Opinion
CV136037004S
12-14-2015
Jennifer Moore v. Maureen Dahlmeyer
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AND FOR A NEW TRIAL #134
Robin L. Wilson, J.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Presently before the court is the plaintiff's, Jennifer Moore's, motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. This motion follows a jury trial in which the plaintiff sought to prove that the defendant, Maureen Dahlmeyer, negligently caused a motor vehicle collision, which caused the plaintiff to sustain serious injuries. The plaintiff commenced suit on March 18, 2013, and filed an amended complaint on July 16, 2015. The following facts are alleged in the plaintiff's amended complaint. On May 17, 2011, the plaintiff was a passenger in a motor vehicle operated by Diane Moore (Moore vehicle), which was stopped in the southbound lane at a red light. The defendant was operating a motor vehicle which was exiting a private driveway and attempting to make a right turn from the private driveway onto a public roadway. The defendant drove her vehicle forward from the private driveway onto the public roadway, at which time her vehicle collided with another vehicle (Prentiss vehicle), which was traveling south on the public roadway. The collision caused the Prentiss vehicle to strike the Moore vehicle. The plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of the collision.
At trial, the plaintiff sought to prove that the defendant was negligent in a number of ways which included violations of both statutory and common law negligence. More specifically, the plaintiff sought to prove that the defendant was negligent per se when she struck the Prentiss vehicle, causing it to collide with the Moore vehicle, in violation of General Statutes § 14-247. At trial, the defendant testified to the following when questioned by plaintiff's counsel: " Q. Do you agree that when exiting the [private] driveway, you are required to grant the right-of-way to vehicles that were on [the public roadway] coming from your left? A. Yes. (Plaintiff's Exhibit A, p. 12.) " Q. And they had priority over you in that situation, correct? A. Yes . . . Q. Did you yield the right-of-way to the driver who was--whose car was coming . . . from your left? A. I did not . . ." (Plaintiff's Exhibit A, p. 17.) The following exchange also occurred between the plaintiff's counsel and the defendant: " Q. So the reason why you didn't yield the right-of-way to the Prentiss vehicle was because you didn't see him; is that correct? A. I did not see his vehicle. Q. And that's the reason why you didn't yield the right-of-way to him, correct? A. Yes. (Plaintiff's Exhibit A, p. 40-41.) Additionally, the defendant testified: " Q. How many light sequences did you wait through before exiting that parking lot that day? A. Two of them . . . I had waited through those two traffic signals then . . . I looked to my left and I looked to my right, and I looked to my left again . . ." (Plaintiff's Exhibit A, p. 22-23.)
Section 14-247 provides: " The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on such a highway. Failure to grant the right-of-way as provided by this section shall be an infraction."
At the conclusion of the trial, the court charged the jury, in relevant part, as follows: " NEGLIGENCE PER SE. Negligence can arise from a violation of a statute that creates a duty by declaring that such requirements must be followed or that certain acts must not be done. By enacting such a law, the legislature has determined the appropriate standard of care to which an individual's conduct must conform. Conduct that violates the requirements of such a statute constitutes negligence. The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant has violated the following statutory duty: The plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to yield the right-of-way to vehicles on the road while entering from a private driveway, in violation of General Statutes § 14-247. This statute requires that '[t]he driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on such a highway.' A violation by the defendant of a duty imposed by this statute constitutes negligence. If you find that the plaintiff has proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated this statute, then the defendant's conduct is negligent as a matter of law."
In addition to the negligence per se jury instruction, the court also charged the jury, in relevant part, as follows: " FAILURE TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY § 14-247. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to yield the right-of-way to vehicles on the road while entering from a private driveway, in violation of § 14-247 of the Connecticut General Statutes. This is an allegation of statutory negligence. This statute states that '[t]he driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on such a highway.' The term 'highway' is defined in the following way: " 'Highway" includes any state or other public highway, road, street, avenue, alley, driveway, parkway or place, under the control of the state or any political subdivision of the state, dedicated, appropriated or opened to public travel or other use.' If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway and failed to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on such highway, then you shall find that the defendant failed to conform her conduct to the duty imposed by this statute, and is therefore negligent as a matter of law."
