Opinion
Case Number 03-10303-BC.
July 30, 2003
The petitioner, John Moore, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Now before the Court are the petitioner's "Motion for New Trial, Directed Verdict, and Summary Judgment, Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Expert Witnesses, Motion for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and a Personal Bond" ("First Motion") [dkt # 7] and "Motion for Relief from Judgment, Motion to Vacate Judgment, Motion to Dismiss, and to Consider Whether Probable Cause was Shown at Preliminary Examination" ("Second Motion") [dkt # 9].
In the First Motion, the petitioner first seeks a new trial. If, after reviewing the merits of the petitioner's habeas corpus petition, the Court determines that the petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief, the Court could order the state to retry the petitioner within a certain period of time. However, such relief is not appropriate at this point in the proceedings because the Court has not yet addressed the merits of the petition. An answer to the petition has not yet been filed and is not due to be filed until August 3, 2004. The Court, therefore, shall deny the petitioner's request for a new trial at this time.
Next, the petitioner moves for a directed verdict and summary judgment. A motion for directed verdict is inapposite in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, and the Court shall deny the petitioner's request for such relief. A motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 presumes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require sub mission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (internal quotes omitted).
A fact is "material" if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001). "Materiality" is deter mined by the substantive law claim. Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2000). An issue is "genuine" if a "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non moving party." Henson v. Nat'l Aeronautics Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Irrelevant or unnecessary factual disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. St. Francis Health Care Centre v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). When the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non moving party," there is no genuine issue of material fact. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus, a factual dispute which "is merely colorable or is not significantly probative" will not defeat a motion for summary judgment which is properly supported. Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 1999).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Univ., Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002). The party opposing the motion then may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party, after sufficient opportunity for discovery, is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
In this case, the petitioner has failed to satisfy the burden of informing this Court of the basis for his motion and identifying portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Univ., Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002). The factual discussion and argument contained in the petitioner's motion, in fact, support a finding that there exists a genuine dispute over material facts. Thus, the Court will deny this motion.
Next, the petitioner seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. The relief the petitioner seeks is the same relief sought in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus: a declaration that his conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The Court will determine the constitutionality of the petitioner's conviction when the Court addresses the merits of the habeas petition in due course.
The petitioner also seeks appointment of counsel and expert witnesses in this matter. There exists no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in civil cases, and the Court has broad discretion in determining whether counsel should be appointed. Childs v. Pellegrin, 822 F.2d 1382, 1384 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[A]ppointment of counsel in a civil case is . . . a matter within the discretion of the court. It is a privilege and not a right.") (internal quotation omitted). A habeas petitioner may obtain representation at any stage of the case "[w]henever the United States magistrate or the Court determines that the interests of justice so require." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In this case, the Court determines after careful consideration that the interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel at this time. With respect to his request for expert witnesses, the petitioner fails to specify a reason that expert witnesses would be necessary or appropriate in this case. The Court shall also deny this request.
Finally, in his First Motion, the petitioner seeks to be released on bond pending disposition of his habeas petition. To receive bond pending a decision on the merits of a habeas corpus petition, a petitioner must show a substantial claim of law based on the facts surrounding the petition and the existence of "some circumstance making the [motion for bond] exceptional and deserving of special treatment in the interests of justice." Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964); Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990). "There will be few occasions where a prisoner will meet this standard." Dotson, 900 F.2d at 79. Where the Court finds no substantial claim that the petitioner is confined in violation of the Constitution, it need not reach the issue of whether exceptional circumstances exist which deserve special treatment in the interests of justice. Id. Because a habeas petitioner "is appealing a presumptively valid state conviction . . . it will indeed be the very unusual case where a habeas petitioner is admitted to bail prior to a decision on the merits in the habeas case." Lee v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993). The petitioner's motion fails to establish the existence of any extraordinary and exceptional circumstances which merit immediate release on bond. Therefore, the Court denies the First Motion in its entirety.
In his Second Motion, the petitioner asserts claims for various types of relief: relief from judgment, for the judgment to be vacated, dismissal of the charges against him, and a finding that the prosecutor failed to establish probable cause at the preliminary examination. These claims challenge the lawfulness of his state-court conviction and seek relief from the judgment of conviction. The Court will determine whether the petitioner's conviction is unconstitutional when the Court addresses the merits of his petition. To the extent that the petitioner intends to assert additional claims for habeas corpus relief in this motion, the petitioner should do so by filing an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus prior to the respondent's filing an answer to the petition. Therefore, the Court also denies the Second Motion in its entirety.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petitioner's "Motion for New Trial, Directed Verdict, and Summary Judgment, Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Expert Witnesses, Motion for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and a Personal Bond" [dkt # 7] and "Motion for Relief from Judgment, Motion to Vacate Judgment, Motion to Dismiss, and to Consider Whether Probable Cause was Shown at Preliminary Examination" [dkt # 9] are DENIED.