Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of complaint received by pro se office ninety-two days after receipt of right-to-sue letter); Legra v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, No. 14-cv-9245, 2016 WL 6102369, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2016) (dismissingpro se plaintiff's ADA claims filed 95 days after plaintiff received right-to-sue letter); Moore v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-4578, 2016 WL 3963120, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (dismissingpro se plaintiff's ADA claims that were filed 95 days after plaintiff received right-to-sue letter); Sanchez v. National Cleaning Co., 11 F.Supp.2d 453, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissingpro se plaintiff's complaint as untimely where filed 92 days after receipt of right-to-sue letter).

Id. at 8. This renders Plaintiff's ADA claims untimely, and the Court declines to apply any equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in light of the fact that the EEOC's letter “contain[ed] a clear notice that she must bring suit within ninety days of receipt of the letter.” See Legra v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, No. 14-cv-9245, 2016 WL 6102369, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2016) (dismissing pro se plaintiff's ADA claims filed 95 days after plaintiff received right-to-sue letter); see also Moore v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-4578, 2016 WL 3963120, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (dismissing pro se plaintiff's ADA claims that were filed 95 days after plaintiff received right-to-sue letter and declining to allow equitable tolling). Even if Plaintiff's allegation is wrong-and she did not receive the right-to-sue letter on the same day it was issued through some form of electronic delivery-her filing of the complaint was still untimely according to the presumption that a plaintiff receives an EEOC right-to-sue letter within three days of when it was issued unless the plaintiff demonstrates otherwise.

“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . ‘prohibits employment-related discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and retaliation against employees who complain about discrimination.'” Tassy v. Buttigieg, 51 F.4th 521, 529 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2008)); see also Moore v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-4578 (KPF), 2016 WL 3963120, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Title VII, however, does not bar discrimination based on disability. See Moore, 2016 WL 3963120, at *6 (dismissing Title VII claim where Plaintiff “alleges discrimination solely on the basis of disability, and makes no claims involving any of the protected classes that are within the scope of Title VII”); Risco v. McHugh, 868 F.Supp.2d 75, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability.”).

Tiberio, 664 F.3d at 37 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). This includes, for example, “an affidavit by the claimant stating the actual date of receipt (or lack thereof).” Johnson El v. New York City Admin. for Children's Servs., No. 19 Civ. 4352 (LGS), 2021 WL 293327, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Moore v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 4578 (KPF), 2016 WL 3963120, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (“This presumption may be rebutted by admissible evidence that the document was not mailed, was received late, or was never received, but ‘[t]he mere denial of receipt does not

(internal quotation marks omitted)) (collecting cases); see also Moore v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 4578 (KPF), 2016 WL 3963120, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (“[T]he filing requirements of Title VII and the ADA are not jurisdictional[.]” (quoting Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003), as amended (July 29, 2003))).

"A plaintiff's failure to file a claim within the time limits set by Title VII ... will ordinarily preclude [him] from pursuing that claim in federal court, and can warrant dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Moore v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 4578 (KPF), 2016 WL 3963120, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (citation omitted). However, equitable tolling may be warranted where (i) a party "has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period [he] seeks to have tolled," and (ii) the party "has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply."

"A plaintiff's failure to file a claim within the time limits set by Title VII ... will ordinarily preclude [him] from pursuing that claim in federal court, and can warrant dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Moore v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 4578 (KPF), 2016 WL 3963120, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (citation omitted).

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f), 12117(a); see also Tiberio, 664 F.3d at 37 (2d Cir. 2011). Although pro se plaintiffs are entitled to leniency in other areas of litigation, the case law is clear: The 90-day deadline is strictly enforced against represented and pro se plaintiffs alike. If a pro se plaintiff misses her deadline by a few days, or even one day, her action must be dismissed as untimely. See, e.g., Ayala v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 15-CV-4919 (VSB), 2017 WL 1234028, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (one day late); Moore v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 4578 (KPF), 2016 WL 3963120, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (five days late); Moscowitz v. Brown, 850 F. Supp. 1185, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (one day late), abrogated on other grounds, 216 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Nash v. Human Dev. Servs., No. 02 Civ. 8551 (DF), 2003 WL 22871911, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2003) (The 90-day time limit "should be strictly enforced and not extended by even one day.") (quoting Holmes v. NBC/GE, 914 F. Supp. 1040, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). A pro se litigant's mistake about the correct way to calculate the deadline, such as the misconception that the 90-day deadline is equivalent to a three-month deadline, is not an excuse.

Title VII and the ADEA required Plaintiff to file his Complaint within 90 days of receiving his Right to Sue Letter. See, e.g., George v. Prof'l Disposables Int'l, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 3d 428, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (ADEA); Moore v. City of N.Y., No. 15 Civ. 4578 (KPF), 2016 WL 3963120, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (Title VII). "Generally speaking, '[t]his requirement should be strictly enforced and not extended by even one day.'"

"It does not, however, bar disability discrimination." Moore v. City of N.Y., No. 15 Civ. 4578 (KPF), 2016 WL 3963120, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016). Plaintiff claims that he suffered discrimination, in violation of this statute, on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.