At the conclusion of the trial, on July 24, 2015, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent in any way. On July 29, 2015, the plaintiff filed the present motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, along with a supporting memorandum of law, on grounds that: (1) the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence; (2) the verdict is contrary to the law as contained in the trial court's instructions to the jury; (3) there was error in excluding evidence of alcohol consumption by the defendant; and (4) there was error in refusing to allow questioning of the defendant regarding whether she made a claim against a third party driver for the damage to her car.
According to the interrogatories completed by the jury, the jury determined that the defendant was not negligent per se and as a result, did not make any determinations regarding causation or damages.
On August 6, 2015, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion along with a supporting memorandum of law, to which the plaintiff filed a reply on August 17, 2015. Oral argument was heard on the motion at short calendar on September 21, 2015.
DISCUSSION
" The trial court possesses inherent power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court's opinion, is against the law or the evidence . . . [The trial court] should not set aside a verdict where it is apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably reach their conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles . . . Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 702, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). " Although the court has broad discretion in setting aside a verdict, its discretion is not boundless . . . Upon issues regarding which, on the evidence, there is room for reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men, the conclusion of a jury, if one at which honest men acting fairly and intelligently might arrive reasonably, must stand . . . [I]f there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury's verdict, unless there is a mistake in law or some other valid basis for upsetting the result other than a difference of opinion regarding the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, the trial court should let the jury work [its] will . . . [T]he court should not assume that the jury made a mistake, but should suppose that the jury did exactly what it intended to do." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sigular v. Gilson, 141 Conn.App. 581, 593, 62 A.3d 564 (2013).
" [Courts] must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury's verdict . . . In making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable. (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, supra, 278 Conn. 704. " A verdict is not defective as a matter of law as long as it contains an intelligible finding so that its meaning is clear . . . A verdict will be deemed intelligible if it clearly manifests the intent of the jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Bergman, 106 Conn.App. 660, 680, 943 A.2d 515 (2008), aff'd, 296 Conn. 169, 994 A.2d 666 (2010).
In support of her posttrial motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, the plaintiff argues that, based on the defendant's testimony, there is undisputed evidence that the defendant, who was entering the highway from a private driveway, failed to yield the right-of-way to the Prentiss vehicle, which was traveling on a public roadway. The plaintiff contends that this is a clear violation of § 14-247 and accordingly, constitutes negligence per se. The plaintiff also contends that it is inconsequential whether the defendant acted reasonably, ascertained safety, or failed to see the Prentiss vehicle before pulling out of the private driveway because failure to yield the right-of-way to vehicles on a public roadway while entering from a private driveway is an automatic violation of § 14-247 and thus, negligence per se. The plaintiff argues that the jury simply had to decide whether the defendant violated § 14-247 and the jury could not have concluded that the defendant was not negligent per se based on the defendant's own testimony admitting to the violation of this statute.
The plaintiff also argues that there is no evidence to support the defendant's hypothetical position taken at trial that the Prentiss vehicle had crossed the solid white line, and even if there was such evidence, there is no law or precedent to support the assertion that the Prentiss vehicle would have surrendered the right-of-way had it crossed the solid white line. The plaintiff contends that the language of § 14-247 makes it clear that the right-of-way is legally granted to all vehicles traveling on the public roadway, and contains no language from which the defendant could conclude that the right-of-way is revoked when a driver changes lanes. Thus, the plaintiff argues that in light of the defendant's undisputed testimony, the jury's verdict in favor of the defendant was unreasonable, against the weight of the evidence and contrary to the law. In support of her motion, the plaintiff attached an excerpt of the trial transcript (Exhibit A).
In opposition, the defendant counters that she testified at trial that she waited through two light cycles for traffic to clear before pulling out from the private driveway to enter onto the public roadway, and looked to her left twice for traffic. The defendant argues that based on this testimony, the jury properly rendered a verdict for the defendant because it proves that she was not negligent. Additionally, the defendant argues that there is a possibility that the Prentiss vehicle crossed the solid white line and thus, the vehicle did not even have the right-of-way pursuant to § 14-247 as the plaintiff contends. As a result, the defendant contends that the jury verdict should not be set aside because she acted reasonably and the jury clearly understood the law as charged.
