Opinion
5:19-cv-473-MTT-MSH
11-09-2021
DAVID TIMOTHY MOORE, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff David Timothy Moore, an inmate currently confined at Dooly State Prison (“DSP”) in Unadilla, Georgia, has filed a pro se complaint (ECF No. 1) seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 42). For the stated reasons, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's complaint arises out of his incarceration within the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDC”) system. Compl. 6-8, ECF No. 1. According to Plaintiff, Defendants refuse to acknowledge or accommodate his Nation of Islam (“NOI”) beliefs and practices. Id. at 8-11. He contends the following religious accommodation requests were either denied or, if fulfilled, remain inadequate: (1) provide meals in accordance with the NOI diet; (2) permit him to wear the NOI bowtie; (3) allow an NOI volunteer inside the prison to lead services; (4) provide NOI services twice per week; and (5) permit the use of prayer or anointing oils. Id. at 24-26. Plaintiff claims that by refusing to fully accommodate these requests, Defendants have violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia received Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) on November 7, 2019. The Court transferred the case to this Court on December 3, 2019 (ECF Nos. 6, 7). Following preliminary screening, the Court allowed all of Plaintiff's claims to proceed for further factual development but denied his request for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). Order & R. 6-7, Apr. 21, 2020, ECF No. 10; Order 1, June 8, 2020, ECF No. 13 (adopting recommendation).
The Court also later denied a renewed motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction (ECF Nos. 24, 35, 38).
Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on April 27, 2021 (ECF No. 42). After granting Plaintiff extensions of time to respond, the Court received Plaintiff's timely response on September 3, 2021 (ECF No. 60-1). Defendants have not replied and their motion for summary judgment is ripe for review.
The Court ordered Plaintiff to respond by August 5, 2021. Text-Only Order, Aug. 2, 2021, ECF No. 57. “Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner's court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012)). “Absent evidence to the contrary, we assume that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date that he signed it.” Id. Further, “[t]he burden is on the Government to prove the motion was delivered to prison authorities on a date other than the date the prisoner signed it.” Id. Plaintiff's response is dated August 5, 2021, and is therefore timely under the mailbox rule.
Plaintiff also appears to assert a cross motion for summary judgment. See Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. 1, at 1, 34. Dispositive motions in this case were due by April 28, 2021. Sched. Order Jan. 14, 2021. Plaintiff's filing is dated August 5, 2021. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J.
DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing (1) Plaintiff's claims against them in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and § 1983, (2) Plaintiff's claims against Smith and Ward are not cognizable under § 1983 to the extent he raises claims under a theory of supervisory liability, (3) Plaintiff fails to show a First Amendment or RLUIPA violation, (4) Plaintiff fails to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, (5) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and (6) Plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages, punitive damages, or injunctive relief. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5-20, ECF No. 42-1. The Court recommends that Defendants' motion be granted on all six grounds.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A
Attach. 1, at 1. Plaintiff did not seek additional time to file a dispositive motion before the deadline. Therefore, Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment is untimely and the Court need not consider it. See Dipietro v. Cooper, No. 4:19-CV-113-CDL-MSH, 2021 WL 3417941, at *2 (M.D. Ga. May 26, 2021) (refusing to consider the plaintiff's untimely cross summary judgment motion attached to his response); see also T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. Cochran Motor Speedway, No. 5:09-CV-118, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 21, 2010) (citing Dedge v. Kendrick, 849 F.2d 1398, 1398 (11th Cir. 1988)). fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
II. Undisputed Material Facts
Plaintiff has been incarcerated within GDC since 1987. Compl. 7; Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 5, ECF No. 42-2. In 1997, he converted to Islam and began to practice as a member of the Islamic sect known as the NOI. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 6; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 6, ECF No. 60-2. NOI's practice of Islam is unorthodox and primarily seeks to enlighten and empower the Black race, as well as eliminate the ongoing disparate treatment. Compl. 15; Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 8. The Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) considers the NOI to be a hate group based in part on its unorthodox Islamic beliefs. Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 10; Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 10. Though there has been hostility towards NOI inmates, there have been no reported instances of verbal or physical altercations stemming from GDC inmates' practice of NOI. Compl. 23; Pl.'s Dep. 33:02-33:24; Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 9.
