After hearing the testimony of both parties to the suit, the court determined that the appellant had failed to carry the burden as to "wilful" failure to comply with the order and that "under the evidence here, [appellee] didn't just flat refuse to pay when she had the child; he quit paying ... after he took possession of the child based on her statement that she didn't want it. I don't think that would show a wilful violation." Where there is a conflict in the evidence regarding the wilful violation of custody, the discretion of the trial court will not be disturbed. Moore v.Moore, 235 Ga. 512 ( 220 S.E.2d 133) (1975); Carr v. Friers, 232 Ga. 760 ( 208 S.E.2d 849) (1974); Berman v. Berman, 232 Ga. 342 ( 206 S.E.2d 447) (1974). 3. Appellant enumerates as error the court's failure to modify the final judgment and decree of divorce.

1. Cook contends the trial court erred by finding him in contempt. This is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court which appellate courts will not disturb unless there has been a clear abuse. Moore v. Moore, 235 Ga. 512, 513 ( 220 S.E.2d 133); Berman v.Berman, 232 Ga. 342, 343 ( 206 S.E.2d 447). Based upon the record in this case, the only conclusion that can be reached is that Cook has wilfully refused to comply with the orders of the trial court, and has repeatedly displayed his contempt for the court. Accordingly, the enumeration of error is without merit.

The appellee should not be allowed to frustrate performance of the condition precedent by not making a choice and then contend the appellant did not send the children to a private school of his choice. Compare Moore v. Moore, 235 Ga. 512 ( 220 S.E.2d 133). The trial court erred in sustaining the traverse and in dismissing appellant's garnishment action.

3. While we find no Georgia authority construing Code Ann. § 81A-156 (g), we hold that it was not error for any reason urged on appeal to deny Hawkins' motion to award reasonable expenses and to adjudge Travelers in contempt. Cf. Moore v. Moore, 235 Ga. 512 ( 220 S.E.2d 133) (1975). See also Southern Concrete Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 F. Supp. 362 (1) (Ga. 1975) (construing the analogous Fed.R. C. P. 56 (g)).

The test on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion on the basis of the facts before it. Moore v. Moore, 235 Ga. 512, 513 ( 220 S.E.2d 133) (1975). We do not find that the trial judge's action here represents an abuse of discretion.

The agreement does not confer upon Tiffany the right to reject a school what the parties characterize as a veto. See Moore v. Moore, 235 Ga. 512, 220 S.E.2d 133 (1975) (college "selected by mutual agreement between the plaintiff, defendant and the child involved"); Van Nortwick v. Van Nortwick, 52 Ill. App.2d 229, 201 N.E.2d 857 (1964) (selection of school "by joint agreement of the Husband and Wife"). We are not at liberty to find a veto power where the language used by the parties does not confer one.