I
" Negligence involves the violation of a legal duty [that] one owes to another, in respect to care for the safety of the person or property of that other . . . The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Curran v. Kroll, 118 Conn.App. 401, 407, 984 A.2d 763 (2009), aff'd, 303 Conn. 845, 37 A.3d 700 (2012). " To prove negligence per se, a plaintiff must show that the defendant breached a duty owed to her and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Donnell v. Feneque, 120 Conn.App. 167, 171, 991 A.2d 643 (2010). " Negligence per se operates to engraft a particular legislative standard onto the general standard of care imposed by traditional tort law principles, i.e., that standard of care to which an ordinarily prudent person would conform his conduct. To establish negligence, the jury in a negligence per se case need not decide whether the defendant acted as an ordinarily prudent person would have acted under the circumstances. They merely decide whether the relevant statute or regulation has been violated. If it has, the defendant was negligent as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gore v. People's Saving's Bank, 235 Conn. 360, 376, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995).
Section 14-247 details the right-of-way at a driveway or public road. It provides, in relevant part: " The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on such highway." " The operator of a motor vehicle proceeding upon a public highway is under no duty to anticipate that the driver or operator of another motor vehicle about to enter the highway from a private road or driveway will fail to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles on the public highway as required by statute, and, in the absence of anything which gives or should give notice to the contrary, he or she is entitled to assume and to act upon the assumption, even to the last moment, that the driver of the motor vehicle so entering the public highway will, in obedience to the statute, yield the right-of-way." 3A Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 246 (2015). Thus, if § 14-247 is violated, a defendant is negligent as a matter of law. See O'Donnell v. Feneque, supra, 120 Conn.App. 173 (holding with regard to statutory negligence, jury had to merely decide whether defendant had violated the statute and if she had, defendant was negligent as a matter of law).
In Romano v. Vittorio-Benegoss, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-11-6024348-S (April 24, 2013, Wilson, J.), the plaintiff contended that the defendant struck the passenger side of the plaintiff's motor vehicle when the defendant was exiting from a private driveway onto a public roadway, in violation of § 14-247. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that there was " no genuine issue of material fact with respect to liability that the defendant was negligent per se in that she failed to yield the statutory right-of-way to the plaintiff's vehicle in violation of . . . § 14-247 . . . when she exited from the private driveway into the side of the plaintiff's vehicle." Id. In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which he attested that he was operating a motor vehicle in a southerly direction on a public roadway. Id. At that time and place, the defendant, suddenly and without warning, drove her vehicle out of the private driveway onto a public roadway and directly into the passenger side of the plaintiff's car. Id. The court held that the facts attested to in the plaintiff's affidavit would clearly support a violation of § 14-247 and because the statute had been violated, the defendant was negligent as a matter of law. Id. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and concluded that, based on the plaintiff's affidavit, any reasonable person would agree that the defendant failed to grant the right-of-way to the plaintiff's vehicle and thus, was negligent per se. Id.
Additionally, in Devlin v. Janis, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-09-5030988-S (April 6, 2010, Wilson, J.), the plaintiff relied on his affidavit and a police report to prove that the defendant violated § 14-242(e). The court stated that the plaintiff's affidavit, along with the police report, established that the plaintiff was entitled to the right-of-way, and that the defendant entered into the plaintiff's lane, making it impossible for the plaintiff to avoid a collision. The court held that this constituted a violation of § 14-242(e) and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the defendant was negligent per se. Id.
Section 14-242(e) provides: " The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or within the area formed by the extension of the lateral lines of the private alley, road or driveway across the full width of the public highway with which it intersects, or so close to such intersection of public highways or to the area formed by the extension of the lateral lines of said private alley, road or driveway across the full width of the public highway as to constitute an immediate hazard."
Similarly, in the present case, the defendant, who was pulling her motor vehicle out of a private driveway and entering a public roadway, failed to yield the right-of-way to the Prentiss vehicle, while it was traveling on said public roadway. The defendant struck the Prentiss vehicle, causing it to collide with the Moore vehicle. As in Romano and Devlin, it is undisputed that the defendant here failed to yield the right-of-way to the Prentiss vehicle: " Q. Do you agree that when exiting the [private] driveway, you are required to grant the right-of-way to vehicles that were on [the public roadway] coming from your left? A. Yes . . . Q. Did you yield the right-of-way to the driver who was--whose car was coming . . . from your left? A. I did not. Q. So the reason why you didn't yield the right-of-way to the Prentiss vehicle was because you didn't see him; is that correct? A. I did not see his vehicle. Q. And that's the reason why you didn't yield the right-of-way to him, correct? A. Yes." (Plaintiff's Exhibit A, p. 12, 17, 40-41.) Because the court charged the jury on negligence per se and failure to yield the right-of-way pursuant to § 14-247, the jury had to decide whether, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the defendant violated § 14-247. Based on the defendant's own admission, it is clear that she failed to yield the right-of-way to the Prentiss vehicle. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the defendant was clearly aware that she was required to grant the right-of-way to vehicles that were traveling a public roadway, and despite possessing this knowledge, she failed to yield the right-of-way to the Prentiss vehicle. Despite this admission, awareness, and undisputed evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.