On January 31, 2019, Plaintiff transferred to DSP, where he is presently incarcerated. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 5; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 5. At that time, and throughout the time underlying Plaintiff's claims, GDC employed all Defendants. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 1, 2, 3; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 1, 2, 3. GDC provides a Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP”) for practicing Muslim inmates. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 11; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 11. GDC also provides a Religious Accommodation SOP whenever an inmate's religious requirements are not met by the current SOPs. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 13; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 13.
Plaintiff made five religious accommodation requests while at DSP. First, he requested anointing/prayer oils. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 16; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 16. Although he never received a response, DSP allowed Plaintiff to order and use anointing/prayer oils for NOI practices. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 16, 17; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 16, 17.
Plaintiff also made the same requests in a grievance filed while incarcerated at Washington State Prison. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 38; Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B-1, at 1, ECF No. 42-5; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 36.
Second, Plaintiff requested a meal plan tailored to the NOI diet. Compl. 14; Pl.'s Dep. 55:04-55:14; Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. B-1, at 1, ECF No. 42-5. GDC offers an alternative meal plan in an effort to accommodate various dietary restrictions, but this remains inadequate under the NOI diet. Pl.'s Dep. 55:20-56:02. Plaintiff did not receive any response to this accommodation request. Pl.'s Dep. 55:01-55:14. GDC issued a memorandum on November 17, 2020, requiring all prisons to observe and accommodate NOI's Fast in December. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 21, 22; Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. C-3, at 1-3, ECF No. 42-9; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 21, 22. The December menu, though “devoid of land animal flesh, ” also remains inadequate under the NOI's December Fast diet. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 22; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 22.
Third, Plaintiff requested that NOI services be permitted twice per week. Compl. 13; Pl.'s Dep. 71:14-71:20. GDC offers Jumuah on Fridays to all Islamic inmates, which accounted for one of the services requested by Plaintiff. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 24; Pl.'s Dep. 76:04-76:15; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 24. GDC further permits one NOI-specific service per week. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 24, 25; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 25. In addition to these weekly services, Plaintiff is required to pray five times a day. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 23; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 23. GDC also gives Plaintiff, and the other NOI inmates, access to NOI materials to use during services and daily prayers. Pl.'s Dep. 86:06-86:22.
GDC ceased all religious services for a period during Covid-19 but has since resumed. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 26; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 26.
Fourth, Plaintiff requested that GDC permit outside NOI volunteers to enter the prison to lead services. Compl. 13; Pl.'s Dep. 93:12-93:25. GDC refused Plaintiff's request because such a volunteer would be considered a leader of a hate group, which could inflame tensions between inmates. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 33; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 33. GDC, however, permits Plaintiff to communicate with NOI leaders via telephone or correspondence. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 34; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 34.
Finally, Plaintiff sought permission to wear the NOI bowtie. Compl. 13; Pl.'s Dep. 65:18-65:24, 66:12-66:15. The NOI mandates that males wear the bowtie when wearing a suit in public. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 28; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 28. The bowtie is not required inside the home, during leisurely time, when exercising, or any time that the NOI male is not wearing a suit. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 29; Pl.'s Dep. 63:01-63:07; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 29. GDC denied Plaintiff's request for the NOI bowtie because it poses a choking hazard, and it informs other inmates that the wearer practices NOI which could inflame tensions. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 30, 32; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 30, 31, 32.
III. Official Capacity Claims
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against them in their official capacities because the Eleventh Amendment and the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 bar such claims. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5-7. The Court agrees and recommends that Defendants' motion be granted on this ground.
The GDC is an agency of the state of Georgia, and Smith and Ward are employees of the Georgia Department of Corrections. GDC employees are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims against them in their official capacities. “Official capacity suits for damages against employees of a state agency are suits against the state agency.” Ferguson v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 428 F.Supp.2d 1339, 1352 (M.D. Ga. 2006). “A suit against a governmental entity which is considered an ‘arm of the state'-such as the GDC-is a suit against the State.” Id. (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)). “[T]he Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars a § 1983 action against the State of Georgia and the [GDC] unless the State either consents to suit or waives its sovereign immunity with regard to § 1983 claims-neither of which has happened here.” Ferguson, 428 F.Supp.2d at 1352. Plaintiff's claims against Smith and Ward in their official capacities for monetary damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and Plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages against Smith and Ward in their official capacities.
