Opinion
Case No. 01:02-CV-00028 PGC.
August 23, 2005
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This civil rights matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. On January 2, 2002, plaintiff and inmate Randall Troy Montoya was stabbed several times — most notably in his left eye — by another inmate who had escaped momentarily from his cell. At the time, Montoya was a pretrial inmate. Montoya was rushed to the hospital, but the attack resulted in Montoya losing use of his left eye. Montoya's hand was also examined by doctors. While the doctors could not find any fractures in his right hand, Montoya, after being released on January 26, 2001, later had his right thumb examined by another doctor, who concluded that it was broken and had already set incorrectly.
On March 13, 2002, Montoya filed this action, alleging several claims for relief against numerous defendants. Specifically, Montoya claims that under § 1983, all defendants, including Weber County, failed in their duty to protect Montoya against assaults by other inmates, and that certain defendants holding supervisory positions in the jail also failed in their duty to provide Montoya with adequate medical care. At the heart of Montoya's claims lies the issue of whether the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him and provide him adequate medical care. For his claims to survive summary judgment, Montoya must demonstrate that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The court finds that Montoya has failed to satisfy that burden, and therefore grants defendants' motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
On January 2, 2001, Montoya was stabbed while incarcerated in the Weber County Jail (the "Jail"). Montoya was a maximum security pretrial inmate being housed in the Jail's maximum security pod D-1 ("D-1"). Defendants in this case are Weber County Sheriff Brad W. Slater, Lieutenant Florrie Petersen, Chief Deputy Gerald Cook, Corrections Lead Officer Steven West, Lead Officer Richard Watson, and Officers Jeffrey Anderson, K. Morris, and Leonel Herrera. At the time of the incident, Officer Slater was the Weber County Sheriff and chief policymaker for the Jail. His duties included signing and approving all policy changes submitted by the Jail's management. Approval was given only after the changes had been reviewed and approved by the Weber County Attorney's Office. Lieutenant Petersen was a member of the Weber County Sheriff's Office and was the Watch Commander during her shifts. She had supervisory duties over the Jail and was responsible for implementing Jail policies. Officer Cook was the Weber County Sheriff Chief in charge of administration and finances of the Jail, including providing medical care. Correctional Officer West was a Corrections Lead Officer and Shift Supervisor over housing with the Weber County Sheriff's Office. He was informed of dangerous inmate incidents at the beginning of and throughout each shift. Prior to the incident, Officers Slater, Cook, Petersen and West ("Supervisory Defendants") were not personally familiar with Montoya, nor were they in D-1 when Montoya was stabbed. On the night of the incident, Lead Officer Watson, and Officers Anderson, Morris, and Herrera ("Defendant Officers") were working swing shift in D-1.
Also housed in D-1 on the day in question was inmate Mark Snarr, a known member of the Soldiers of Aryan Culture prison gang (SAC). Snarr's cell mate was Jason Bates, the man who ultimately stabbed Montoya. At about 10:15 p.m., on January 2, 2001, Officer Herrera allowed Snarr to leave his cell to sharpen a pencil. Officer Morris warned Herrera "to watch for [Snarr's] cell mate, Jason Bates, because in the past he has wandered out of his cell." Officer Herrera followed Officer Morris's advice by verifying that the cell door was closed through checking an indicator light that informed officers of whether a cell door was open. At 10:25 p.m., Officer Herrera again opened the cell door to let Snarr back in again, he again checked the indicator to verify that the door closed. At some point, however, either when Snarr was let out of the cell or when he returned, Bates, unnoticed by the Defendant Officers, left his cell. It is undisputed that the cell door closed both times and that the indicator light was working properly. Investigation, however, revealed a metal partition in the guard room window would have blocked Defendant Herrera's view of inmates Snarr and Bates' cell and the stairway leading to the common area. While the exact manner in which Bates escaped his cell is still unknown, defendants have speculated that Bates took advantage of an unknown blind spot that was not detected in earlier tests.
