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Moore v. Penn Corp.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Oct 19, 1999
No. 4:98-CV-170 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 1999)

Opinion

No. 4:98-CV-170

October 19, 1999


OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT


On November 13, 1998, plaintiff Linda Lee Moore, acting pro se, filed this action in Michigan's Kalamazoo County Circuit Court, naming as defendants both her former employer, Penn Corporation, d/b/a Beach Products ("Beach Products" or "the company") and collective bargaining representative, Local No. 7 of the International Brotherhood of Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers of America ("Local 7" or "the union"). The case involves claims by Moore that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment with the company, and that the union failed to fairly represent her in a grievance she filed against the company. The complaint filed in state court nominally includes claims of "Breach of Contract — Wrongful Termination" (Count I) "Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress" (Count II) "Count III," alleging breach of the duty of fair representation; "Negligence" (Count IV) and "Gender Bias" (Count V).

Beach Products filed a timely Notice of Removal, in which the union has joined, contending that the action presents a federal question under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. The matter is currently before the court on motions by both defendants for summary judgment (docket nos. 15 and 16).

Plaintiff Moore has not filed a written response to either of the motions. For the following reasons, the court grants the motions.

FACTS

Moore began working for Beach Products at its Fulford Street plant in Kalamazoo, Michigan on December 8, 1994. After being hired, she worked as a "floater" in the company's packaging department, where her responsibilities included working as a plate former, napkin wrapper, plate wrapper, or generally servicing any area in the department where she was needed. During her employment, Moore was a member of Local 7, with which Beach Products had entered into a collective bargaining agreement. The company's agreement with the union included an absenteeism policy, which Moore had admitted was clearly and unequivocally explained to her by the company. Complaint, ¶ 15.

Between February 2 and November 13, 1995, Moore was absent from work on numerous occasions, for either full or partial days. Moore apparently attributes many of her absences to Sally Martz, whom she alleges served as her "immediate supervisor" in the packaging department. Complaint, ¶¶ 21-22.

Moore, who alleges that she is prone to suffer from migraine headaches, essentially contends that Martz treated her so badly on the job that Moore would frequently be forced to leave work because of a severe migraine headache.

On November 15, 1995, after Moore's accumulated number of absences surpassed those permitted by the collective bargaining agreement, the company terminated her employment. After her discharge, Moore filed a grievance with the union, which was ultimately denied by the company. The union denied Moore's request for arbitration on January 13, 1996.

On September 30, 1996, Moore filed an administrative charge of discrimination against the union, alleging that the union had refused to pursue her grievance because of her gender. Based upon its investigation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") was unable to conclude that Local 7 had discriminated against Moore.

The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on January 6, 1997. As noted above, Moore, acting without benefit of counsel, filed this action against both the company and the union on November 13, 1998.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

As an initial matter, the court must determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Section 1331 of Title 28 provides that district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The court concludes that this case arises under Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), which provides in pertinent part as follows:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce.
. . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

The Supreme Court has held that state court lawsuits alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under § 301 and be resolved with reference to federal law.

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985). This rule, which applies whether the lawsuit alleges breach of contract or liability in tort, is required by the need for interpretive uniformity and predictability. Id. at 211. Accordingly, the Court has held that . . . when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim . . . or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law. Id. at 220.

However, the Supreme Court has also held that [Section] 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis for interpreting collective bargaining agreements, and says nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such agreements. In other words, even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is `independent' of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.

Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef. Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1988) (footnote omitted). In sum, "judges can determine questions of state law involving labor-management relations only if such questions do not require construing collective-bargaining agreements." Id. at 411.

Following these directives, the Sixth Circuit has developed a two-step approach for determining whether section 301 preemption applies:

First, the district court must examine whether proof of the state law claim requires interpretation of collective bargaining terms.

. . .

Second, the court must ascertain whether the right claimed by the plaintiff is created by the collective bargaining agreement or by state law. If the right both is borne of state law and does not invoke contract interpretation, then there is no preemption.

However, if neither or only one criterion is satisfied, section 301 preemption is warranted. . . . DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Under this approach, preemption is required when resolving the plaintiff's claim will not involve direct interpretation of a precise term of the collective bargaining agreement, but will require a court to address relationships created through the collective bargaining process and to mediate a dispute founded upon rights created by the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 218 (citing Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 382-83 (6th Cir. 1991)).

