Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-12303.
October 31, 2007.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Sen K. Tan, Judge, Superior Court No. 3AN-04-04301 Civil.
Martin W. Moody, pro se, Eloy, Arizona, Appellant. John K. Bodick, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Talis Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, and Carpeneti, Justices. [Bryner, Justice, not participating.]
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited for any proposition of law or as an example of the proper resolution of any issue.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
Martin Moody appeals a decision of the superior court dismissing his administrative appeal. Moody lost his prison job and his privilege to keep arts and crafts supplies in his cell after he was found guilty of disciplinary infractions. Moody argues that his due process and rehabilitation rights were violated when he was suspended from work and lost his in-cell craft supply privileges without a hearing. Because Moody's interest in prison employment and in-cell craft items does not raise a fundamental constitutional question, the decision of the superior court is affirmed.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Moody is an Alaska prisoner at the Florence Correctional Center in Florence, Arizona. Moody was first charged with a disciplinary infraction on June 1, 2003, for using abusive and obscene language. On June 16, 2003, Moody appeared before the disciplinary committee for the infraction and was found guilty. He lost thirty days of commissary privileges as a sanction. Moody's second infraction was also for using abusive and obscene language, on June 7, 2003. Moody again appeared before the disciplinary committee on June 20, 2003, where he was found guilty of the second disciplinary infraction and given a verbal warning. Moody was entitled to have the assistance of a staff advisor at the disciplinary hearing. It is the practice of the institution that a prisoner who is found guilty of a prison disciplinary infraction is automatically terminated from employment for ninety days, and Moody was suspended from employment in the laundry on June 9, 2003 and given a notice of termination on June 20, 2003. Moody's privilege to have hobby and craft items in his cell was revoked on August 5, 2003. A prisoner found guilty of a disciplinary infraction is not eligible for in-cell hobby and craft supplies for 180 days. After filing several grievance forms protesting the loss of his job and in-cell craft supplies, Moody filed an administrative appeal in the superior court. Superior Court Judge Sen K. Tan granted the State's motion to dismiss on March 15, 2006, and Moody appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a decision on a motion to dismiss an administrative appeal de novo. Constitutional issues are questions of law that are also reviewed de novo.
Varilek v. City of Houston, 104 P.3d 849, 851 (Alaska 2004).
Brandon v. State, Dep't of Corr., 938 P.2d 1029, 1031 (Alaska 1997).
IV. DISCUSSION
Martin Moody appeals the decision dismissing his case and argues that his constitutional rights were violated when he was suspended from his prison laundry job and lost his privilege to have craft supplies in his cell. Alaska Statute 22.10.020(d) confers jurisdiction on the superior court to hear administrative agency appeals where "provided by law." We have previously determined that nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act or any other statute allows for appeal from a DOC administrative decision. But we will review an inmate disciplinary proceeding when it raises "fundamental constitutional questions." Thus, the question in this case is whether loss of a prison laundry job and suspension of in-cell hobby and craft privileges raise fundamental constitutional questions. The superior court determined that loss of in-cell craft privileges did not rise to the level of a fundamental constitutional question. It further noted that because Moody's job was not one that focused on rehabilitation, Moody had no constitutional interest in continued employment at his prison job. The superior court therefore dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The State argues that the appeal is moot, and Moody concedes that "he has held several institutional jobs since this infraction and has slowly repurchased many of the confiscated items." However, we will decide the merits of the case because the situation is likely to arise again and evade review. See Ulmer v. Alaska Rest. Beverage Ass'n, 33 P.3d 773, 777-78 (Alaska 2001) (noting that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine requires consideration of three factors, including "whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition" and "whether the mootness doctrine, if applied, may repeatedly circumvent review of the issues").
Brandon, 938 P.2d at 1031.
Id.
Owen v. Matsumoto, 859 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Alaska 1993).
Moody argues that a liberty interest in his prison employment was created by AS 33.30.191, which states: "It is the policy of the state that prisoners be productively employed for as many hours each day as feasible." Moody also argues that his right to in-cell craft items is part of his rehabilitation effort and that removing the items violated his right to rehabilitation.
