Opinion
6:22-CV-1125 (TJM/TWD)
12-13-2022
ROBIN A. MOORE, JR., Plaintiff, v. REGINA A. RINALDI, STATE OF NEW YORK, Defendants.
ROBIN A. MOORE, JR. PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
ROBIN A. MOORE, JR. PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
THERESE WILEY DANCKS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent the Court a civil rights complaint filed by Robin A. Moore, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1.) Plaintiff has also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 4.) For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff's IFP application for purposes of initial review and recommends dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety and without leave to amend.
Plaintiff filed two complaints, which the Court considers together. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1).
I. IFP APPLICATION
Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed IFP. (Dkt. Nos. 4, 5.) After reviewing Plaintiff's application, this Court finds he is financially eligible for IFP status. Therefore, Plaintiff's IFP application is granted for purposes of initial review.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action against Regina A. Rinaldi, a State Administrative Law Judge, and the State of New York (collectively, “Defendants”) on October 31, 2022. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1.) Plaintiff alleges that on July 29, 2022, while at his final parole hearing, Judge Rinaldi “failed to uphold her duty” by denying Plaintiff new counsel after hearing Plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Rettinger, make certain comments to Plaintiff, including telling Plaintiff to shut up; saying Plaintiff sounded like “Johnny Cohern” raised from the dead; saying Plaintiff sounded like someone who takes psychiatric medication; and saying Plaintiff sounded like a psychiatric patient. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4.) Plaintiff claims that due to all this “negligent” behavior and the “racist slur[]”, he has suffered “great” mental anguish which is affecting his PTSD, anxiety, and depression and which requires him to see his doctor more. Id.
Plaintiff's claims against Mr. Rettinger are the subject of another action filed in this District. See Moore v. Reittinger, et al No. 6:22-cv-1083 (LEK/ATB), ECF Dkt. No. 6 (recommending dismissing of the complaint in its entirety with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim).
It is unclear who Plaintiff is referring to in the complaint. Given the context, the intended reference may be to noted criminal defense attorney Johnnie Cochran.
Plaintiff asserts multiple causes of action against Judge Rinaldi and the State of New York: (1) Judge Rinaldi did not say anything when Mr. Rettinger told Plaintiff to shut up; (2) did not correct Mr. Rettinger for telling him to shut up and that he sounded like a psych patient; (3) failed to do her duty to rule “on such matters as see [sic] properly fit”; (4) violated his First Amendment rights; (5) violated his “free exercise of legal argument”; and (6) violated ethics and code of professional conduct. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4-5.) Plaintiff requests the termination of Judge Rinaldi and $2.5 million in damages. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5.)
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
A. Legal Standard
This Court must conduct an initial review of complaints filed IFP, and “complaints in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (governing complaints filed IFP); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (governing complaints filed by prisoners against the government). When reviewing these types of complaints, this Court must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Allen v. Stringer, No. 20-3953, 2021 WL 4472667, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (applying Section 1915(e)(2)(B)); Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999)) (applying Section 1915A).
Plaintiff is a “prisoner” as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (See Dkt. No. 5; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c) (defining “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”).)
This Court must exercise caution when determining whether to sua sponte dismiss a pro se complaint on the grounds that it is frivolous. See Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983). “An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “A claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Id.
When undertaking this initial review, the Court must construe pro se pleadings with the utmost leniency. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding that a pro se litigant's complaint is to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
B. Discussion
Plaintiff purports to bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1.) To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must “‘allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States.'” Rae v. Cty. of Suffolk, 693 F.Supp.2d 217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999)).
1. Claims Against Defendant Judge Rinaldi
It is well-settled judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for judicial acts performed in their judicial capacities. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). Absolute immunity protects judges for their judicial acts, even when such acts “are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). This is because “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation[.]” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). This is true however erroneous an act may have been and however injurious its consequences were to the plaintiff. Id.
Although the allegations in the Complaint do not clarify the context of Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff appears to complain of Judge Rinaldi's conduct while performing her duties as a State Administrative Law Judge. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1.) Claims against judges are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Here, Plaintiff claims Judge Rinaldi failed to act, thus violating his rights, during his final parole hearing. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4-5.) Plaintiff's allegations against Judge Rinaldi clearly relate to actions that are judicial in nature and, therefore, she is entitled to judicial immunity. See, e.g., Hardy-Graham v. Southampton Just. Ct., No. 20-CV-0981(JS) (SIL), 2021 WL 260102, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2021) (dismissing claims against a New York State court judge on initial review because of judicial immunity); United States v. Bommer, No. 1:19-CV-00823 EAW, 2020 WL 1963159, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020) (same). Thus, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Judge Rinaldi fail as a matter of law.
Consequently, the Court recommends that all claims against Judge Rinaldi be dismissed with prejudice as Plaintiff seeks relief from a defendant immune from suit under Section 1983.
2. Claims Against Defendant State of New York
The Eleventh Amendment has long been construed as barring a citizen from bringing a suit against his or her own state in federal court, under the fundamental principle of “sovereign immunity.” U.S. Const. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-21 (1890). Eleventh Amendment immunity is lost only if Congress unequivocally abrogates states' immunity or a state expressly consents to suit. Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 365-66 (2d Cir. 2009). It is well-settled that Congress did not abrogate states' immunity through Section 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1979), and New York State has not waived its immunity from suit on the type of claims asserted in the Complaint. See generally Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Dawkins v. State of New York, No. 93-CV-1298 (RSP/GJD), 1996 WL 156764 at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1996).
Accordingly, the Court recommends that all claims against the State of New York should be dismissed with prejudice as Plaintiff seeks relief from a defendant immune from suit under Section 1983. See LeGrand v. Evan, 702 F.2d 415, 417 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Dicks v. Binding Together, Inc., No. 03 CIV 7411, 2007 WL 1462217, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2007) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims for prospective injunctive relief against the State of New York as barred by the Eleventh Amendment) aff'd in part sub nom. Dicks v. Chow, 382 Fed. App'x 28 (2d Cir. 2010); see also deBroize v. New York State, No. 99-CV-0904 (NAM), 2001 WL 1217192, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2001) (dismissing ADA claims against State of New York).
C. Opportunity to Amend
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993).
Here, better pleading could not cure the deficiencies described above. Therefore, the Court recommends dismissal without leave to amend.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 4) is GRANTED only for purposes of filing and any appeal unless the trial court certifies in writing that the appeal is not taken in good faith per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1) be DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.