Additionally, GDC employees, as state officials acting in their official capacities, are not considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71; see also Ferguson, 428 F.Supp.2d at 1352-53. Since § 1983 requires that a “person” deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights, the lack of a “person” in this case establishes an independent ground for the denial of Plaintiff's claims. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Therefore, Plaintiff may not raise claims against Defendants in their official capacities.
IV. Supervisory Liability
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Smith and Ward to the extent Plaintiff raises claims against them under a theory of supervisory liability. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 7-9. The Court agrees with Defendants and recommends their motion be granted on this ground.
A prisoner cannot state a § 1983 claim based on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004). Instead, to state a claim against a supervisory official, a prisoner must allege facts showing either that the supervisor personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation or that there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 1986). This may be done by alleging that the official either “(1) instituted a custom or policy which resulted in a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights; (2) directed his subordinates to act unlawfully; or (3) failed to stop his subordinates from acting unlawfully when he knew they would.” Gross v. White, 340 Fed.Appx. 527, 531 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Goebert, 510 F.3d 1312, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff's argument opposing summary judgment is the epitome of an insufficient supervisory liability claim. Plaintiff contends that both Defendants directly participated in the alleged constitutional violations because Defendant Ward, as Commissioner of GDC, designated Defendant Smith “to adjudicate the Plaintiff's administrative grievance relevant to the claims in this case.” Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 17-20. Plaintiff cites the GDC's SOP relating to the grievance process which directs “[t]he Commissioner or his/her designee . . . to deliver a decision to the Offender.” Id. at 18; Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 16, at 15, ECF No. 60-16. This grant of authority, however, does not amount to supervisory liability. See Monnell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1979) (“[T]he mere right to control without any control or direction having been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability.” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, a prison official's participation in the grievance process-even if denying said grievance-does not in and of itself amount to participation in the alleged constitutional violation. See Welch v. Chase, No. 5:10-CV-43-MTT, 2011 WL 3817015 at *2 (M.D. Ga. June 14, 2011) (“Merely filing a grievance with a supervisory person does not alone make the supervisor liable for the allegedly violative conduct brought to light by the grievance, even if the grievance is denied.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, Plaintiff's claims do not amount to supervisory liability against either Defendant.
V. First Amendment and RLUIPA Claims
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Petitioner fails to show a First Amendment or RLUIPA violation. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 9-15. The Court agrees and recommends that Defendants' motion be granted on this ground.
A. First Amendment and RLUIPA Standards
The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I. “To establish a violation of his [or her] right to free exercise, [a plaintiff] must first establish that a state actor imposed a ‘substantial burden' on his practice of religion.” Wilkinson v. GEO Grp., Inc., 617 Fed.Appx. 915, 917 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1549 (11th Cir.1993)). The prisoner's beliefs must be sincere, meaning they are “truly held and are religious in nature.” Williams v. Sec'y for Dept. of Corr., 131 Fed.Appx. 682, 685 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Prison officials may limit a prisoner's free exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs if such “limitations are ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'” Johnson v. Brown, 581 Fed.Appx. 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
RLUIPA requires the government to justify any substantial burden on a prisoner's religious exercise by demonstrating a compelling governmental interest. See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v.Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). “To establish a prima facie case under section 3 of RLUIPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate 1) that he engaged in a religious exercise; and 2) that the religious exercise was substantially burdened.” Smith v. Governor for Ala., 562 Fed.Appx. 806, 813 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Once a Plaintiff makes such a showing, “the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2017).
B. Defendants' Motion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not shown his religious rights were substantially burdened. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 11-13. Specifically, they contend that of Plaintiff's five religious requests, all but two were accommodated, and that the denial of those two-the NOI bowtie and permitting NOI volunteers inside the prison-posed no more than a mere inconvenience on Plaintiff's practice of religion and “were based on legitimate security concerns.” Id. at 12-13. The Court agrees that Plaintiff's religious exercise rights were not substantially burdened and recommends that Defendants' motion be granted on this ground.