At 10:28 p.m., Montoya was released from his cell in D-1 to sharpen a pencil. After Montoya entered the common area, Bates came out from his hiding spot and confronted him. Bates and Montoya immediately began exchanging blows. While Officer Watson immediately called for emergency assistance, Officers Herrera and Anderson waited at the door of D-1 for backup to arrive. Jaily policy and practice recommends that officers wait to address hostile situations until there are five officers to one maximum security prisoner. This measure is meant to increase the probability that the combative inmate can be efficiently and safely subdued. While the two Defendant Officers waited for backup — at most, they waited two minutes — Bates, armed with a sharpened toothbrush, stabbed Montoya in the left eye. Once helparrived, the two Defendant Officers entered and subdued Bates and Montoya and called an ambulance. Upon arrival of the ambulance, Montoya was transported to Ogden Regional Medical Center. He was escorted by jail guards.
According to Montoya, he complained during the ambulance to two guards that his thumb was broken. A male guard told him it would be attended to at the hospital. The doctors treated Montoya's eye; despite their efforts, Montoya lost use of his left eye. The doctors also took x-rays of his hands; however, the guards, for safety and security reasons, did not uncuff Montoya during the x-rays. The doctor did not find any breaks in his hand, but did in the report state that "I cannot exclude carpal fractures." The physician's orders for Montoya also included a notation that said: "R thumb — without break — watch this — if it gets worse." After being released, Montoya was immediately returned to the Jail. Montoya claims that while a nurse was delivering some medication to his cell, he asked her if someone could "look at his thumb." According to Montoya, the nurse briefly looked at his thumb, asked why he had not had it taken care of while at the hospital, and then did nothing more. No one other than the nurse examined Montoya's thumb while in the Jail. Some time later, while not in custody (Montoya was released from custody on January 19, 2001), Montoya went to an orthopaedic surgeon, who diagnosed the thumb as having been previously broken. On March 13, 2002, Montoya filed this action. Defendants now argue that summary judgment should be granted as to all claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
According to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." When faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The nonmoving party, however, "may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Defendants' motion for summary judgment raises several issues, including: (1) whether Montoya's claims are barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), (2) whether there is an affirmative link between Montoya's injury and the actions of the Supervisory Defendants, (3) whether Montoya's claims are cognizable under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, (4) whether there is a basis for county liability under § 1983, and (5) whether defendants are protected from suit by qualified immunity. In light of its prior order prohibiting defendants from pleading exhaustion of remedies except as to jurisdictional matters, the court will not re-examine the exhaustion of remedies issue. Moreover, the court, based on its conclusions stated hereinafter, finds that a qualified immunity analysis and determination is unnecessary. Thus, the only issues the court need decide are (a) whether the Defendant Officers violated Montoya's right to reasonable safety, and if so, whether an affirmative link exists between the violation of this right and the actions of the Supervisory Defendants, and (b) whether Montoya's medical care was inadequate, and if so, that the alleged inadequacy is affirmatively linked to the Supervisory Defendants' actions.I. Duty to Protect
Montoya claims that both the Supervisory Defendants and the Officer Defendants violated his constitutional right to reasonable safety by failing to protect him. Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, any person who (a) under color of State law, (b) deprives another of Constitutional rights is civilly liable for that deprivation. The Eighth Amendment imposes duties on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, as well the duty to "ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must `take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'" This duty includes "protect[ing] prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." It would go too far, however, to presume that "every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety."
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, ch. 21 (2005).
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).
Id. at 833 (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettle ship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1998)).
Id. at 834.
In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a purely objective test in determining whether an inmate's Eighth Amendment right to protection has been violated. Instead, the Court held that Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard has a subjective component: A prison official is "deliberately indifferent" for these purposes if he "knows of an disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." "Therefore, in order to establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff `must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,' the objective component, and that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to his safety, the subjective component." Because the analysis for personal liability (the Defendant Officers), as opposed to supervisory liability (the Supervisory Defendants), is different, the court looks at both claims individually. A. Defendant Officers
Id. at 828.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Montoya claims that the Defendant Officers — those on scene during the altercation between Montoya and Bates — failed in their duty to protect him, thus violating his Eighth Amendment rights. As discussed above, to prove his claim, Montoya must satisfy both the objective and subjective components of the "deliberate indifference" standard announced in Farmer. In Grimsley v. MacKay, the Tenth Circuit held that conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm existed because guards had received repeated warnings of the danger and "refused to make the situation safer." In that same case, the court also found that when one maximum security inmate is locked securely in his cell and another is released into the common area, it is not a condition posing a substantial risk of serious harm, nor is it an obvious risk of which the guards should be aware. In Farmer, the Supreme Court gave an example of an obvious situation in which the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's safety: "If . . . prison officials were aware that inmate `rape was so common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep [but] instead . . . would leave their beds and spend the night clinging to the bars nearest the guards' station [the risk is obvious].'"
