Opinion
Nos. 05-06-01598-CR, 05-06-01599-CR
Opinion Filed April 17, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F04-73687-J, F05-01017-MJ.
Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and FRANCIS.
OPINION
Jose Montiel waived a jury and pleaded guilty to two aggravated assault with a deadly weapon offenses. The trial court assessed punishment at two years' imprisonment in the first case and deferred adjudicating guilt and placed appellant on ten years' community supervision in the second case. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his guilty plea and the trial judge failed to review the magistrate's findings. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
In his first issue, appellant argues the judicial confession is insufficient to support his guilty pleas. Appellant asserts a drafting error in the indictment that is repeated in the judicial confession renders the evidence insufficient in each case. The State responds the evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant's convictions.
When a defendant pleads guilty, the State must introduce sufficient evidence into the record to support the plea and show the defendant is guilty, and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon 2005); see also Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). We will affirm the trial court's judgment if the evidence introduced embraces every essential element of the offense charged. See Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).
In each case, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally and knowingly threatened Daisy Avina with imminent bodily injury and he used or exhibited a deadly weapon. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 22.01(a), 22.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007). The indictments alleged appellant "used and exhibited a deadly weapon, a motor vehicle, by ramming the motor vehicle operated by defendant into the motor vehicle operated by complainant during the course of the assault." Appellant argues that because Avina is not specifically named as the complainant, the evidence is insufficient. We disagree.
Daisy Avina is listed as "complainant" at the top of each indictment. Signed judicial confessions, which track all of the information contained in the indictments, are included in the records. A judicial confession admitted into evidence and contained in the clerk's record is sufficient to prove appellant's guilt. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Moreover, appellant testified he "threatened Avina by ramming her car" with his car.
We conclude the evidence embraces all of the essential elements of the offenses charged, and is sufficient to support appellant's convictions. See Stone, 919 S.W.2d at 427; see also Barfield v. State, 63 S.W.3d 446, 450 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). We resolve appellant's first issue against him.
In his second issue, appellant argues there is no evidence the district court ever reviewed the magistrate's findings and no order adopting the actions of the magistrate. The State responds that the records support the presumption the trial court reviewed the actions of the magistrate.
The judgments recite the trial court accepted appellant's pleas and found appellant guilty. We must presume the regularity of the trial court's proceedings and indulge every presumption in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and documents in the lower court. See Light v. State, 15 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). It is appellant's burden to overcome this presumption of regularity. See Breazeale v. State, 683 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) (op. on reh'g); Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd).
Although the district court judge did not sign the magistrate's form adopting the actions of the magistrate, nothing in the records show the judge did not review the magistrate's actions. Moreover, the judgments incorporate the magistrate's findings. We conclude appellant has not overcome the presumption of regularity of the trial court's proceedings. We resolve appellant's second issue against him.
We affirm the trial court's judgments.