct.
He claims the medical examiner's testimony that blunt-force head trauma ultimately caused the victim's death had no probative value because the “sole basis” for the conclusion was hearsay—medical records compiled by other doctors. Appellant cites Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 146 S.E.2d 895 (1966), where this Court held that “ ‘[a]n [expert] opinion, based mainly upon representations out of court, can be no more competent testimony than the representations.’ ” Id. at 643, 146 S.E.2d 895 (citation omitted).
"An expert . . . may give an opinion based upon his own examination . . ., upon his observation . . ., or upon any state of facts, supported by some evidence in the case, which he assumes as true." Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 643 (5) ( 146 S.E.2d 895) (1966) (Emphasis supplied). "An opinion, based mainly on representations out of court, can be no more competent testimony than the representations.
But the expert must base his opinion on facts supported by evidence in the case; he cannot base his opinion on what he has heard in private conversations with others. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 643 ( 146 S.E.2d 895) (1966); Flanagan v. State, 106 Ga. 109, 110 ( 32 S.E. 80) (1899). See also Agnor's Ga. Evid. (2nd ed.), § 9-7. It follows that the officer's testimony was insufficient to establish a "pattern of criminal gang activity" as that term is defined in OCGA § 16-15-3 (2).
Likewise, questions which are not material to the issues in the case are properly excluded. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636 ( 146 S.E.2d 895) (1966). It is within the trial court's discretion to curtail argumentative questions or questions which misstate the witness's testimony.
3. Appellant assigns as error several instances wherein he contends the trial court erred in restricting the cross-examination of certain state's witnesses. Although each party has a right to a thorough cross-examination, the judge's discretion in controlling questioning during a trial will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636 ( 146 S.E.2d 895) (1966). Error is enumerated on the court's sustaining an objection when defense counsel was questioning a Kennesaw officer regarding items taken during a burglary of appellant's home some months before the shooting.
The requirements for such action as set forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 ( 87 S.C. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493) (1966), have been met here. Counsel suggests that the only possible issue for review is that raised by his objection to the introduction of evidence of the Florida crime. After carefully reviewing applicable law, the record, transcript of trial and the entire charge of court, we conclude there was no error. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636; 637 ( 146 S.E.2d 895) (1966); Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261 ( 71 S.E.2d 615) (1952). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Testimony relating to other crimes is admissible if such testimony aids in identification or shows the state of mind, plan, motive or scheme of the accused. Davis v. State, 233 Ga. 638, 639 (2) ( 212 S.E.2d 814) (1974); McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633 ( 187 S.E.2d 271) (1972); Atkins v. State, 236 Ga. 624, 625 ( 225 S.E.2d 7) (1976); Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 637 ( 146 S.E.2d 895) (1966); Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395 ( 46 S.E. 897) (1904). The trial court limited testimony concerning the incident to that portion involving the child (the court prohibited the district attorney from bringing out during the guilt-innocence phase that the defendant stabbed Mrs. Blake after she grabbed her son).
In the first enumeration of error we consider, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting over timely objection of defense counsel evidence of separate crimes allegedly committed by appellant. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 637 ( 146 S.E.2d 895) (1966) states the general rule that, "`On a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly distinct, independent, and separate from that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible, unless there be shown some logical connection between the two from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other.' Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261 ( 71 S.E.2d 615) (1952)." Thus, before evidence of independent crimes is admissible two conditions must be satisfied. First, there must be evidence that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime.
We have also examined Enumerations 9, 17, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 31 and find them to be without foundation in the record or matters within the sound discretion of the trial judge for which no abuse of his discretion is shown. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636 ( 146 S.E.2d 895) (1966); Gravitt v. State, 220 Ga. 781 ( 141 S.E.2d 893) (1965); Butler v. State, 226 Ga. 56 ( 172 S.E.2d 399) (1970); Tanner v. State, 228 Ga. 829 ( 188 S.E.2d 512) (1972); Davis v. State, 230 Ga. 902 ( 199 S.E.2d 779) (1973); Crowder v. State, 233 Ga. 789 ( 213 S.E.2d 620) (1975). 4.