Opinion
67046-8-I
06-25-2012
JEFFREY MOORE, Appellant, v. BLUE FROG MOBILE, INC., a Washington corporation; VICTOR SIEGEL and JANE DOE SIEGEL, a married couple; Respondents. BRETT MAXWELL and JANE DOE MAXWELL, a married couple, and MAHA IBRAHIM and JANE DOE IBRAHIM, a married couple, Defendants.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Lau, J.
This is the second appeal involving a willful nonpayment of wages dispute between Jeffrey Moore and his former employer, Victor Siegel. In Moore v. Blue Frog Mobile, Inc., 153 Wn.App. 1, 221 P.3d 913 (2009) (Moore I), we reversed summary judgment in Moore's favor, implicitly rejected Siegel's request on appeal for summary judgment dismissal in his favor, and held material fact issues remain on whether a bona fide dispute existed. Moore appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment of dismissal in Siegel's favor on the bona fide dispute issue. Under the law of the case doctrine, issues decided in a prior appeal in the same case are binding on further proceedings in the trial court on remand. Because the trial court's order contravenes Moore I's holding, we reverse and remand for trial.
The Wage Dispute
This case involves a dispute between two former executives of Blue Frog Mobile, Inc. Jeffrey Moore was terminated from Blue Frog and entitled to certain payments under a severance agreement. Blue Frog's new chief executive officer, Victor Siegel, later determined that Moore breached the agreement's nondisparagement clause by submitting a declaration in a third party's lawsuit against Blue Frog. He directed Blue Frog to stop paying Moore, who then sued the company and Siegel, individually, under RCW 49.52.070. This statute provides for double damages when an employer or officer willfully withholds an employee's wages. The existence of a bona fide dispute over the employee's entitlement to the wages defeats a willfulness finding. Moore I, 153 Wn.App. at 9.
Moore previously settled with two Blue Frog board members, and Blue Frog stipulated to judgment in Moore's favor.
The facts are fully set forth in Moore I. We repeat only the facts necessary to resolve this appeal. [3] Siegel relies on no exception in RAP 2.5(c)(2). [4] Siegel's contrary arguments are unpersuasive. Given our disposition here, we need not address Moore's remaining challenges.
In Moore I, Moore moved the trial court for summary judgment, arguing Siegel lacked a reasonable basis to withhold his severance payments. Siegel opposed summary judgment, arguing the existence of a bona fide dispute over Moore's wages entitlement because Siegel reasonably believed that Moore's declaration breached the severance agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in Moore's favor for $125,946.86, twice the unpaid severance amount and awarded Moore attorney fees and costs in the amount of $51,043.82.
Moore I Appeal
Siegel specifically argued on appeal, "The more precise issue is whether Siegel . . . reasonably believed that Moore breached his contract with Blue Frog, thereby excusing its further performance under the contract and making any further payment to Moore unnecessary." Appellant's Reply Br. at 2 (Moore I). In addition to reversal of Moore's summary judgment, Siegel requested summary judgment dismissal in his favor because, "[a]s a matter of law, this court may, on the record before it, determine that as a matter of law a bona fide dispute existed between Siegel and Moore over whether Moore had any further severance payments due him because of Moore's breach of the severance agreement." Appellant's Reply Br. at 15 (Moore I).
We reversed summary judgment to Moore, rejected Siegel's request for summary judgment in his favor, and concluded material fact issues remain as to the existence of a bona fide dispute. On remand, before a different trial court, Siegel moved for summary judgment in his favor, arguing, "The undisputed facts establish that future payments 'were fairly debatable.'" In granting Siegel's summary judgment, the court reasoned,
Upon consideration of this evidence and all papers submitted in support of and in opposition to this motion and related evidentiary motions, the Court determines that no reasonable person could believe other than that it was fairly debatable as to whether plaintiff Moore was owed further payments by his former employer. The court also denied Moore's CR 56(f) continuance motion, granted Siegel's motion to strike portions of a Blue Frog employee declaration, and denied Moore's reconsideration motion.
ANALYSIS
Moore argues that the court's order granting summary judgment to Siegel contradicted our Moore I holding. Siegel counters that because we did not remand with particular instructions in Moore I, the law of the case did not preclude Siegel's summary judgment motion.
We review summary judgment orders de novo. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 860, 93 P.3d 108 (2004). Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c).
The law of the case doctrine provides that when there is an appellate court ruling, that holding must be followed in all subsequent stages of the same litigation. State v. Schwab, 163 Wn.2d 664, 672, 185 P.3d 1151 (2008). Although the law of the case is discretionary for an appellate court under RAP 2.5(c), an appellate decision binds the trial court on remand. Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d 91, 113, 829 P.2d 746 (1992) (law of the case doctrine "refers to 'the binding effect of determinations made by the appellate court on further proceedings in the trial court on remand.'" (Citing 15 Lewis H. Orland & Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice: Judgments § 380, at 55 (4th ed. 1986)); see also RAP 12.2 ("Upon issuance of the mandate of the appellate court as provided in rule 12.5, the action taken or decision made by the appellate court is effective and binding on the parties to the review and governs all subsequent proceedings in the action in any court, unless otherwise directed upon recall of the mandate as provided in rule 12.9, and except as provided in rule2.5(c)(2).").
Our opinion in Moore I casts no doubt that fact issues remain as to the bona fide dispute's core question—the reasonableness of Siegel's belief. We reasoned, "[T]he critical issue here is . . . whether Siegel's asserted belief—that Moore breached the severance agreement and was no longer entitled to severance payments—was reasonable enough to create a bona fide dispute." Moore I, 153 Wn.App. at 8. We then held, "Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a bona fide dispute existed, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment order and its award of attorney fees and costs." Moore I, 153 Wn.App. at 10.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, our decision in Moore I constitutes the law of the case and binds the parties and the trial court on remand. Because the trial court's ruling contravenes our holding in Moore I, we reverse and remand for trial.