1. Substantial Burden
The Eleventh Circuit has “applied similar definitions of ‘substantial burden' when assessing claims under both RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause.” Robbins v. Robertson, 782 Fed.Appx. 794, 802 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004)). “[A]n individual's exercise of religion is ‘substantially burdened' if a regulation completely prevents the individual from engaging in religiously mandated activity, or if the regulation requires participation in an activity prohibited by religion.” Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. It means “more than an inconvenience on religious exercise” but instead is “akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly.” Id. Under this definition, Plaintiff's religious exercise has not been substantially burdened.
GDC considers the NOI to be a religious hate group. Id. As such, by GDC's policy, Plaintiff is never permitted in-person spiritual counseling from an NOI imam. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 33. Nevertheless, Plaintiff's ability to engage in religious exercise was not substantially burdened by this policy. By Plaintiff's own admission, he attends two NOI services per week-one specifically for NOI and one for all that practice Islam; he prays five times per day; and he consults NOI materials for spiritual guidance. Pl.'s Dep. 37:02, 71:21-71:25, 72:01-72:19, 75:18-75:25, 76:01-76:10, 86:10-86:22. Additionally, Defendants permit Plaintiff to consult outside religious leaders via letters and phone calls. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 34. This directly provides Plaintiff the relief he seeks -“spiritual counseling and consultation.” Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 27. Plaintiff has not asserted that such counseling and consultation must occur in person. Rather, he argues the available forms of communication are inadequate because the information provided is “not as comprehensive and as informative as it would be” from an NOI volunteer relaying this information in person. Pl.'s Dep. 90:09-90:18. While this may be true, it does not amount to more than a mere inconvenience of his religious exercise. See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d at 1279 (finding no substantial burden where “the outside sources that [the plaintiff] submitted in connection with his request did not make any mention of the need for a ‘designated worship area' in connection with the practice of Odinism.”).
Similarly, with respect to his request to wear an NOI bowtie, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a substantial burden. Plaintiff contends that wearing the NOI bowtie is essential and mandated for NOI males. He admits, however, that it is only required when wearing a suit. Pl.'s Dep. 63:01-63:07. Plaintiff attempts to overcome this technicality, arguing “he can wear the NOI bow tie with his prison uniform, . . . which would comply with the minimum requirements of the NOI male's dress code[.]” Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 24. His deposition testimony, however, contradicts this argument. According to Plaintiff, if he is staying at home, “going to a job that requires [him] to wear some other uniform or . . . going to the gym, ” then he is not obligated to wear the NOI bowtie. Pl.'s Dep. 63:01-63:07. Plaintiff further admits that it is not required to be worn at all NOI services and prayers. Pl.'s Dep. 63:20-64:02. Most notably, when asked whether he would wear the bowtie with his prison uniform if permitted, Plaintiff wavered, stating he “probably would wear it[.]” Pl.'s Dep. 63:10-63:13 (emphasis added). Given Plaintiff's testimony, Defendants' refusal to accommodate his NOI bowtie request was not a substantial burden. See Smith v. Governor for Ala., 562 Fed.Appx. at 813 (“While Smith presented to the court statements in his own affidavit that he needed this item for worship, those personal assertions-without any support from authoritative sources-cannot meet the standard for proving a substantial burden.” (citation omitted)).
Finally, Plaintiff claims the restricted diet provided by Defendants is unsatisfactory. Specifically, he argues Defendants have failed to fully accommodate his request for a specialized diet year-round and that the accommodated diet for the NOI December Fast is inadequate. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 20-23. This argument also fails the substantial burden analysis.