In this case, Moore's complaint references an "employment agreement" between herself and the company, an agreement which she specifically alleges was breached. Moore has not denied that her relationship with Beach Products was controlled by a collective bargaining agreement, or that she is seeking to enforce a right allegedly created by the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the court concludes that § 301 preemption applies and this court has jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the non-existence of any genuine issue of material fact and may satisfy this burden by "`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). While inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, "[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Only factual disputes which may have an effect on the outcome of a lawsuit under the applicable substantive law are "material." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A. BEACH PRODUCTS' MOTION

In its motion, Beach Products argues that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on Moore's claims against the company because (1) the undisputed facts reveal that her wrongful discharge claim is devoid of merit; (2) the undisputed facts are insufficient as a matter of law to establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) Moore has not pled a claim of gender bias against the company, and such a claim would be barred in any event because Moore did not name the company in her EEOC charge.

1. Wrongful Discharge Claim against Beach Products Beach Products argues that Moore's claim of wrongful discharge (Count I), based on an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement, must proceed, if at all, under § 301 of the LMRA, particularly given Moore's accompanying claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation (Count III). In such a "hybrid § 301/fair representation" case, the claims against the employer and the union are "inextricably interdependent." DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983). Thus, in order to prevail against either party, the plaintiff "must not only show that [her] discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union." Id. at 165.

Assuming that Moore will be able to demonstrate a breach of duty by the union, the company argues that her "hybrid" claim must still fail because Moore cannot show that the company breached the collective bargaining agreement in firing her. According to the agreement, a copy of which the company has provided in support of its motion, employees are permitted a maximum of ten (10) days of excused absence in any twelve (12) month period. The specified discipline for exceeding this number of excused absences is discharge. Exhibit B, at pp. 37-38.

According to the company's Human Resources Manager, Moore accumulated 12 excused absences under this system.

Affidavit of Joan Honeysett, at p. 3, ¶ G. Moore has presented no evidence which disputes the accuracy of the company's record of her excused absences. Under the circumstances, the court concludes that no genuine issue remains regarding whether the company breached the collective bargaining agreement in terminating Moore.

According to the company, Moore actually had 69 excused absences during a nine-month period. However, based on the company's practice of grouping absences due to related causes into "occurrences," it attributed to Moore only 12 excused absences instead of 69. Affidavit of Joan Honeysett, at p. 3, ¶¶ F-G.

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim against Beach Products Count II of Moore's complaint asserts a claim against the company for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The company argues that this claim fails because the alleged conduct which forms the basis for this claim is insufficient as a matter of law to establish the tort.

"The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has four elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress." Haverbush v. Powelson, 217 Mich. App. 228, 551 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1996) (citations omitted). "Liability for such a claim has been found only where the conduct complained of has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. "[L]iability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities." Linebaugh v. Sheraton Michigan Corp., 198 Mich. App. 335, 497 N.W.2d 585, 588 (1993) (citation omitted).

Under some circumstances, federal labor law may preempt a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, such as where reference must be made to the collective bargaining agreement in order to determine whether the employer acted outrageously, or whether it merely asserted its legal right (i.e., to discharge an employee for just cause) in a legally permissible way. DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 218-220 (6th Cir. 1994). In other cases, such as where the employee's alleged emotional distress was not a result of her termination but of other abuse she claimed to have endured during her employment, courts have found the tort claim not preempted. See, e.g., Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 802 (6th Cir. 1990). However, because Beach Products has not argued that Moore's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is preempted, the court need not determine whether preemption would apply under the circumstances of this case.

In support of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Moore alleges that Sally Martz, who was aware that Moore suffered from migraine headaches and "stress," "intentionally and without just cause yelled at the Plaintiff harassing her and making the job of the Plaintiff as difficult as possible." Complaint, ¶ 23.

"everyday . . . asked [Plaintiff] how she was doing and thereupon finding her having a nice day would commence to yell at, harass, intimidate and otherwise publicly demean the Plaintiff . . . intending to cause her a migraine headache and severe stress thereby forcing the Plaintiff to leave work for the day and go home." Complaint, ¶ 24.
"would wrongfully harass and blame the Plaintiff for everything wrong intending to cause the Plaintiff severe infliction of mental distress." Complaint, ¶ 25.
"was successful in physically and emotionally debilitating the Plaintiff thereby causing her to go home." Complaint, ¶ 26.

