Opinion
April 19, 1989.
Public assistance — Food stamps — Disqualification — Scope of appellate review.
1. In a public assistance case involving the disqualification of a food stamp recipient, the scope of review of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is limited to determining whether the recipient's constitutional rights have been violated or an error of law committed or whether necessary findings are supported by substantial evidence. [262]
2. When a food stamp recipient has pled guilty to charges of making false statements to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, the Department is required to impose a disqualification period unless the trial court's sentencing order says otherwise; neither silence in the sentencing order nor the judge's ex parte communication with the recipient is sufficient to preclude the Department's authority to disqualify the recipient. [263]
Submitted on briefs January 11, 1989, to Judges PALLADINO and SMITH, and Senior Judge KALISH, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal No. 2255 C.D. 1988, from the Order of the Department of Public Welfare in the case of Appeal of: Sarah Montigney, Case No. 40-0116515.
Food stamp recipient temporarily disqualified by the Luzerne County Assistance Office. Recipient appealed to the Department of Public Welfare. Appeal sustained by hearing officer but denied by Office of Hearings and Appeals. Recipient appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
Sarah Montigney, petitioner, for herself.
Jeffrey P. Schmoyer, Assistant Counsel, for respondent.
Sarah Montigney (petitioner) petitions for review of a determination of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) which concluded that petitioner was ineligible for food stamp benefits for a period of six months. We affirm.
Petitioner pled guilty in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County to charges of making false statements to DPW. On the basis of the guilty plea and sentencing order, the Luzerne County Assistance Office disqualified petitioner from receiving food stamps for a six month period, May 1, 1988, through November 1, 1988.
Petitioner requested a hearing, which was held on June 27, 1988. The hearing officer concluded that DPW improperly disqualified petitioner from receiving food stamps on the basis that DPW's actions were contrary to the trial court's sentencing order, which was silent on the disqualification issue.
The Office of Hearings and Appeals reversed the hearing officer, concluding that the silence of the court order did not render DPW's disqualification action contrary to the court order. Petitioner's request for reconsideration was granted on August 12, 1988, and on August 25, 1988, the Office of Hearings and Appeals affirmed the denial of benefits. Petitioner now appeals to this court.
There is some dispute in the proceedings below as to appealability of DPW's actions. This court has jurisdiction as this appeal concerns DPW's disqualification, rather than an appeal of the trial court's sentencing order.
Our scope of review is limited to determining whether petitioner's constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law exists, or necessary findings are supported by substantial evidence. Colonial Manor Personal Care Boarding Home v. Department of Public Welfare, 121 Pa. Commw. 506, 551 A.2d 347 (1988).
DPW is required to impose a disqualification period unless contrary to the trial court's sentencing order, as mandated by 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(g)(2)(i) (1988). In accordance with 55 Pa. Code § 273.4(h) (2), DPW must impose a six month disqualification for individuals found guilty of fraud, unless contrary to the trial court's order.
Because the trial court's sentencing order is silent on the issue of disqualification, petitioner asserts that DPW's action was contrary to the court's order, and therefore, DPW improperly disqualified petitioner. Moreover, petitioner contacted the trial court judge, and received a letter in response stating it was not his intention to impose a disqualification. Petitioner claims that the judge's letter establishes that no disqualification should have been imposed by DPW.
DPW's action was not rendered contrary by the silence of the sentencing order. The judge's ex parte communication with the petitioner is insufficient to preclude DPW's authority to disqualify petitioner, as mandated by both the Code of Federal Regulations and the Pennsylvania Code. Further, the trial court judge did not subsequently amend the sentencing order to reflect any intentions concerning disqualification.
Accordingly, we affirm.
ORDER
NOW, April 19, 1989, the order of the Department of Public Welfare, at No. 40-0116515, is affirmed.