In Ferguson v. State, Department of Corrections, we held that a prisoner has an "enforceable interest in continued participation in rehabilitation programs." Ferguson participated in the Alaska Correctional Industries Program, a rehabilitative program which provided him with employment outside the prison. After a positive drug test, Ferguson was removed from the program without a hearing. Because Alaska prisoners have an enforceable constitutional interest in rehabilitative programs, we held that Ferguson was given inadequate process before being removed from the program. However, in Hays v. State, we held that there was no violation of Hays's right to rehabilitation where he was removed from his position at the prison law library without a hearing. Hays did not have an "enforceable constitutional interest in continued employment as a prison librarian."
816 P.2d 134, 139 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 140.
830 P.2d 783, 785 (Alaska 1992).
Id.
Moody's situation is more analogous to that of Hays than Ferguson. Under DOC Policy 808.04, a prisoner is entitled to certain process, including a hearing if requested, when removed from a rehabilitation program. Rehabilitation programs under the policy include "academic and vocational education programs" and "employment in Alaska Correctional Industries programs." Jobs within the prison itself are not included in the list. As the State points out, jobs within the prison entail no formal training program, specified objectives, or stated rehabilitative components. Moody worked in the prison laundry, performing a needed service within the institution, like running the prison library. These institutional jobs are not part of any rehabilitative program. Because removal of Moody from his job at the prison laundry does not raise a fundamental constitutional question, it is not reviewable on appeal.
The policy provides, in relevant part:
2. When a determination is made that a prisoner should be removed from a rehabilitation program covered by this policy . . . because of failure to comply with the requirements of the program or for other good cause, either the staff person responsible for the program, a staff person closely associated with the prisoner's involvement in the program, or a designee shall deliver to the prisoner a Notice of Intent to Remove From Program (form 808.048). This Notice may be preceded by a Warning Regarding Program Participation (form 808.04A) at the discretion of the staff member responsible for the program.
3. The staff member providing a copy of the "Warning Regarding Program Participation" or "Notice of Intent to Remove From Program" shall observe the prisoner sign the form. Once completed, a copy must be made and provided to the prisoner to show receipt and understanding of the Notice. . . .
4. The Notice must include the following:
a. The reason for the proposed removal;
b. The proposed removal will become effective at 4:30 pm the next working day unless the prisoner requests a hearing before a classification committee/hearing officer. . . .
c. If the prisoner fails to exercise the right to a classification hearing in a timely manner, the removal will become effective and is not subject to appeal. . . .
The loss of in-cell hobby and craft privileges also does not raise a fundamental constitutional question. In Adkins v. Crandell, a prisoner argued that the institution violated his right to rehabilitation by denying him access to a word processor for his correspondence courses. We noted that "some measures may affect merely comfort or convenience without violating prisoners' rights" and determined that there was no infringement of the right to rehabilitation. And in Mathis v. Sauser, a prisoner challenged a prison policy which prevented inmates from having a computer printer in their cells. Mathis argued that the policy infringed upon his right to rehabilitation. We noted, however, that Mathis had not argued that he was involved in any rehabilitation program that required the use of the printer in his cell.
No. S-7794, 1999 WL 33958768, at *1 (Alaska, January 13, 1999).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
942 P.2d 1117, 1124 (Alaska 1997).
Id.
Id.
Any interest that Moody has in hobby and craft items is unlikely to be greater than his interest in a word processor or printer, and as we recognized in Adkins and Mathis, neither of those raises a fundamental constitutional question. And Moody has also not lost all right to his in-cell hobby and craft items, he simply has had the right suspended for a period of time. As the loss of in-cell possession of craft supplies does not raise a fundamental constitutional question, the superior court correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The State additionally argues that Moody is not entitled to relief regarding his hobbycraft items because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. However, given that there is no jurisdiction to hear Moody's appeal, it is not necessary to address this argument.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the superior court is AFFIRMED.