Defendants do not address Plaintiff's claim that the accommodated meal plans, both generally and with respect to the December Fast, remain inadequate. See, generally, Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 9-15. Nevertheless, because Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims, the Court will address Plaintiff's dietary claim under the summary judgment standard. See Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009) (“When a party moves for final, not partial, summary judgment, we have stated that it becomes incumbent upon the nonmovant to respond by, at the very least, raising in their opposition papers any and all arguments or defenses they felt precluded judgment in the moving party's favor.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
With respect to Plaintiff's December Fast request, GDC issued a memorandum mandating that each prison observe and accommodate the NOI December Fast. See Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. C-3, at 1. While Plaintiff claims that Defendants fail to provide at least one meal per day without land animal flesh during the fast, the record does not support this assertion. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 9, 22-23. The menu for the December Fast demonstrates that GDC has ensured no meat is provided to NOI fasting inmates at supper. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. SJ12, at 4-5, ECF No. 60-15.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff continues to take issue with this accommodation, as well as with the daily accommodated meal plans, arguing that neither conforms to the specific requirements of the NOI diet. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 22. As a practicing Muslim, Plaintiff is afforded the restricted meal plan offered to Muslim inmates which provides him with “a pork-free diet[.]” Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. C-1, at 5, ECF No. 42-7.
Plaintiff can also participate in the “Vegan and Restricted Vegan meal” plans. See Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. C-2, at 2, ECF No. 42-8. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff's arguments, GDC's current meal plans-both generally and during the December Fast-accommodate the restrictive diet required by NOI. That the GDC does not mandate an NOI-specific diet yearly does not substantially hinder Plaintiff's ability to engage in this religious activity. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 352 (“providing Muslim inmates with a pork-free diet satisfied the First Amendment.”); Holmes v. Conway, No. 1:12-CV-4105, 2012 WL 6923588, at *2-3 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 21, 2012) (finding no substantial burden where “[t]he jail does not serve pork, and defendants have offered plaintiff a vegetarian diet as a substitute for Halal.”).
VI. Equal Protection Claim
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff fails to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 15-16. The Court agrees and recommends that Defendants' motion be granted on this ground.
A. Equal Protection Standards
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A claim under the Equal Protection Clause requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis.” Sweet v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2006). It is not enough that the alleged action “results in a . . . disproportionate impact.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 256 (1977). “Proof of [ ] discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id.
B. Defendants' Motion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim fails to show either that he was treated differently than orthodox Islamic inmates or that such treatment was based on discriminatory intent. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 15-16. As an initial matter, it appears Defendants interpret Plaintiff's argument as being similarly situated solely to orthodox Islamic inmates. While true, Plaintiff also compares his bowtie request with Jewish inmates' right to wear the yarmulke. See Compl. 9, 13-14, 16. Nevertheless, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that his requests are fundamental to the practice of NOI, such that he is similarly situated to the other religious inmates, or that the denials were the result of discriminatory intent.
In fact, given the finding that Plaintiff has not shown his religious exercise has been substantially burdened by the denial of his requests, his equal protection claim likewise fails. See Cook v. Jones, No. 3:16cv568, 2019 WL 6868982, at *7 n.7 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2019) (“Indeed, ‘if a law passes muster under the First Amendment it is also likely to be upheld under the Equal Protection clause,' and ‘if a law violates First Amendment rights there is no need to resort to the Equal Protection clause to redress the constitutional violation.'” (quoting Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125-26 (3d Cir. 2005)); A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 226 n.9 (5th Cir. 2009) (“It is generally unnecessary to analyze laws which burden the exercise of the First Amendment rights by a class of persons under the equal protection guarantee, because the substantive guarantees of the Amendment serve as the strongest protection against the limitation of these rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (“In view of the result we have reached under the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to consider appellant's claim that the denial of benefits also deprived her of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
As explained above, NOI mandates that males wear the NOI bowtie only when they wear a suit. Because it is undisputed that Plaintiff does not wear a suit in prison, the NOI bowtie is not currently a mandatory part of his religion. Moreover, Plaintiff's request to wear the NOI bowtie was denied for legitimate security concerns that the bowtie could be weaponized. Even if this were not a legitimate security concern, Plaintiff has not shown that GDC permits any inmate to wear a bowtie. See Williams v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 131 Fed.Appx. 682, 687 (11th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff “failed to allege facts showing that any other specific inmate in that institution had been allowed to remove his shows before entering the prison chapel.”).