Beach Products has submitted a copy of a portion of Moore's deposition testimony, during which she described Martz's allegedly tortious behavior.

However, even if all of the conduct which Moore has described did occur as alleged, the court concludes that Martz's actions did not rise to the level of being "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Martz might have treated Moore unfairly and even insulted her, but her actions simply do not, as a matter of law, qualify as tortious. Under the circumstances, Beach Products is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on this claim.

3. Gender Bias Claim against Beach Products In Count V of her complaint, Moore alleges that "said Defendant highly discriminated against Plaintiff on a gender bias [sic] thereby causing the Plaintiff to lose her employment with the Defendant Beach Products." Complaint, ¶ 42. In its current motion, Beach Products argues that because this allegation appears to refer only to the union, Moore's complaint on its face fails to state a claim of gender discrimination against the company. Beach Products also argues that even assuming that Moore meant to assert a claim of gender bias against the company, such a claim is barred due to Moore's failure to name the company in her EEOC charge.

An administrative charge, made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, must be filed before a party can bring a Title VII action in federal district court. Romain v. Kurek, 836 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1987). "A corollary of this general rule is that a party must be named in the EEOC charge before that party may be sued under Title VII, `unless there is a clear identity of interest between [the unnamed party] and a party named in the EEOC charge. . . ."' Id. (citing Jones v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 748 F.2d 1083, 1086 (6th Cir. 1984)). Two goals are advanced by this requirement:

First, the charge serves to notify the defendant of the discrimination claim alleged against him. Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 905 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). By receiving notice of the claim, a defendant is able to preserve evidence that could be useful in his defense. Second, by naming the charged party and bringing him before the EEOC, that person is able to participate in conciliation efforts directed at securing voluntary compliance with the Act. Id. Conciliation is a primary goal of Title VII and provides an avenue for compliance without the resort to the expense and inconvenience of litigation.

Romain, 836 F.2d at 245. "The rule in this circuit is that a party must be named in the EEOC charge before that party may be sued under Title VII unless there is a clear identity of interest between [the unnamed party] and a party named in the EEOC charge. . . ." Knafel v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Akron, Inc., 899 F.2d 1473, 1481 (6th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted, citing Romain, 836 F.2d at 245, Jones, 748 F.2d at 1086; and Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 525 (6th Cir. 1977)).

In support of its motion, the company has submitted a copy of Moore's September 30, 1996 administrative charge. Exhibit G. The charge names only "Teamsters Union Local # 7" as the party having allegedly discriminated against her. However, the charge also alleges that her employer denied her a voluntary lay off, awarding it to "two less senior men co-workers." The charge also alleges that the union "did not pursue my grievance (denied me representation) because of my sex."

Although Beach Products is mentioned in Moore's administrative charge, she did not name the company as a respondent, even though the form charge which she signed clearly permits her to name more than one party, including her employer. Moreover, the company and the union have no identity of interest in this matter. Under the circumstances, any Title VII claim which Moore may have intended to assert in this action stands only against the union, the party named in the administrative charge. Beach Products is therefore entitled to summary judgment in its favor to the extent that Moore's complaint may be construed to implicate the company as a defendant in a federal claim of sex discrimination.

B. THE UNION'S MOTION

In its motion, the union argues that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor because (1) Moore's state law claims asserted in Counts III and IV are preempted by federal labor law, and must be resolved under the standards for the duty of fair representation; (2) Moore has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that the union breached its duty of fair representation; (3) alternatively, Counts III and IV are time-barred because Moore neglected to file her complaint within the applicable six-month statute of limitations; and (4) Count V, Moore's claim of gender bias, is either time-barred (if based on federal law) or preempted (if based on state law).

1. Counts III and IV: Preemption Count III alleges that the union breached its duty and failed to adequately represent Moore, causing her to be terminated from her employment under circumstances which were contrary to the "employee handbook" (presumably the collective bargaining agreement) and "standard accepted company practice." Count IV alleges that the union was "negligent and grossly negligent in [its] representation" of Moore. As noted, the union argues that both counts are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.