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-37.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 681-82.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-37.
In this case, Montoya claims that the defendants failed in their duty to protect Plaintiff and provide him with reasonable safety through (1) the de facto policy of granting maximum security inmates "out of cell time" in excess of the official policy limit, and (2) the Defendant Officers' one-to-two minute delayed response. The court finds Montoya's arguments unpersuasive in that they fail to demonstrate that the Defendant Officers were deliberately indifferent to a condition posing a substantial risk of serious harm. First, it is undisputed that inmates were only permitted in the common area when all other inmates were locked in their cells, a condition Grimsley found did not pose a substantial risk of serious harm. Therefore, the alleged de facto policy of rewarding inmates with extra "out of cell time" when other inmates were securely locked down did not create a condition posing a substantial risk of serious harm. As there is no dispute that the Defendant Officers believed Bates to be securely locked down, they did not act with deliberate indifference when releasing Plaintiff from his cell, but were at most negligent to the risk of an attack by another inmate. Second, the short delay in the Defendants Officers' physical entrance into D-1 was not reckless disregard to a risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, as backup had been immediately summoned and both inmates were subdued within less than two minutes from the time the fight began. Although Jail regulations gave officers the discretion to enter immediately when two inmates were fighting, the Defendant Officers reaction was a reasonable response to a dangerous situation — two maximum security inmates fighting with a weapon — not the recklessness necessary to substantiate a finding of deliberate indifference.
Grimsley, 93 F.3d at 681-82.
See Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 514 (5th Cir. 2003).
This court finds that Montoya has failed to satisfy the objective component of the test. Consequently, the court need not reach a decision on whether Montoya could satisfy the subjective component of the deliberate indifference standard. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment on Montoya's claim against the Defendant Officers for failure to protect. Because of the court's finding that Montoya has failed to demonstrate that there was deliberate indifference, it need not reach a decision regarding whether the defendants' are shielded by the qualified immunity doctrine.
B. Supervisory Defendants
In addition to claiming that the Defendant Officers violated his Eighth Amendment right to be protected from assaults by other inmates, Montoya asserts the same § 1983 claim against the Supervisory Defendants. To successfully assert a § 1983 claim against a supervisory defendant under the Eighth Amendment for failure to protect, a plaintiff must show personal involvement or participation in the incident." Consequently, "[s]upervisor status alone is insufficient to support liability." In the Tenth Circuit, personal participation is shown by an "affirmative link . . . between the deprivation and either the supervisor's `personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.'" Moreover, to prove a supervisor's deliberate indifference to subordinates' training, the plaintiff must show (a) complete failure to train, or (b) training that is so reckless or grossly negligent that future misconduct is almost inevitable.
Grimsley, 93 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id. ( citing Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1441).
Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516, 1524 (10th Cir. 1987); quoting McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1374 (10th Cir. 1984).
Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th Cir. 1988).
Montoya asserts that the Supervisory Defendants personally participated in failing to protect his right to reasonable safety by (1) violating or permitting violation of official Jail "out of cell time" policy and restrictions, (2) failing to re-classify him, or (3) imposing temporary restrictions on members of SAC, whom Supervisory Defendants knew posed a danger to minority inmates. First, as discussed above, the de facto "out of cell time" policy did not violate Montoya's constitutional right to reasonable safety and protection, as it did not create a condition posing a substantial risk of serious harm; even if the Supervisory Defendants failed to enforce the official policy, their personal participation in the de facto policy is not an affirmative link to the Montoya's injury.
