Finally, this sale was in the context of an auction where the "conditions prescribed by the seller or owner and announced at the time and place of the auction are binding on the purchaser whether or not he knew or heard them." Continental Can Co. v. Commercial Waterway Dist. 1, 56 Wn.2d 456, 459, 347 P.2d 887, 354 P.2d 25 (1959) (quoting Moore v. Berry, 40 Tenn. App. 1, 288 S.W.2d 465 (1955)). See RCW 62A.2-328; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 28, comment e (1981). None of the cases cited by Travis to show the applicability of Berg to this case involve an auction.

Rosin v. First Bank of Oak Park, 126 Ill. App.3d 230, 235, 466 N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (1984). See, Cuba, supra; Coleman, 540 S.W.2d at 938 ("`where a right is reserved in the seller to reject any and all bids received, the right may be exercised by the owner even after the auctioneer has accepted a bid, and this applies to the auction of public as well as private property'"); City of New York v. Union News Co., 222 N.Y. 263, 118 N.E. 635 (1918); Eugene Stud Veneer, Inc. v. State Bd. of Forestry, 3 Or. App. 20, 469 P.2d 635 (1970); Moore v. Berry, 40 Tenn. App. 1, 288 S.W.2d 465 (1955); Continental Can v. Commercial Etc., 56 Wn.2d 456, 347 P.2d 887 (1959). As it was here made known both through advertisements and the announcement at the auction that any bids on the lands would have to be confirmed by the probate court, the situation is analogous to reserving a right in the seller to confirm, accept, or rejects the bids.

Well v. Schoeneweis, 101 Ill. App.3d 254, 257 (1981). Moore v. Berry, 40 Tenn. App. 1, 8 (1955). Holston v. Pennington, 225 Va. 551, 556 (1983).

There is no showing by any credible evidence that the buyer authorized the auctioneer to change the terms of the sale, after the hammer fell. The defendant cannot, under the facts, rely upon the provision of the contract she signed with the auctioneer which gave her the right to confirm or reject bids. Where the terms announced at the auction sale include the right in the owner to reject bids, that condition is binding on all bidders, whether they heard it or not. Moore v. Berry (1955) 40 Tenn. App. 1, 288 S.W.2d 465. We hold, however, where the right to reject bids is not stated in the printed posters, nor is it announced at the sale, that right cannot be asserted after the bid is accepted by the fall of the hammer or other act of acceptance by the auctioneer.

" Id. § 20, at p. 238. In cases involving auction sales advertised or announced by the auctioneer that "`The commissioners reserve the right to reject any and all bids received'" [ Continental Can Co. v. Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 1 of King County, 56 Wash.2d 456, 347 P.2d 887 (1959), aff'd 354 P.2d 25 (1960)], or that "All this property is sold subject to Owner's Confirmation" [ Moore v. Berry, 40 Tenn.App. 1, 288 S.W.2d 465 (1955)], or that "`The State Forester reserves the right . . . to reject any or all bids'" [ Eugene Stud Veneer, Inc. v. State Bd. of Forestry, 3 Or.App. 20, 469 P.2d 635 (1970)], or that "Cosigners [sic] will have the privilege of no sale if they do not wish to sell for the last bid on the animal" [ Bradshaw v. Thompson, supra n. 1, 454 F.2d 75], or that the commissioner reserves the right to "`reject any or all bids if in his judgment he deemed it for the best interests of the city'" [ City of New York v. Union News Co., 222 N.Y. 263, 118 N.E. 635 (1918)] it was held that the rights thereby reserved in the seller could be exercised by the owner even after the auctioneer had knocked down the property to the highest bidder. If we should, arguendo, accept the foregoing principle that the seller's expressly reserved right to reject any and all bids may be exercised even after the auctioneer accepts the highest bid, we need remember that the texts and cases so holding were solely concerned wi

("[S]uch a reservation sets a sale apart from the garden variety of auctions with reserve.") See also Continental Can Co. v. Commercial Waterway Dist., 347 P.2d 887 (Wash. 1959); Moore v. Berry, 288 S.W.2d 465 (Tenn.App. 1955); New York v. Union News Co., 118 NE 635 (N.Y. 1917). Where the seller explicitly reserves the right to reject or approve, the auctioneer is without authority to accept for the seller.

" (Italics ours.) In Moore v. Berry, 40 Tenn. App. 1, 288 S.W.2d 465 (1955), a notice of sale at public auction contained, among others, the following reservation: "`. . .

The plat in the instant case constituted a "printed condition". See also Moore v. Berry, 40 Tenn. App. 1, 288 S.W.2d 465. In the case now before us, the record is devoid of any proof that the owner of the land, at any time, authorized or approved any modification or change in the printed or announced condition of sale.

Some courts hold that the advertisement or advance announcement has no significance except to announce that a sale has been set. This approach was cited with approval by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Pitchfork, 615 P.2d 541 at 547.See also 7 Am.Jur.2d Auctions and Auctioneers, § 16 (1980), citing Anderson v. Wisconsin C.R. Co., 107 Minn. 296, 120 N.W. 39 (1909), Moore v. Berry, 40 Tenn. App. 1, 288 S.W.2d 465 (1955). Still other courts have held that declarations of the auctioneer subsequent to and at variance with the advertised procedures cannot change the printed terms of such advertisements unless the purchaser has knowledge of the modification.

Where the owner reserves the right to refuse a bid and the auctioneer has stated that the sale is subject to confirmation by the owner, there is no binding sale until the owner accepts the bid. See, e.g., Moore v Berry, 40 Tenn. App. 1, 288 S.W.2d 465 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1955) (perm. app. denied).