The union is correct: both claims are clearly preempted by § 301. In cases perhaps too numerous to cite, courts have held that claims such as these, which require examination of the employment relationship of parties to a collective bargaining agreement, are preempted. E.g., Jones, 939 F.2d at 383 (employee's breach of contract claim against employer preempted where claim to reinstatement existed solely by virtue of collective bargaining agreement) Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 800-02 (6th Cir. 1990) (employee's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud claims, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on employer's exercise of collective bargaining agreement rights were preempted, though claims for tortious interference, loss of consortium, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, not based on exercise of collective bargaining agreement rights, were not preempted) Maushund v. Earl C. Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 5 89, 590 (6th Cir. 1986) (employee's claim for breach of oral just cause contract preempted because "[t]he collective bargaining process prohibits [plaintiff] from engaging in separate negotiations with the company and precludes any actions to enforce such an agreement"). Because these state law claims must be treated as § 301 claims arising under the collective bargaining agreement, the court must determine whether the claims are barred under the applicable limitations period.

2. Section 301 Claim: Statute of Limitations This case is a hybrid § 301/unfair representation action because Moore alleges both a breach of a collective bargaining agreement by Beach Products and a breach by the union of its duty of fair representation. As noted by a Sixth Circuit panel in Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d at 803, In DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), the Supreme Court conclusively established that section 301 actions brought by individual employees are governed by the six-month statute of limitations borrowed from section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).

According to the settled law in this circuit, a section 301 claim accrues when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged violation. Chrysler Workers Ass'n v. Chrysler Corp., 834 F.2d 573, 581 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1033, 108 S.Ct. 2017, 100 L.Ed.2d 604 (1988) Shapiro v. Cook United, Inc., 762 F.2d 49, 51 (6th Cir. 1985). Because a section 301 claim accrues against the company when it accrues against the union, McCreedy v. Local Union No. 971, UAW, 809 F.2d 1232, 1236 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied, 818 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1987), we must establish a single accrual date for each section 301 claim and then ascertain whether the plaintiffs filed suit within six months of that date. 914 F.2d at 803 (internal quotation marks omitted). The claims, therefore, accrue simultaneously and "the timeliness of the suit must be measured from the date on which the employee knew or should have known of the union's final action or should have known of the employer's final action, whichever occurs later." Robinson v. Central Brass Mfg. Co., 987 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th Cir.) (citation and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 827 (1993).

In this case, Moore's section 301 claim against Beach Products is predicated on her allegation that the company's termination of her employment breached of the provisions of the "employee handbook," otherwise known as the collective bargaining agreement. Moore's section 301 claim against the union is predicated on her allegation that the union failed to fairly represent her in connection with her termination. Given the nature of these claims, they accrued when the union notified Moore of its final action on her grievance.

The union's submissions indicate that by letter dated January 16, 1996, the union notified Moore of its decision not to take her grievance to arbitration. Moore, however, did not file her action until November 13, 1998, over two and one-half years later. Given these undisputed facts, Moore's hybrid § 301 claim is clearly time-barred.

3. Gender Bias Claim against the Union As noted above, Count V of Moore's complaint alleges that the union discriminated against her on the basis of her gender. The union argues that to the extent that this states a claim against it for violation of Title VII, such a claim is time-barred.

An aggrieved individual who desires to file a Title VII claim in federal court must do so within 90 days from the receipt of a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The record on file in this case indicates that the EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice on January 6, 1997, over one and one-half years before Moore filed this action in November, 1998. Exhibit H. Under the circumstances, the union is correct that any Title VII claim is time-barred. See, e.g., Peete v. American Standard Graphic, 885 F.2d 331, 332 (6th Cir. 1989).

The union also correctly argues that to the extent that Count V represents an attempt by Moore to assert a claim under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq., such a claim is also barred as preempted by federal labor law. See Jones v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 838 F.2d 856, 860-61 (6th Cir. 1988) (where alleged underlying discriminatory actions included a breach of the collective bargaining agreement and the failure of the union to fairly represent the plaintiffs because of their sex, claims of sex discrimination against union under Elliott-Larsen "must be deemed to be foreclosed and preempted").

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants both defendants' motions and enters summary judgment in their favor.

The complaint is therefore dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

So ordered this 19th day of October, 1999.


Summaries of

Moore v. Penn Corp.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Oct 19, 1999
No. 4:98-CV-170 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 1999)
Case details for

Moore v. Penn Corp.

Case Details

Full title:LINDA LEE MOORE, Plaintiff, v. PENN CORP. d/b/a BEACH PRODUCTS, and…

Court:United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

Date published: Oct 19, 1999

Citations

No. 4:98-CV-170 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 1999)