With respect to his outside volunteer request, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the available forms of communication with an outside NOI leader are inadequate. Further, Plaintiff has not shown that any other volunteer from a GDC-designated religious hate group-or even serious threat group-has been permitted to lead services inside GDC prisons. Finally, while GDC does not mandate a meal plain tailored to the NOI diet, Plaintiff has not shown that the current alternative meal plans provided by GDC are inadequate. Plaintiff's request for GDC to accommodate the December Fast was fulfilled, and though his restrictive meal plan request was unanswered, he has access to pork-free, vegan, and restrictive vegan diets.
VII. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that even assuming Plaintiff could show a First Amendment, RLUIPA, or Equal Protection violation, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 16-19. The Court agrees, and therefore, recommends that in the alternative Defendants' motion be granted on this ground.
A. Qualified Immunity Standard
“[Q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 904 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant seeking qualified immunity must show that at the time of the alleged wrongful acts, “he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Id. at 905. Once this is established, “the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Id. To do so, a plaintiff must “demonstrate: first, that the facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff establish a constitutional violation; and, second, that the illegality of the officer's actions was clearly established at the time of the incident.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Defendants' Motion
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on each of Plaintiff's claims because Plaintiff failed to show a violation of his constitutional rights. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 17. Plaintiff does not contest Defendants' qualified immunity defense as it relates to his claim for all monetary damages-just “attorney[']s fees, court costs, and injunctive relief and the costs associated therewith[.]” Pl.'s Resp. in Opp. 12. As such, the Court will address Defendants' qualified immunity claim as it relates to all of Plaintiff's claims for relief.
It is undisputed in this case that Defendants acted within their discretionary authority in their alleged actions related to Plaintiff's NOI accommodation requests.
Because that determination is made, the burden then shifts to Plaintiff to show that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons stated above, the Court determines that Defendants' refusal to permit Plaintiff to wear the NOI bowtie, refusal to permit an NOI volunteer inside the prison, and failure to mandate a meal plan specific to the NOI diet did not violate Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment, RLUIPA, or the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
VIII. Damages and Injunctive Relief
Defendants argue Plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages or injunctive relief. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 19-20. As an initial matter, the Court previously denied Plaintiff's first and second requests for injunctive relief, and it is not clear that Plaintiff has re-asserted this claim. See Order & R. 2-5, Jan. 13, 2021, ECF No. 35; Order & R. 6-7, Apr. 21, 2020, ECF No. 10. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to reassert his claim for injunctive relief, this request should be denied. Plaintiff argues that Defendants refuse to accommodate his request for weekly NOI services, but the record contradicts this assertion. See Defs.' Ex. C, at 4-5, ECF No. 42-6. Plaintiff also admits attending weekly NOI services. See Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 8. Nevertheless, Plaintiff continues to take issue with Defendants' accommodations, as GDC does not have an SOP tailored to NOI. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 30-31. While, true, GDC has yet to specify an SOP for NOI inmates, there remains the religious accommodation SOP, and GDC must still abide by the Constitution and RLUIPA. Thus, it is recommended that Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief be denied.
With respect to compensatory damages, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not shown a physical injury due to the alleged constitutional violations. Id. at 19. The Court agrees, and therefore, recommends that Plaintiff's claims for compensatory damages be denied. See Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2021) (“the text of § 1997e(e) bars only requests for compensatory damages stemming from purely mental or emotional harms.”). Moreover, with respect to Plaintiff's RLUIPA claims for monetary damages, as Defendants correctly argue, Plaintiff may not proceed against any of the individual Defendants. See, e.g., Hathcock v. Cohen, 287 Fed.Appx. 793, 798 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that “RLUIPA does not create a private action for monetary damages against prison officials sued in their individual capacity”).
It is unclear whether Defendants also argue Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages. However, to the extent they also claim Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages because he has not shown a physical injury, they are not entitled to summary judgment. In Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2021), the Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiffs may recover punitive damages for alleged constitutional violations even if they do not allege a physical injury which would entitle them to compensatory damages under the PLRA. Hoever, 993 F.3d at 1362-64. Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff's punitive damages claim on any other basis. See Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 19-20. Nevertheless, because the Court recommends granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's Constitutional and RLUIPA claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff's request for punitive damages should be denied as well.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 42) be GRANTED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 9th day of November, 2021.