Opinion
1:20-cv-01321-GSA-PC
11-22-2022
MARCUS J. MOORE, Plaintiff, v. MICHELE DODD, et al., Defendants.
ORDER FOR CLERK TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS CASE
AND
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
(ECF No. 14.)
OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS
GARY S. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. BACKGROUND
Marcus J. Moore (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) On November 8, 2021, the Court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 13.) On December 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint, which is now before the court for screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff is a state prisoner presently incarcerated at the R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, California. The events at issue in the Complaint allegedly occurred at Valley State Prison in Chowchilla, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiff names as the sole defendant Michele Dodd (Social Worker) (“Defendant”).
Plaintiff allegations follow:
On July 21, 2020, Defendant Social Worker Michele Dodd lowered Plaintiff's level of mental health care, violating Plaintiff's right to adequate medical care. Defendant Dodd knew the seriousness of Plaintiff's mental health needs, yet still acted against Plaintiff. Dodd was not Plaintiff's clinician and was not part of Plaintiff's treatment team. By doing this, Defendant Dodd also violated CDCR's Mental Health Program Guide under the Coleman v. Wilson decision.
Plaintiff requests monetary damages, including punitive damages, as relief.
IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
B. Mental Health Care Claim - Eighth Amendment
Prisoners' mental health needs are among the medical needs covered by the Eighth Amendment. See Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (mental health care requirements analyzed as part of general health care requirements), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Where a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim arises in the context of medical care, including mental health care, the prisoner must allege and prove “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). An Eighth Amendment medical claim has two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). This principle extends to an inmate's mental-health-care needs. Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 92-93 (8th Cir. 1990).
Deliberate indifference by prison personnel to an inmate's serious mental-health-care needs violates the inmate's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id. Deliberate indifference is shown by “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a claim that the named defendants “[knew] of and disregarded] an excessive risk to [plaintiff's] health . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical need' by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'” and (2) “the defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059, overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc., 104 F.3d at 1136 (en banc) (internal quotations omitted)).
Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)).
“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,' but that person ‘must also draw the inference.'” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.'” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). “A showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1060. “[E]ven gross negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)).
“A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted).
Plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts for the court to determine whether he states an Eighth Amendment claim against the Defendant. Plaintiff has not established that he had a serious medical need when he interacted with Defendant Dodd, and to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege specific facts demonstrating that the Defendant knew and understood that Plaintiff had a serious medical need and was at substantial risk of serious harm (objective prong). Plaintiff has not done so.
Neither has Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts showing what the individual Defendant personally did that violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged detailed facts showing that Defendant knew he had a serious medical need, knew he was at excessive risk of serious harm, and yet ignored the risk or otherwise acted unreasonably while knowing about the risk (subjective prong). Based on Plaintiff's existing allegations, Plaintiff demonstrates at most that his claim is based on a difference of opinion with the Defendant regarding treatment, which does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment medical claim against Defendant Dodd.
C. Violation Of Prison Rules
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dodd violated the rules in CDCR's Mental Health Program Guide. Plaintiff is advised that violation of state tort law, state regulations, rules and policies of the CDCR, or other state law is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law. See Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007). To state a claim under § 1983, there must be a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); also see Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995); Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279 (2002).
Although the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In this instance, the Court has not found a cognizable federal claim in the Complaint and therefore Plaintiff's potential state claim(s) fail as well.
Moreover, “California's Government Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a [state] public entity or its employees for money or damages be presented to the [Department of General Services] no more than six months after the cause of action accrues.” Lopez v. Cate, No. 1:10-cv-01773-AWI, 2015 WL 1293450, at *13 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2). “Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, but is . . . a condition precedent to plaintiff's maintaining an action against defendant and thus an element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The “obligation to comply with the Government Claims Act” is independent of the obligation to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. McCoy v. Torres, No. 119CV01023NONEJLTPC, 2020 WL 5257842, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020), report and recommendation.adopted, No. 119CV01023NONEJLTPC, 2021 WL 111748 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2021) (citing McPherson v. Alamo, No. 3:15-cv-03145-EMC, 2016 WL 7157634, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Parthemore v. Col, 221 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1376 (2013)). In the present case, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded facts demonstrating that he complied with the Government Claims Act in bringing his state law claims.
Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant for violation of the rules in CDCR's Mental Health Program Guide.
V. CONCLUSION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims in the Complaint against Defendant Michele Dodd. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires.” However, a district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.” Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). In this action, the Court previously granted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint, with guidance by the Court. Plaintiff has now filed two complaints without alleging facts against any Defendants which states a claim under § 1983. The Court finds that the deficiencies outlined above are not capable of being cured by amendment, and therefore further leave to amend should not be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court randomly assign a United States District Judge to this case;
AND
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. This case be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim; and
2. The Clerk be directed to enter judgment and close this case.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) days after the date of service of these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
IT IS SO ORDERED.