Moore v. Moore

16 Citing cases

  1. Savage v. Savage

    No. 10-17-00139-CV (Tex. App. Oct. 24, 2018)   Cited 2 times

    Furthermore, "[w]here a party invokes the exercise of the jurisdiction within the court's general powers, he will not be thereafter heard or urged that the court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment so rendered." Kohls v. Kohls, 461 S.W.2d 455, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Moore v. Moore, 430 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); Dutchover v. Dutchover, 334 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1960, no writ) ("The jurisdiction of the court was invoked by appellants; and, in such cases, it has been held that one who has invoked the court's exercise of a jurisdiction within the general powers of a court, may be estopped to raise the invalidity of the action."). The Moore Court stated the general rule regarding this issue as follows:

  2. Brown v. Sommers (In re Brown)

    807 F.3d 701 (5th Cir. 2015)   Cited 17 times
    Stating that "debtor's eligibility for a state law exemption under § 522 is determined by the facts and law in existence on the [petition] date"

    Hopkins v. Wright, 17 Tex. 30, 39 (1856) (“The rule is well settled, that the succession to the personal estate of a decedent is to be governed by the law of the country in which he was domiciled at the time of his death.”); Moore v. Moore, 430 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex.Civ.App.1968) (applying predecessor to the Texas Estates Code) (“The family of a decedent is not entitled to an allowance in lieu of a homestead out of property in the course of administration within the state, unless the decedent at the time of death was domiciled in the state.” (quoting

  3. In re Brown

    521 B.R. 205 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014)   Cited 9 times

    Furthermore, the domicile rule applies to allowances in lieu of homesteads, which by definition consist of personal property as well. See Moore v. Moore, 430 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“The family of a decedent is not entitled to an allowance in lieu of a homestead out of property in the course of administration within the state, unless the decedent at the time of death was domiciled in the state.”). More generally, here, all of the property comprising the Debtor's probate estate—i.e., the property exempted out of his bankruptcy estate—is personal property.

  4. Black Lake Pipe Line v. Union Const. Co. Inc.

    538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976)   Cited 258 times
    Concluding party could not recover on quantum meruit claim if work was required by contract

    Lewis v. Southmore Savings Association, 480 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1972); Dallas Railway Terminal Co. v. Guthrie, supra; 4 Wigmore, Evidence, Supra. Texas courts have recognized that trial courts have wide discretion in determining whether summaries are necessary to expedite the trial. Texas Whse. Co. of Dallas, Inc. v. Spring Mills, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Moore v. Moore, 430 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shelby County v. O'Banion, 188 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1945, no writ). Similarly, it is for the trial court in the exercise of its discretion to determine whether the opposing party had an adequate opportunity to examine the records. 1. MPD: MPD's claims against Black Lake were summarized in an exhibit that was designated MPD — 11.

  5. In re Bruce Bishop

    No. 05-18-01333-CV (Tex. App. Mar. 6, 2020)

    "It is a part of the public policy enforced by the courts of Texas that where a party invokes the exercise of a jurisdiction within the court's general powers, he will not thereafter be heard to urge that the court was without jurisdiction to render the order or judgment rendered." See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 430 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Parties should not be allowed to "trifle with the courts" in such a manner.

  6. Pope v. Moore

    729 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. App. 1987)   Cited 10 times

    Having invoked the court's jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, Pope cannot now contend that the finding of a fact which required the denial of jurisdiction does not bind him when a finding which would have permitted the exercise of jurisdiction would bind the opposing party. See Moore v. Moore, 430 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (estoppel to question jurisdiction). Consequently, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes Pope from relitigating the date on which he actually learned of the judgment.

  7. Tibbetts v. Tibbetts

    679 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App. 1984)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that under Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Texas courts have complete authority to make any modifications to divorce decrees from other states that could have been made if the modification request had been filed in the state in which the divorce decree was issued

    In the first place, appellant having invoked the jurisdiction of the Texas court to hear his modification claim cannot now question that jurisdiction. Gaspard v. Gaspard, 582 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ); Moore v. Moore, 430 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Spence et ux v. State National Bank of El Paso, 5 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Comm'n App. 1928). The Texas court, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S.C.A. Const. art.

  8. Finn v. Finn

    658 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App. 1983)   Cited 50 times
    Recognizing computer printouts as business records

    Furthermore, Texas case law has recognized that trial courts have wide discretion in determining whether summaries are necessary to expedite the trial. Texas Warehouse Co. of Dallas, Inc. v. Springs Mills, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Moore v. Moore, 430 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shelby County v. O'Banion, 188 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1945, no writ). Finally the court holds that it is for the trial court to determine whether the opposing party has had an adequate opportunity to examine the records. It should here be noted that when Kleinman's testimony as to the value of Finn's capital account was solicited and the objection made, Thompson Knight offered to make the records available to the wife for her examination.

  9. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Stigger

    635 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. App. 1982)   Cited 4 times

    Standard Fire has not questioned the trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction over this case. Indeed, it could not do so under the rule in Moore v. Moore, 430 S.W.2d 247, 250-251 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (party who invokes jurisdiction of court cannot be heard, on appeal of its decision, to question the very jurisdiction he invoked). We interpret the decisions in Mr. W. Fireworks, Flynt, Haginas, and Isbell to mean that, where no question of bad faith or fraud in invoking the trial court's jurisdiction is presented, the court is empowered to grant complete relief on the claims its jurisdiction was invoked to adjudicate, even if such relief requires a judgment in excess of the court's jurisdictional limits.

  10. McGinty v. McGinty

    592 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)   Cited 3 times

    "The principle is one of estoppel in the interest of a sound administration of the laws whereby the regularity or even validity of an act procured by one himself cannot be raised not that the act is valid, for it may not be, and estoppel does not make valid the thing complained of, but merely closes the mouth of the complainant." Moore v. Moore, 430 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Gaspard v. Gaspard, 582 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1979, no writ). Finding no error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.