Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1680 (RMC).
February 24, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Jerome Moore challenges his parole proceedings as unconstitutional. He seeks a new parole hearing. Defendants Edward F. Reilly, Jr. and Sharon Barnes-Durbin move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (6). The Court is not persuaded that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction inasmuch as the complaint presents a federal question. It therefore denies the motion as brought under Rule 12(b)(1). Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) (improper venue) and (b)(6) (failure to state a claim).
Mr. Moore is serving a sentenced imposed in February 1991 by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia of 12.5 years-to-life and one year consecutive. He became eligible for parole after serving five years of the sentence. Mr. Moore was denied parole twice before his third parole proceeding at issue here. By notice dated May 19, 2003, the United States Parole Commission denied parole to Mr. Moore for the third time and set a hearing for reconsideration in April 2006. Mr. Moore challenges the period of time he is required to serve before reconsideration. He asserts that the Commission's application of its guidelines, which allowed it to consider "charges that the Plaintiff was never indicted nor convicted of" and to delay his "next parole hearing . . . up to 14 years 4 months," Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Complaint at 3, violated the ex post facto and due process clauses of the Constitution.
Effective August 5, 1998, the United States Parole Commission assumed authority over parole determinations of District of Columbia prisoners convicted of felonies. See Franklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Acting on its "exclusive authority to amend or supplement any regulation interpreting or implementing [D.C.] parole laws," D.C. Code § 24-131 (a)(1) (2001) (formerly § 24-1231), the Commission promulgated new guidelines. Plaintiff claims that under the former District of Columbia Board of Parole guidelines, he would have been eligible for parole sooner (within 18-24 months) than under the Commission's guidelines (within 54-72 months). Complaint Memorandum at 3, ¶ 15.
Mr. Reilly is a United States Parole Commissioner and Ms. Barnes-Durbin is an employee of the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia. Mr. Moore does not specify in what capacities he has sued either Defendant, but the allegations do not directly implicate them in any wrongdoing. The Court therefore determines that they are being sued only in their official capacities. An official-capacity lawsuit is properly against the employing entity, which, as to Mr. Reilly is the United States, and as to Ms. Barnes-Durbin is the District of Columbia. Mr. Moore does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 because, as a general rule, that provision of the civil rights statutes creates a cause of action against individuals in their personal capacities. See Simpkins v. District of Columbia Government, 108 F.3d 366, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Mr. Moore therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The same applies for § 1983's judicially created counterpart claim against federal officials. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief against the municipality, "§ 1983 must yield to the more specific federal habeas statute, with its attendant procedural and exhaustion requirements, where an inmate seeks injunctive relief challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration of his sentence." Nelson v. Campbell, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); see also Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("it is well-settled that a [person] seeking relief from his conviction or sentence may not bring an action" for injunctive relief") (citations omitted).
With respect to the relief sought, namely a new parole hearing, Defendants argue that Mr. Moore's exclusive remedy lies in an action for a writ of habeas corpus because it may affect the duration of his custody. Mr. Moore counters that he is not seeking early release but rather "a fair hearing." Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Lawsuit at 3.
It is established that "habeas is indeed exclusive when a non-habeas claim would have a merely probabilistic impact on the duration of custody." Razzoli v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This includes a claim challenging one's parole eligibility. Id. at 376. Because habeas actions are properly brought against a petitioner's warden, who in this case is located in Jonesville, Virginia, Defendants assert that the complaint should be dismissed for "lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to effect service." Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 7. Mr. Moore has not named his warden as a defendant; thus, lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of process are inapplicable defenses. However, the proper venue for a habeas action is the judicial district where the warden is located. See Stokes v. U.S. Parole Commission, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("[A] district court may not entertain a habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its territorial jurisdiction"). The Court therefore will grant the motion to dismiss the habeas claim for improper venue.
For the preceding reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss. A memorializing order accompanies this memorandum opinion.