Opinion
Case No. 8:01-CV-1338-T-24MSS
November 13, 2001
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court for consideration of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc. No. 4, filed July 16, 2001). Plaintiff opposes Defendant's motion. (Doc. No. 10, filed August 10, 2001).
Defendant argues that Count I of Plaintiffs Complaint alleging violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act is time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided in Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5) (2000).
I. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the district court is required to view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. All that is required is "a short and plain statement of the claim." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted a simplified pleading" approach because of "the liberal opportunity for discovery and other pretrial procedures . . . to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense. . . ." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48. The purpose of notice pleading is to reach a decision on the merits and to avoid turning pleading into "a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome. Id.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on February 22, 1999. Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges acts of discrimination occurring between June 24, 1998 and July 3, 1998. Compl. ¶ 14. Defendant agrees that the filing of the discrimination charge with the EEOC "operated as a dual filing with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR")." See Def.'s Mot. at 2, n. 1.
Thereafter, the EEOC issued a reasonable cause determination letter on September 28, 1999. Compl. ¶ 16. Defendant agrees that this letter "was issued more than 180 days after the Plaintiff filed" the discrimination charge. Def's Mot. at 2; see Fla. Stat. § 760.11(3) (2000) (requiring FCHR to determine if there is reasonable cause within 180 days of the filing of the charge). This EEOC letter stated that,
Upon finding that there is reason to believe that violations have occurred, the Commission attempts to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices by informal methods of conciliation. Therefore, the Commission now invites the parties to join with it in reaching a just resolution of this matter. * * * If the Respondent declines to discuss settlement or when, for any other reason, a settlement acceptable to the office Director is not obtained, the Director will inform the parties and advise them of the court enforcement alternatives available to aggrieved persons and the Commission. A Commission representative will contact each party in the near future to begin conciliation.
Ex. A attached to Compl.
conciliation was not reached and on January 11, 2001, the United States Department of Justice issued to Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue Within 90 Days. Compl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff then filed a complaint on April 3, 2001, within the 90-day limit.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Count I is time-barred because Plaintiff filed her complaint more "than 1 year after the date of determination of reasonable cause by the [FCHR] commission." Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5) (2000). Defendant contends that the EEOC reasonable cause determination operates as a reasonable cause determination by the FCHR. See Dawkins v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 53 F. Supp.2d 1356, 1361 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that an EEOC's no-cause determination operated as a no-cause determination by the FCHR). Thus, Defendant argues that Plaintiff had one year from the EEOC's determination of reasonable cause issued on September 28, 1999 to file a complaint. Plaintiff's complaint was filed on April 3, 2001 — well beyond that one year time frame — and for that reason Defendant contends that the action is time-barred.
Defendant relies on McDowell v. School Bd. of Leon County, 765 So.2d 804 (Fla. 1St DCA 2000) for the proposition that the one-year statute of limitations still applies when the commission issues a reasonable cause determination beyond 180 days after the charge filing. In McDowell, the claimant received a reasonable cause determination from the FCHR a year after the filing of a discrimination charge. McDowell, 765 So.2d at 804. McDowell concerned judicially crafted time limitations where a reasonable cause determination is issued after the required 180 days. Id. at 805. These judicially crafted time limitations were based on Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 703 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) and Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 734 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Id. McDowell applied the one-year statute of limitations from the date that a reasonable cause determination is made, despite this determination being made after the 180 days. McDowell, 765 So.2d at 806. Defendant urges this Court to follow McDowell and apply the one-year statute of limitations from the date a reasonable cause determination was issued in this matter.
Subsequent to McDowell, these issues were considered by the Florida Supreme Court in Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432 (Fla. 2000), which ultimately quashed Milano and the First District's opinion in Joshua. The Florida Supreme Court held that a general four-year statute of limitations, instead of the one-year in section 760.11(5), applies " if the Commission on Human Relations does not make a reasonable cause determination on a complaint within the 180 days contemplated by section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes (1995)." Joshua, 768 So.2d at 433 (emphasis added).
