Opinion
NO. 09-11-00477-CR
03-21-2012
DON MOOKDASNIT, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 221st District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 11-01-01056 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Don Mookdasnit of forgery and sentenced him to thirty-eight years in prison. On appeal, Mookdasnit challenges the admission of extraneous-offense evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Factual Background
Bartender James McMahon testified that on January 15, 2011, Mookdasnit came into Molly's Pub and used a twenty-dollar bill to purchase beer. McMahon tested the bill with a counterfeit-detecting pen, and the bill passed this test. Later that night, Mookdasnit purchased more beer with another twenty-dollar bill. McMahon testified that this bill also passed the counterfeit-detecting test. He testified that he gave Mookdasnit change on both occasions. Manager Jeff Wilkins testified that the next day, he was counting currency from the previous night's sales when he discovered two counterfeit twenty-dollar bills.
McMahon testified that Mookdasnit came into the Pub again on January 29. Employee Erin Ross testified that Mookdasnit used a twenty-dollar bill to purchase beer and she gave him change. Ross testified that she did not know the bill was counterfeit and she described the bill as a "20-dollar bill, the kind you see every day." When McMahon recognized Mookdasnit, he contacted Wilkins and the police. McMahon retrieved the bill that Mookdasnit gave to Ross. Officer Jason Bertleson testified that when he arrived at Molly's Pub, he searched Mookdasnit and found two more twenty-dollar bills on Mookdasnit's person.
United States Secret Service Agent Scott Maxwell testified that the two bills passed on January 15, the bill passed on January 29, and the two bills found on Mookdasnit's person on January 29 were all counterfeit and not authorized by the United States government. Maxwell testified that the bills could pass the counterfeit-detecting test if they had been bleached or the counterfeit-detecting pen was faulty. He testified that it is uncommon for a person in the general population to possess a counterfeit bill, but that an ordinary person may unknowingly possess a counterfeit bill. He explained that people investigated for counterfeiting usually have multiple bills in their possession. He has encountered one case in which a person unknowingly possessed two counterfeit bills.
Mookdasnit testified that he loaned money to David White, a friend who had spent time in prison for forging currency. On January 15, White took Mookdasnit to Molly's Pub. Mookdasnit testified that White gave him a twenty-dollar bill to purchase alcohol. Mookdasnit stated that he did not really look at the bill. At the end of the night, White gave Mookdasnit another twenty-dollar bill to purchase more alcohol.
On January 29, Mookdasnit obtained three more twenty-dollar bills from White because White still owed Mookdasnit money. Mookdasnit testified that he did not look at the bills. Mookdasnit went to Molly's Pub and purchased a pitcher of beer with one of these bills. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and arrested Mookdasnit. Mookdasnit testified that he was shocked to learn that the bills were counterfeit. He initially told Maxwell that the bills may have come from a man named "Scott" during a drug deal. Mookdasnit testified that White was his friend, but he subsequently realized that White was responsible for the bills. Mookdasnit denied knowing that any of the bills were counterfeit. He testified that he is not guilty of forgery.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second issue, Mookdasnit contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his forgery conviction. Mookdasnit was charged with forgery related to the bill passed on January 29. He argues that the evidence fails to show that he knowingly passed a counterfeit bill. Because this issue, if sustained, would afford Mookdasnit the greatest relief, we address it first.
