Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc.

10 Citing cases

  1. Xerox Corp. v. JCTB Inc.

    No. 6:18-cv-06154-MAT (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2019)   Cited 3 times
    Explaining origins of Rule 62 (b)

    Plaintiff argues that this standard does not apply where, as here, Defendants seek to delay enforcement of a money damages award. Plaintiff's Response ("Pl.'s Resp.") at 6 (citing John Wiley& Sons, Inc. v. Book Dog Books, LLC, 327 F. Supp.3d 606, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("This Court agrees with those courts holding the traditional four factors 'appl[y] only when the judgment sought to be stayed is for injunctive or equitable relief.'") (quoting Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc., No. 14 CIV. 8326, 2017 WL 4326537, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) (stating that the traditional four-factor test "applies only when the judgment sought to be stayed is for injunctive or other equitable relief—i. e., when the judgment does not fall within the parameters of Rule 62(d), but instead implicates Rule 62(c)"); citing Butler v. Ross, No. 16CV1282 (DLC), 2017 WL 6210843, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (stating that "it is [former] Rule 62(d) and its accompanying test that are applicable here")). The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the four-factor test applicable to stays of judgments ordering injunctive or equitable relief is not applicable here.

  2. Freeman v. Giuliani

    24-mc-00353 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    In the absence of the posting of a bond or the provision of some alternative means of securing the judgment acceptable to the court in which the judgment is entered, a judgment creditor is entitled to enforce the judgment. See e.g., Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc., 2017 WL 4326537, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) (characterizing the default rule of 62(b) as “no stay absent a bond”); Micula v. Gov't of Romania, 2015 WL 4643180, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2015) (“Without a bond or some other guaranty, a stay is unfair and would impose a hardship on Petitioners.”). The District Court for the District of Columbia reminded Defendant of the availability of the supersedeas bond on December 20, 2023, when it dissolved the 30-day Stay of Execution at Plaintiffs' request following the defamation verdict in their favor. D.C. Action, Dkt. No. 144 (“Moreover, should this case be appealed, Giuliani can avoid any claimed prejudice and obtain a stay of enforcement at any time by posting a full supersedeas bond.”) (cleaned up).

  3. Gardner-Alfred v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.

    22-cv-1585 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2024)   Cited 1 times
    Discussing bonding requirement

    “Significantly, the bond requirement is not designed to protect the judgment debtor's ability to continue in business; rather, it is designed to minimize or eliminate the risk that it will pay the judgment, only to find that it cannot get the money back pending appeal.” Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc., 2017 WL 4326537, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017). “[T]he bond requirement will not be waived solely on the basis that it will pose a severe financial hardship on the appellant unless some other form of security is offered.”

  4. Saadeh v. Kagan

    20 Civ. 1945 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2024)

    That Michael Kagan has claimed that he is unable to pay the judgment or for a bond supports not waiving the bond requirement, as he has not provided an acceptable alternative means of securing the judgment against him. See, e.g., Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 8326 (CM), 2017 WL 4326537, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) (declining to waive bond requirement under Nassau in view of judgment-debtor's stated inability to pay judgment or bond).

  5. Petersen Energia Inversora, S.A.U. v. Argentine Republic

    15 Civ. 2739 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2023)

    Additionally, the Republic's concession that it “does not have the financial resources to post a bond,” (Def.'s Br. 1), is determinative as to Nassau factors two, three, and four. See Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 8326, 2017 WL 4326537, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) (holding that a judgment debtor's admission to the court that he cannot satisfy the judgment or obtain a bond in the full amount is “determinative as to factors two, three, and four”); see also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Book Dog Books, LLC, 327 F.Supp.3d 606, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (applying the same).

  6. Sire Spirits, LLC v. Green

    21 Civ. 7343 (JPC) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2023)   Cited 7 times

    (internal quotation marks omitted)); Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc., Nos. 14 Civ. 8326, 15 Civ. 8441 (CM), 2017 WL 4326537, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) (explaining that a party's concession that it cannot pay a judgment or obtain a bond “is determinative as to factors two, three, and four”).

  7. EMA Fin. v. Joey N.Y., Inc.

    17-CV-9706 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 1, 2022)   Cited 3 times

    Courts in this district have held that such showings overwhelmingly weigh against waiver of the bond requirement. See Book Dog Books, LLC, 327 F.Supp.3d at 649 (refusing to waive bond requirement “solely on the basis that it will pose a severe financial hardship on the appellant”); Butler, 2017 WL 6210843, at *3 (determining the argument that defendant “simply cannot pay” the judgment insufficient for waiver of the bond requirement); Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 8326, 2017 WL 4326537, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) (holding that defendant's advisement that it could not satisfy the judgment nor obtain a bond from any source was “determinative” that the court should not waive the bond requirement). The same must be said here.

  8. TD Bank v. Miller

    18 Civ. 10608 (VM) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2022)

    Miller claims she “cannot post bond without imperiling the rights of her legitimate creditors, ” (Stay Letter at 2), but that is a “weak reed on which to premise an argument that the bond requirement should be waived -- especially where, as here, the movant wants it waived entirely and unconditionally.” Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc., Nos. 14 Civ. 8326, 15 Civ. 8441, 2017 WL 4326537, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017). The primary purposes of Rule 62(d) are to guarantee recovery for the party that ultimately prevails and to “protect the judgment debtor from the risk of losing the money if the decision is reversed.”

  9. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. eFloorTrade, LLC

    16 Civ. 7544 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y. May. 7, 2020)   Cited 4 times

    (Def. Reply (Dkt. No. 117) at 7; Moore Aff. (Dkt. No. 118) ¶ 8) Defendants' inability to post a bond "is determinative as to factors two, three, and four."Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc., No. 14 CIV. 8326, 2017 WL 4326537, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) (finding that movant's inability to post a bond demonstrated that it lacked the funds to pay the judgment after the appeal). Indeed, "a concession of inability to pay is often 'determinative'" of the entire Rule 62 inquiry. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Book Dog Books, LLC, 327 F. Supp. 3d 606, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Moore, 2017 WL 4326537, at *2).

  10. Petersen-Dean, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh

    19 Civ. 11299 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2020)   Cited 4 times

    They provide documentation showing that the award dwarfs their assets. But the bond requirement will not be waived solely on the basis that it will pose a severe financial hardship on the appellant."); Moore v. Navillus Tile, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 8326, 2017 WL 4325537, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) ("The bond requirement is not designed to protect the judgment debtor's ability to continue in business."). Petersen expends a great deal of effort asking the Court to instead apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d), see Petersen Stay Mem., ECF No. 41, at 8-15, but that provision applies only to orders granting injunctive relief, and as such is inapplicable for the reasons we have already reviewed, supra.