Rather, battery claims require that the defendant actually touch plaintiff or cause another object to touch plaintiff. See, e.g., Micalizzi v. Ciamarra, 206 F. Supp. 2d 564, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing battery claim where defendant never touched plaintiff); Mooney v. Carter, 160 P.2d 390, 392 (Colo. 1945) (stating that "[t]o constitute [a battery] it is enough wilfully to set in motion a force which in its ordinary course causes an injury," and finding a battery where a defendant intentionally swerved her car to throw a police officer from the running board). While the term "resulted in" in the jury instruction almost assuredly encompasses direct or indirect applications of force, the term cannot connote but-for causation without proximate causation.

See Prosser, § 9 at 35. An intent to injure plaintiff, however, is unnecessary in a situation in which a defendant willfully sets in motion a force that in its ordinary course causes the injury. Mooney v. Carter, 114 Colo. 267, 273, 160 P.2d 390, 392 (1945) (operating car so as to throw plaintiff off running board); see Prosser, § 9 at 35. A battery may occur without assault under various circumstances such as when plaintiff is unaware of the contact when it occurs, or prior to the occurrence, by reason of his either being asleep or under anesthetic.

Other courts are in accord with our view. See, e.g. , Mooney v. Carter , 114 Colo. 267, 160 P.2d 390, 393 (1945) (stating that plaintiff’s injuries from being thrown from a running board could not stem from negligence when the defendant intentionally applied force to her car to throw the plaintiff off); City of Miami v. Sanders , 672 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla. 1996) ("[A] suit for a police officer’s use of excessive force necessarily involves the intentional tort of battery."); Baska v. Scherzer , 283 Kan. 750, 156 P.3d 617, 628 (2007) (holding that the doctrine of transferred intent applied and plaintiffs could not style their claim as negligence where defendant intended to punch a third party but instead punched plaintiff); Schumann v. McGinn , 307 Minn. 446, 240 N.W.2d 525, 529–30 (1976) (stating that the excessive use of force by a law enforcement officer is an intentional battery and distinguishing negligence); Howard v. Wilson , 62 So.3d 955, 957 ¶ 9 (Miss. 2011) ("[T]here is no such thing as a ‘negligent battery.’ "

Grimm v. Harper, 84 Idaho 220, 370 P.2d 197. The reasons for such a rule are recognized as being, (1) that the trial court, from seeing and hearing the witness, may have formed such a doubt as to the credibility of the testimony, or entertained such an impression from the surrounding circumstances and atmosphere of the trial, as to conclude that a fair and impartial trial was not had; and (2) that the exercise of such power is not an invasion of the jury's function to decide the facts, for upon granting a new trial the questions of fact will again be submitted to the jury for a decision. Mooney v. Carter (1945), 114 Colo. 267, 160 P.2d 390."Id., 88 Idaho at 500, 401 P.2d at 541.

This rule of appellate review is predicated, in part, upon the principle that the discretion of the trial judge in granting a new trial on the weight of the evidence may be supported by his having seen and heard the witnesses and having formed a doubt as to their credibility, or having determined from the surrounding circumstances and atmosphere of the trial, that the jury's verdict resulted in manifest injustice. Mooney v. Carter (1945), 114 Colo. 267, 160 P.2d 390. Cf. Buckeye Irrigation Co. v. Askren (1935), 45 Ariz. 566, 46 P.2d 1068; State, ex rel. Inter-State Oil Co., v. Bland (1945), 354 Mo. 622, 190 S.W.2d 227; Chisom v. Woodward Iron Co. (1956), 265 Ala. 212, 90 So.2d 816; Larsen v. Webb (1933), 332 Mo. 370, 58 S.W.2d 967; Johnson v. Ilwaco (1951), 38 Wn.2d 408, 229 P.2d 878.

The reasons for such rule are recognized as being, (1) that the trial court, from seeing and hearing the witness, may have formed such a doubt as to the credibility of the testimony, or entertained such an impression from the surrounding circumstances and atmosphere of the trial, as to conclude that a fair and impartial trial was not had; and (2) that the exercise of such power is not an invasion of the jury's function to decide the facts, for upon granting a new trial the questions of fact will again be submitted to the jury for a decision. Mooney v. Carter, (1945) 114 Colo. 267, 160 P.2d 390." 88 Idaho at 500, 401 P.2d at 541.

Grimm v. Harper, 84 Idaho 220, 370 P.2d 197. The reasons for such rule are recognized as being, (1) that the trial court, from seeing and hearing the witness, may have formed such a doubt as to the credibility of the testimony, or entertained such an impression from the surrounding circumstances and atmosphere of the trial, as to conclude that a fair and impartial trial was not had; and (2) that the exercise of such power is not an invasion of the jury's function to decide the facts, for upon granting a new trial the questions of fact will again be submitted to the jury for a decision. Mooney v. Carter, 114 Colo. 267, 160 P.2d 390 (1945)." 88 Idaho at 500, 401 P.2d at 541.

We note that several jurisdictions do follow the same policy as the Missouri appellate courts. See Thomas v. Moore, 146 Cal.App.2d 59, 303 P.2d 624, 626 [1, 2-6]; Downie v. Brunton, 147 Cal.App.2d 43, 304 P.2d 1028, 1031 [1, 2]; Johnson v. City of Ilwaco, 38 Wash. 2d 408, 229 P.2d 878; Wood v. Hallenbarter, 12 Wash.2d 576, 122 P.2d 798; Spaziano v. Raponi, 65 R.I. 163, 13 A.2d 810, 812 [2-4]; Buckeye Irrigation Co. v. Askren, 45 Ariz. 566, 46 P.2d 1068; Mooney v. Carter, 114 Colo. 267, 160 P.2d 390; Chisom v. Woodward Iron Co., 265 Ala. 212, 90 So.2d 816. In any event, the long-established policy of the appellate courts of this state upon the review of an order such as that here involved has a valid and substantial basis in the historic distinction between the proper role of trial and appellate courts.

Grimm v. Harper, 84 Idaho 220, 370 P.2d 197. The reasons for such rule are recognized as being, (1) that the trial court, from seeing and hearing the witness, may have formed such a doubt as to the credibility of the testimony, or entertained such an impression from the surrounding circumstances and atmosphere of the trial, as to conclude that a fair and impartial trial was not had; and (2) that the exercise of such power is not an invasion of the jury's function to decide the facts, for upon granting a new trial the questions of fact will again be submitted to the jury for a decision. Mooney v. Carter (1945), 114 Colo. 267, 160 P.2d 390. We have carefully examined the record to ascertain whether there is apparent on its face any justification for the trial court to conclude that the verdict is not supported by the evidence, or to indicate that the granting of a new trial was the result of any conviction on the part of the trial court that there had been a miscarriage of justice.

" This statement of the law is quoted from Mooney v. Carter, 114 Colo. 267, 160 P.2d 390. However, the case at bar was determined by the trier of facts on the issue of reasonable force.