Accordingly, we hold that under OCGA § 33-25-13 an individual's conviction in a criminal prosecution for the murder or voluntary manslaughter of the insured may serve as prima facie evidence of guilt in a civil proceeding brought pursuant to OCGA § 33-25-13 upon either the exhaustion of the individual's right to a direct appeal or the expiration of time within which a first direct appeal could have been timely filed. This construction furthers the public policy upon which OCGA § 33-25-13 is based, to insure "that no one shall be allowed to benefit from his own wrong," Moore v. Moore, 228 Ga. 489, 491 ( 186 S.E.2d 531) (1971), and affords an individual the opportunity to challenge a criminal conviction through a direct appeal before imperiling his rights to any insurance benefits. Question answered in the negative.

The basic issue here is whether a grantee's interest in a deed was forfeited by a statute (Ga. L. 1959, pp. 299, 300; Code Ann. § 113-909) which denies the right of inheritance to one who kills another through malice. For related cases involving the same homicide, see Moore v. Moore, 225 Ga. 340 ( 168 S.E.2d 318); Moore v. Moore, 228 Ga. 489 ( 186 S.E.2d 531). This issue is involved in litigation commenced in the Superior Court of Dodge County by Raymond Moore and others as sole heirs of John L. Moore against Mary W. Moore, Jennings Wright and James Alligood, Jr. The plaintiffs sought cancellation of a deed recovery of rents and general relief. The defendants demanded that certain deeds be declared valid and that the title to the property in question be decreed in the defendant Alligood.

" (Punctuation omitted.) Moore v. Moore, 228 Ga. 489, 491 ( 186 S.E.2d 531) (1971). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Adkins.

" 46 CJS 54, Insurance, § 1170; 44 AmJur2d 657, Insurance, § 1746. Moore v. Moore, 228 Ga. 489 ( 186 S.E.2d 531), cited by the appellant, would not apply to the case sub judice because in the Moore case the beneficiary murdered the insured. The overruling of the motion for summary judgment was not error.

We similarly dismiss Leslie Yohey's alternative arguments urging the application of the laws of either New York or the District of Columbia; both jurisdictions provide that a conviction for killing the insured vitiates beneficiary status.New York Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 6 S.Ct. 877, 29 L.Ed. 997 (1886); see also Moore v. Moore, 228 Ga. 489, 186 S.E.2d 531 (1971) (regardless of whether state law or federal law applies in a FEGLIA case, federal common law provides the same bar to a murderer's recovery); Insurance — Homicide Beneficiary, 27 A.L.R.3d 794, 802 (1969) (proclaiming general rule).See In re Estate of Brown, 132 Misc.2d 171, 503 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1986); Napoleon v. Heard, 455 A.2d 901 (D.C.App. 1983).