No. 05-04-00983-CR
Opinion issued July 7, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 59th Judicial District Court, Grayson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 50866. Affirmed.
Before Justices MORRIS, LANG, and MAZZANT.
JOSEPH B. MORRIS, Justice.
At trial, a jury found Massey Lee Moore, III, guilty of failing to register as a sex offender. He now challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We conclude the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Factual Background
Appellant was required to register as a sex offender by chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because he had been convicted previously of sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault. On August 17, 1999, appellant registered as a sex offender living at his mother's residence at 319 North Lee in Sherman, Grayson County, Texas. Appellant changed his address to 700 East Frisco Road in Sherman, on November 18, 1999, and back to 319 North Lee on February 12, 2002. Between May 2002 and December 2002, Sherman Police Department Detective Terry Dunn, appellant's primary registration authority, was unable to locate appellant when he visited 319 North Lee. During 2002, appellant was enrolled at Grayson County College in Sherman. Appellant's Burger King employment application and W-2 form listed 319 North Lee as his address. Appellant's work supervisor, however, recalled appellant telling her that he had moved to McKinney and asking to have his W-2 form sent to his mother's address in Sherman. According to appellant's brother, appellant and appellant's girlfriend moved their personal belongings from Sherman to McKinney in 2002. The brother stated that he frequently transported appellant back and forth between McKinney and Sherman because appellant did not have a car. The mother of appellant's girlfriend testified that appellant often picked up the phone when she called her daughter's McKinney apartment. Appellant told his girlfriend's mother that he was living in McKinney with her daughter. Sherman Police Department Detective Larry Bell, who replaced Dunn as appellant's primary registration authority in January 2003, testified that he never saw appellant at 319 North Lee. Bell did not know appellant was living with a girlfriend in McKinney. McKinney Police Department Detective Ida Wei testified that she encountered appellant at the McKinney apartment on March 11, 2003, while accompanying a CPS investigator. Appellant admitted to her that he had been living with his girlfriend in McKinney since August 2002. According to Wei, appellant claimed that Detective Bell knew that he was located in McKinney and had permission to be living there. Discussion
In his two points of error on appeal, appellant complains the evidence at trial was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Under Texas law, a person who has "a reportable conviction . . . is required to register . . . with the local law enforcement authority in any municipality where the person resides or intends to reside for more than seven days." Id. art. 62.02(a). If a person required to register intends to change his address, "the person shall, not later than the seventh day before the intended change, report in person to the local law enforcement authority . . . and provide the authority and officer with the person's anticipated move date and address." Id. art. 62.04(a). Failing to register as a sex offender is a criminal offense. Id. art. 62.10. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Simmons v. State, 109 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both supporting and against the finding, demonstrate that the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Evidence is factually insufficient when evidence supporting the verdict, considered by itself, is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence is also insufficient when contrary evidence is so strong that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard could not have been met. Id. The fact finder determines witness credibility, the weight to be accorded to witness testimony, and conflicts in the evidence. See Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647-8 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Here, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction because there is no proof that he resided or intended to remain in McKinney on a permanent basis. He contends that because neither his work supervisor nor Detectives Dunn and Bell ever traveled to McKinney, the State failed to prove that he moved or intended to move, and failed to prove he had a new address. The State, however, presented evidence that appellant frequently stayed overnight at his girlfriend's apartment in McKinney. He told several people, including a police officer, that he was living in McKinney. And he never contacted his primary registration authority to report his McKinney address. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction. Appellant also contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction because the address on his employment application and W-2 forms showed he resided in Sherman. Additionally, appellant points out testimony showing that he worked and went to school in Sherman. Nevertheless, other witnesses testified that appellant told them he had moved to McKinney and was living there. We defer to the fact finder on evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 648. Viewing the evidence that supports the verdict, we do not find it is too weak to support proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484. Nor do we find the contrary evidence so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Id. at 485. We conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We overrule appellant's first and second points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.