In Joshua, the claimant originally filed a discrimination charge with FCHR in January 1995 and then filed another charge in July 1995. Id. Having not received a determination from the FCHR, the claimant filed suit in January 1998. Id. at 434. The defendant in Joshua argued that the one-year statute of limitation began to run after the 180 days. Id. Thus, the defendant argued that based on Milano, the claimant had a year and 180 days from the charge to file suit. Id.
Defendant now contends that the four-year limitation pronounced in Joshua only applies when the commission has failed to render a determination. Therefore, Defendant argues Joshua should not apply to the case at bar because there was a determination after the 180 days. Defendant relies on Woodham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 2001 WL 575105 (Fla.App. 3 Dist) to distinguish Joshua. In Woodham, the claimant filed a discrimination charge and received a no-cause determination 300 days later. Woodham at *1 The claimant then attempted to disregard the administrative remedies process required to proceed after a no-cause determination on the grounds that the determination was made after the 180 days. Id. at *2. The Third District held that the plain language of the statutory scheme required claimants receiving a no-cause determination to request an administrative hearing. Id. at *3 The Third District in Woodham found that Joshua was not applicable and did not dictate a different result. The Third District stated that Joshua involved a statute of limitations issue "if the FCHR does not make a reasonable cause determination within the required 180 days." Woodham at *3 (emphasis added).
Recently a motion for rehearing en banc was denied and a motion for certification to the Florida Supreme Court was granted. Woodham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 12893 (Sept. 12, 2001).
In this matter, Plaintiff is not seeking to avoid requesting a required administrative hearing as the claimant in Woodham, nor did Plaintiff receive a no-cause determination as the claimant in Woodham. The issues in the case at bar, therefore, are not analogous to those addressed by Woodham, and in fact, are closer to those addressed in Joshua.
Although in Joshua a determination was never issued, the scope of the holding, as even the Woodham court recognized, applies "where the Commission has not made a reasonable cause determination within 180 days." Joshua, 768 So.2d at 439; see Seale v. EMSA Correctional Care, Inc., 767 So.2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 2000) (quashing and remanding a decision in light of Joshua's holding that a four-year statute of limitations "applies when the Commission fails to make a reasonable cause determination within 180 days.") (emphasis added). The Court in Joshua was also concerned that applying the one-year statute of limitations would violate a claimant's right to fair notice and opportunity to be heard. Joshua, 768 So.2d at 438. While in Joshua the claimant did not receive a determination letter and Plaintiff here did receive a letter, that letter was from the EEOC and did not inform the Plaintiff of her rights under the Florida Civil Rights Act. The Court in Joshua found that "the Legislature's intent (was] that one claiming a deprivation under its terms would have the Commission make a preliminary reasonable cause determination, notify the claimant of its findings, and inform the claimant of the possible next steps that can be taken." Joshua, 768 So.2d at 439 (emphasis added). While the EEOC letter may serve as a reasonable cause determination from the FCHR, it cannot be said to have informed Plaintiff of the possible next steps that can be taken, nor can it be said to have provided Plaintiff "the options available under" the Florida Civil Rights Act. See Fla. Stat. § 760.11(3) (requiring claimants to be notified of these options). Indeed, as Plaintiff contends, the EEOC letter invites Plaintiff to join informal conciliation in accordance with the federal procedures and instructs that if that fails a representative will inform the parties of possible future steps. It was not until Plaintiff received her right to sue letter in January 2001, that she was notified of the option to bring suit. As in Joshua, this Court is reluctant to dismiss Plaintiffs Florida civil rights claim due to administrative inaction and error. Plaintiff's "constitutionally protected rights should not be denied because the Commission failed to give her adequate notice." Joshua, 768 So.2d at 439
In fact, similar to Joshua, Plaintiff states that she has not received any notice from FCHR. Pl's Resp. at 6.
As such, the Court adopts the holding of Joshua and finds that in the case at bar, the general four-year statutes of limitations applies. Therefore, Count I is not timebarred. Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 4) is DENIED.