The "Jackson v. Virginialegal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We assess all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give deference to the jury's responsibility to fairly resolve conflicting testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
To establish the offense of forgery, the State must prove that the accused acted with intent to defraud or harm another. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21(b) (West 2011). This culpable mental state requires proof of knowledge that the instrument is forged. Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). A person acts intentionally or with intent "when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (West 2011). Intent to defraud or harm may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. Burks v. State, 693 S.W.2d 932, 936-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Intent or knowledge may be inferred from the accused's acts, words, and conduct. See Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
In this case, Moookdasnit's actions leading up to the January 29 offense could lead the jury to reasonably conclude that he acted with intent to defraud or harm another. See Hart, 89 S.W.3d at 64. Mookdasnit associated with and accepted a total of five twenty-dollar bills from a known forger. He passed three of these bills at Molly's Pub, which includes the two bills passed before the date of the charged offense, and was in possession of two other forged bills at the time of his arrest. He initially gave Maxwell incorrect information about the source of the bills. Although Mookdasnit testified that he has experience in the restaurant industry, which involved handling currency and watching for counterfeit bills, he denied knowing the bills were counterfeit. Maxwell, however, testified that the bills were obviously counterfeit, and he identified several features that demonstrated this fact. McMahon and Wilkins testified to the features that made them question the bills' authenticity. The jury heard evidence that a person in the general population may unknowingly possess a counterfeit bill, but that people associated with counterfeit investigations usually possess multiple bills. As sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, the jury was entitled to disbelieve Mookdasnit's testimony that he did not know the bills were counterfeit. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; see also Williams v. State, 692 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Mookdasnit committed the offense of forgery. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We overrule issue two.
Admission of Extraneous Offenses
In issue one, Mookdasnit challenges the admission of extraneous-offense evidence. He contends that the State failed to establish the extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and that admission of the offenses into evidence affected his substantial rights.
"To constitute an extraneous offense, the evidence must show a crime or bad act, and that the defendant was connected to it." Lockhart v. State, 847 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). "This necessarily includes some sort of extraneous conduct by the defendant which forms part of the alleged extraneous offense." Moreno v. State, 858 S.W.2d 453, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for some purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b).
We review a trial judge's decision to admit extraneous-offense evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (op. on reh'g). "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]" Tex. R. Evid. 103(a); see Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). "We should not overturn the conviction if we have fair assurance from an examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect." Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Maxwell explained that he can track serial numbers and other identifiers on a counterfeit bill to obtain a history for the bill. Maxwell testified that he tracked Mookdasnit's bills. Defense counsel objected on grounds that it was improper to suggest that similar bills were tracked in the area. The State responded that this line of questioning was intended to establish that the bills were counterfeit. Maxwell proceeded to testify that, "We had probably about roughly 20 different occurrences where these similar bills were passed[.]" Defense counsel again objected and moved for a mistrial on grounds that it was inappropriate for Maxwell to suggest the bills were passed twenty other times. Counsel argued that these twenty other instances were extraneous offenses. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, but gave the jury a limiting instruction per defense counsel's request.
Assuming, without deciding, that the complained of testimony qualifies as inadmissible extraneous-offense evidence and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting this testimony into evidence, we cannot say that Mookdasnit's substantial rights were affected. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). During closing argument, the State told the jury that it had to prove that Mookdasnit acted with intent to defraud or harm another and, consequently, the issue was whether Mookdasnit knew the bills were counterfeit. The State argued that Mookdasnit's prior convictions for theft could be used for the purpose of determining his intent, but the record does not indicate that the State specifically mentioned Maxwell's testimony regarding the twenty instances when similar bills were passed. The defense also argued that the issue was whether Mookdasnit knew the bills were counterfeit and argued that Mookdasnit received the bills from his friend, White. The trial court instructed the jury, both during Maxwell's testimony and in the jury charge, that it could not consider extraneous offenses unless it first found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mookdasnit committed those offenses and limited the jury's consideration of extraneous offenses to those purposes identified in Rule 404(b). The charge instructed the jury that it could only convict Mookdasnit if it found him guilty of forgery beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume the jury followed the trial court's instructions. See Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Moreover, even without the complained-of testimony, the record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could find Mookdasnit guilty of forgery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Given all of the evidence before the jury, it was unlikely that the admission of extraneous-offense evidence had a substantial effect on the jury's verdict.).
After examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the error, if any, did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect. See Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 592. We overrule issue one. Having overruled Mookdasnit's two issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Horton, JJ.