Opinion
August 10, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barash, J.).
Ordered that the resettled order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The injured plaintiff in the main action was an employee of S H Interiors (hereinafter S H), which was performing certain construction work pursuant to a contract with PCM Development Company (hereinafter PCM). In an order dated January 29, 1996, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) and granted that branch of the cross motion of PCM and The Pyramid Companies (hereinafter Pyramid) which was for summary judgment on its third-party causes of action for common-law and contractual indemnification against S H. While an appeal from that order was pending, S H commenced a second third-party action against Aetna Casualty Surety Company, the insurance company that issued its general liability policy, and Haylor Freyer Coon, Inc., the insurance broker it retained to obtain that policy. Following this Court's affirmance of the Supreme Court's order dated January 29, 1996 (see, Mooney v. PCM Dev. Co., 238 A.D.2d 487), S H moved, inter alia, to declare that the second third-party defendants were required to assume the defense of PCM and Pyramid in the main action and for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.
An appellate court's resolution of an issue on a prior appeal will be deemed the "law of the case" in the event the same issue is raised on a subsequent appeal (see, Martin v. City of Cohoes, 37 N.Y.2d 162, 165; People v. Williams, 188 A.D.2d 573, 574; Locilento v. Coleman Catholic High School, 134 A.D.2d 39, 43). Accordingly, in view of our affirmance of the Supreme Court's prior order finding that PCM and Pyramid were entitled to both common-law and contractual indemnification from S H, the Supreme Court's denial of that branch of S H's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint was proper. Further, the evidentiary showing made by S H in its moving papers was insufficient to entitle it to the declaratory relief sought therein (see, Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324). Finally, the court's awarding of costs was not an improvident exercise of its discretion ( see, CPLR 8106).
Miller, J. P., Altman, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.