Regarding Montoya's re-classification argument, while Supervisory Defendants did have authority to temporarily change inmate classification, it is undisputed that classification is normally done by a separate committee, and that Supervisory Defendants neither participated in Plaintiff's classification, nor had any personal knowledge of him before the incident. Because Montoya and his classification were never brought to the attention of any of the Supervisory Defendants, meaning that they never had the opportunity to choose to reclassify Montoya or leave his maximum security classification unchanged, the court finds that they did not personally participate in Plaintiff's classification.
And third, while Supervisory Defendants had the authority to impose temporary restrictions on SAC members, their failure to confine SAC members to their cells is not an affirmative link to Plaintiff's injury. SAC members were not released into the common area when other inmates were out of their cells. Furthermore, because the Tenth Circuit has held that maximum security inmates securely locked in their cells are not under a substantial risk of serious harm from inmates in the common area, Supervisory Defendants' failure to restrict SAC members' "out of cell time" did not create a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates inside of their cells. Therefore, as Supervisory Defendants reasonably believed that no two inmates who were not cell mates would ever be in the common area at the same time, their failure to restrict SAC members to their cells is not an affirmative link to Montoya's injury.
Grimsley, 93 F.3d at 681-82.
In sum, the court finds that there is no affirmative link between Supervisory Defendants' actions and Montoya's injury and GRANTS summary judgment against his claim that the Supervisory Defendants failed in their duty to protect him. As stated above, because of the court's finding, a qualified immunity analysis is unnecessary.
C. Adequate Medical Care and Supervisor Liability
In addition to his failure to protect claims, Montoya asserts that the Supervisory Defendants violated his constitutional rights under § 1983 by failing to provide adequate medical care. The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to include a prisoner's right to adequate medical care. As explained by the Tenth Circuit, "Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment . . . when they are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's `serious medical needs.'" Deliberate indifference exists where a prison guard intentionally denies or delays access to medical care, or intentionally interferes with already prescribed treatment. Furthermore, a delay in medical care only violates the Eighth Amendment if the denial or delay results in substantial harm to the inmate.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 764 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104).
Id. at 104-05.
Olsen v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Similar to proving that a prison official failed in their duty to protect an inmate from assaults by other inmates, to establish a claim that he did not receive adequate medical care, the inmate must show that the official acted with "deliberate indifference." In analyzing "deliberate indifference", the standard set forth in Farmer — an objective and subjective component must be satisfied — remains applicable. The objective component examines whether the deprivation is serious. Seriousness exists when a condition has been diagnosed as mandating treatment, or when the condition "is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." The subjective component requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew of a "substantial risk of harm" and failed to take reasonable measures to abate it." To prove that a prison official is subjectively aware of a risk to inmate health or safety, "a plaintiff inmate need not produce direct evidence of the official's knowledge. A plaintiff can rely on circumstantial evidence indicating that the official must have known about the risk." As with the duty to protect, a supervisor's personal participation must be affirmatively linked to the inmates injury. Alternatively, the supervisor must have been deliberately indifferent to subordinates' training, either by failing to train them at all, or training them in a grossly negligent manner.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Adames, 331 F.3d at 512 (citing Hope v. Pelter, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
Specht, 832 F.2d at 1524; quoting McKay, 730 F.2d at 1374.
Meade, 841 F.2d at 1528.
In Abu-Fakher v. Brodie, a case with facts similar to those in the case before the court today, the United States District Court of Kansas found no deliberate indifference. While the court's "deliberate indifference" analysis was within the context of a qualified immunity argument, it remains helpful in understanding this issue of the case. The plaintiff in that case was a federal state prisoner whose hand was fractured when a guard knocked him over. After he complained of pain, the plaintiff's hand was x-rayed. Ten days later, in response to the plaintiff's complaints of pain and swelling, the x-ray was re-examined and the fracture was diagnosed. Noting that "improper medical care" does not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights unless it is "grossly inadequate," the court held that the defendants' conduct was not deliberately indifferent because the plaintiff "received immediate attention, and when the swelling and pain continued, he received additional medical attention and care."
Abu-Fakher v. Brodie, 2005 WL 627980 (D. Kan. 2005).