While the plaintiff in the present case filed a posttrial motion to set aside the verdict, and the plaintiffs in Romano and Devlin filed motions for summary judgment, the standards are similar--the jury need not decide whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances, they merely decide whether § 14-247 was violated. The court, in deciding both a motion for summary judgment and a motion to set aside the verdict, applies this standard to the facts and determines whether a jury could have reasonably reached its conclusion. See Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, supra, 278 Conn. 704; Romano v. Vittorio-Benegoss, supra, Superior Court, CV-l 1-6024348-S.
The defendant admitted that she failed to yield the right-of-way to the Prentiss vehicle and thus, the court is bound to take such an admission as conclusively established. See Conn. Code Evid. § 2-1; Devlin v. Janis, Superior Court, supra, Docket No. CV-09-5030988-S (finding that because defendant admitted that her negligence proximately caused motor vehicle accident, court was bound to take such an admission as conclusively established).
The court, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, concludes that the jury could not have reasonably reached a verdict in favor of the defendant. Based on the defendant's admitted failure to yield the right-of-way to the Prentiss vehicle, it is clear that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of the relevant legal principles. Thus, based on the defendant's own testimony at trial, which was undisputed, the jury could only reach one conclusion: the defendant violated § 14-247 and was therefore negligent as a matter of law. Because this court possesses the inherent power to set aside a jury verdict which is against the law and the evidence, the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial is granted.
II
Although the court has granted the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, it is important for the court to address separately the defendant's arguments, because of the significance of the court's ruling. The defendant argues that she was not negligent because she acted reasonably under the circumstances, waiting through two traffic cycles for traffic to clear before pulling out from the private driveway and onto the public roadway. The defendant also contends that there was a possibility that the Prentiss vehicle crossed the solid white line and therefore, the Prentiss vehicle did not even have the right-of-way pursuant to § 14-247.
First, as previously noted, the standard in negligence per se cases is not whether the defendant acted as an ordinarily prudent person would have acted under the circumstances, but whether the relevant statute had been violated. See Gore v. People's Saving's Bank, supra, 235 Conn. 376. In Pinto v. Spigner, 163 Conn. 191, 195, 302 A.2d 266 (1972), the defendant intended to make a left-hand turn at an intersection to cross an eastbound lane and was required to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching from the opposite direction pursuant to General Statutes § 14-246. The defendant failed to yield the right-of-way to a motorcyclist, causing the defendant's motor vehicle to collide with the motorcyclist. Id., 194. At trial, the defendant argued that after the light turned green, she waited until several vehicles approaching her from the west had passed before turning. Id. The court stated, " the defendant cannot escape responsibility by stating that she did not see or hear the [motor vehicle] . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 195. Second, the nonmoving party may not rely on conjecture or unsubstantiated speculation. See Escourse v. 100 Taylor Avenue, LLC, 150 Conn.App. 819, 829, 92 A.3d 1025 (2014).
In applying the court's analysis in Pinto to the present case, the defendant cannot escape liability by stating that she waited through two traffic signals before pulling out of the private driveway onto the public roadway. It is inconsequential whether the defendant in the present case acted reasonably, ascertained safety, or failed to see the Prentiss vehicle before pulling out of the private driveway--she admittedly failed to yield the right-of-way. Additionally, the defendant did not offer any evidence at trial that the Prentiss vehicle crossed the solid white line--the defendant simply relies on conjecture and unsubstantiated speculation to support this argument. Thus, the defendant's arguments do not constitute an excuse for the defendant's admitted violation of § 14-247. There is simply no reasonable basis in evidence for the jury to conclude as it did.
The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict on additional grounds that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of alcohol consumption by the defendant, and in refusing to allow questioning of the defendant regarding whether the defendant made a claim against a third party driver for the damage to her car. Because the court has determined that the jury's verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted on grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and law, the court need not reach the plaintiff's evidentiary claims of error.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the plaintiff's posttrial motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial is granted because the jury's verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and is contrary to law.