The award of alimony, on the other hand, "is left to the sound discretion of the [trial court] upon a consideration of the circumstances in each particular case[.]" Moore v. Moore, 218 Md. 218, 222 (1958). Thus, "[w]e review the amount of the alimony itself under an abuse of discretion standard."

It is, of course, equally established that the equity court which made the original award of alimony may modify that award if thereafter there comes about material change in circumstances which justify the action. Langrall v. Langrall, 145 Md. 340, 345; Moore v. Moore, 218 Md. 218; Warren v. Warren, supra. The case turns, then, on whether there had occurred such material change in conditions as to justify Judge Cullen in reducing the alimony set by Judge Niles.

Likewise, "[t]he award of temporary alimony is left to the sound discretion of the chancellor upon a consideration of the circumstances in each particular case[.]" Moore v. Moore, 218 Md. 218, 222 (1958). "As long as the trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and the ultimate decision is not arbitrary, we will affirm it, even if we might have reached a different result.

The award of temporary alimony is left to the sound discretion of the chancellor upon consideration of the circumstances in each particular case; and, while it is always reviewable upon appeal, the large discretion vested in the chancellor should not be disturbed unless this Court is thoroughly satisfied that there has been a mistake in respect to the amount awarded.Moore v. Moore, 218 Md. 218, 222, 145 A.2d 764 (1958). Regarding the relationships between masters, chancellors, and the appellate courts, the Court of Appeals and this Court have stated, respectively:

That is a matter which is, initially, within the chancellor's discretion. Moore v. Moore, 218 Md. 218, 145 A.2d 764 (1958). Also see Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 447 A.2d 847 (1982).

"It is, of course, equally established that the equity court which made the original award of alimony may modify that award if thereafter there comes about material change in circumstances which justify the action. Langrall v. Langrall, 145 Md. 340, 345; Moore v. Moore, 218 Md. 218; Warren v. Warren, supra. In this jurisdiction most of the cases concerned with the modification of alimony that have reached the appellate courts have involved situations where there was a substantial change in the circumstances of both parties. It is clear, however, from the principles enunciated and applied in these cases and from the uniformly accepted rule in such matters that a substantial change in the circumstances of both parties is not a necessary condition to the court's jurisdiction or authority to modify an initial award of alimony.