Id. at **1-3.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
In this case it is undisputed that Montoya's injuries to his eye and thumb were serious, therefore the issue is whether Plaintiff has met the subjective component of deliberate indifference — whether the Supervisory Defendants were deliberately indifferent by failing to take measures to abate Montoya's injuries. While Montoya failed to file any grievance that could have alerted the Supervisory Defendants to deficiencies in his medical treatment, the court finds this evidence irrelevant in light of the fact that he was blinded and unable to fill out a grievance form.
Nonetheless, the evidence even viewed in a light favorable to Montoya demonstrates that he was not denied medical care by the Supervisory Defendants immediately following the attack. The hospital records that indicate that his eye was surgically addressed and his thumb was X-rayed. Regarding his thumb, while the doctor could not rule out carpal fractures, Montoya's discharge papers clearly stated that the right thumb was not broken. The note did suggest, however, that Montoya should continue to monitor the thumb. Per his own admission, the only time following his hospitalization that Montoya ever complained about his thumb was to a nurse who had passed by his cell to administer to him his eye medication. While this evidence appears to demonstrate that the nurse may have known of Montoya's need for medical care, Montoya has failed to provide any evidence that his communication to the nurse was ever relayed to any of the named defendants. Specifically, there is no evidence demonstrating that the nurse informed the Supervisory Defendants of his request to have his thumb examined. Montoya points to a guard's admission stating that he noticed that Montoya had a broken thumbnail. The court is unconvinced that a broken thumbnail is clear indicator of a broken thumb. In fact, since the doctors who examined Montoya immediately after the incident would have seen the broken thumbnail and outward appearance of the thumb, and yet still noted in the physician's orders that the thumb was not broken, it is unpersuasive to argue that a jail guard would could notice something wrong with the thumb by the appearance of the thumbnail only. As for his claim that he was denied psychological care, there is absolutely no evidence that any of the defendants were aware or should have been aware that such care was necessary or even requested.
Therefore, because the only evidence Montoya has presented to the court regarding his thumb places responsibility on a non-party (the nurse), and because he has failed to show that the nurse's identity is undiscoverable — the court believes that with some due diligence, the nurse's identity could have easily been discovered — the court finds that the Supervisory Defendants, or any other of the named defendants, did not know of Montoya's possible need for medical care for his thumb. Having found that there is no evidence that any of the defendants knew or should have known of Montoya's need for additional medical care, Montoya has failed to satisfy the subjective requirement announced by the Supreme Court in Farmer. In short, because Montoya has failed to demonstrate that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference, the court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment on his claim for failure to provide adequate medical care.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
D. County Liability
Summary judgment is appropriate on Montoya's § 1983 claim against Weber County. For a municipality to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, its official policy must be the moving force behind a constitutional deprivation of a prisoner's rights, demonstrating a "direct causal link" between the municipality's actions and the violation of the inmate's rights. Municipal liability for failure to train must "reflect a `deliberate' or `conscious' choice by a municipality." Typically, deliberate choice is shown by a pattern of constitutional rights violations. A municipality may be liable for a single violation, however, if that violation is predictable or obvious. First, as discussed above, the court finds that Montoya failed to show that the defendants did not protect his constitutional right to reasonable safety. And second, the Supervisory Defendants provided adequate medical care and had no knowledge following his hospitalization that he was in need of additional medical care. Since summary judgment has been granted as to all claims against the Supervisory Defendants and Defendant Officers, Montoya's § 1983 claim against Weber County must too fail. Thus, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Weber County is GRANTED.
Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id.; citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).
Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307.
Id.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the court finds that Montoya has failed to present the court with any evidence which would preclude summary judgment on his claims against the Defendant Officers and Supervisory Defendants for failure to protect. Moreover, Montoya has failed to present any evidence to show that any of the defendants, in particular any of the Supervisory Defendants, had any way of knowing that he was in need of further medical care. And lastly, having found that all individual defendants are not liable in this case, the court also finds that the claims against Weber County must also be dismissed. In sum, summary judgment (#136) is GRANTED, with prejudice, against Montoya as to all claims asserted. Furthermore, since the court did not consider Dr. Michael Haley's testimony in reaching its decision, Montoya's motion to strike his testimony (#156) is DENIED as moot. As for defendants' motion to strike certain exhibits filed by Montoya, that too is DENIED as moot in light of the court's ruling. The clerk of the court is directed to close the case.