On some questions (such as whether the worker must be furnished by a third party), the leased worker exclusion and the related definitions of " employee," " leased worker" and " temporary worker" are unambiguous. Monticello Ins. Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 47 (2005). Where the policy language leaves room for construction, exclusions from insurance coverage are to be strictly and narrowly construed.

); Gavan, 242 S.W.3d at 721; Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Mandrill Corp., 243 Fed.Appx. 961, 967-68 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); Carl's Italian Rest. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 183 P.3d 636, 639-40 (Colo.Ct.App. 2007), cert. denied, No. 08SC23, 2008 WL 2008622 (Colo. May 12, 2008) (en banc); Nautilus, 2005 WL 664358, at *6-7; Brown v. Ind. Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528, 537-10 (Ky. 2005); Monticello Ins. Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 836 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (2005); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 83 Conn.App. 526, 850 A.2d 1047, 1057 (2004); Am. Family Mut, 99 S.W.3d at 30-31. Meeks and Harrell also relied on American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. As One, Inc., 189 S.W.3d 194 (Mo.Ct.App. 2006).

Injuries to employees are typically excluded from coverage, as the expectation is that the employer will have in place workers' compensation insurance. Monticello Ins. Co. v. Dion, 836 N.E.2d 1112, 1113 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (citing 9 Couch, Insurance § 129.7 (3d ed. 1997)); see also AMCO Ins. Co. v. Dorpinghaus, No. 05-1296, 2007 WL 313280, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 12, 2007) ("The reason that policies such as [these] exclude injuries to employees is that such injuries are supposed to be covered by worker's compensation insurance, not by CGL insurance."). Both "automobile and CGL insurers exclude from their policies those risks that are supposed to be covered by their insured's workers' compensation insurance policies so as to avoid both double coverage and double premiums."

The insurance policy at issue in this case is a CGL policy designed to “protect an insured employer against liability for losses to third parties arising out of the operation of the insured's business.” Monticello Ins. Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 47, 836 N.E.2d 1112 (2005). “Injuries to employees are typically excluded from coverage ... as the expectation is that the employer will have in place workers' compensation insurance (or self-insurance) in one of the forms made compulsory by G.L. c. 152, § 25A.”

Theodore did not file such a motion. Although the judge recognized that the term "arising out of" is to be construed "expansively" and "indicates a wider range of causation than the concept of proximate causation in tort law," we consider his interpretation of the clause too narrow, particularly in light of the recent case of Monticello Ins. Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 46 (2005), a case decided subsequent to his allowance of DeAmelio's motion. In Dion, the insured, preparatory to felling a large tree, was making a chain saw cut in the tree when the tree fell the wrong way. It struck and killed the defendant's decedent, who had been operating a wood-chipping machine on the same job. The relevant provision for purposes of our case excluded

See also Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Orange and Blue Const., Inc., 545 Fed.Appx. 851, 855 (11th Cir.2013) (“Unlike worker's compensation insurance or employers' liability insurance, which exist to provide employers with coverage for injuries that occur to employees during the scope of employment, the sole purpose of commercial general liability insurance is to provide coverage for injuries that occur to the public-at-large.”); Monticello Ins. Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 836 N.E.2d 1112, 1113 (2005). The language of the contract, though perhaps clumsy, is clear, as is the result: Armbruster is an “employee” and her injuries are not covered by the policy.

Romero's complaint alleges that he was working for STBC when he fell, that STBC was a subcontractor on the appellant's project, and that his injuries arose out of its operations. On these facts, this case is a dead ringer for Monticello Insurance Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 836 N.E.2d 1112 (2005), in which the court interpreted an identical provision broadly to exclude coverage for injuries suffered by an independent contractor. Id. at 1114.

Such policies are designed to "protect an insured employer for losses to third parties arising out of the operation of the insured's business." Scottsdale I, 460 F.Supp.2d at 255; (citing Monticello Ins. Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 836 N.E.2d 1112, 1113 (2005)). Injuries to employees are typically excluded from coverage because employers are expected to have separate workers' compensation insurance.

The majority of these courts have held that the phrase "furnished to" in the definition unambiguously requires the involvement of a third party, such as a temporary staffing agency, that supplies the worker to the insured employer. See, e.g., AMCO Ins. Co. v. Dorpinghaus, 2007 WL 313280, at *4-5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2440, at * 14-15 (D.Minn. Jan. 11, 2007); Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Gardner, No. 04-1858, 2005 WL 664358, at *2-3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4423 at *6-7 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 21, 2005); Brown, 184 S.W.3d at 537; Monticello Ins. Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 836 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (2005); Nationwide, Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 83 Conn.App. 526, 850 A.2d 1047, 1055 (2004); Tickle, 99 S.W.3d at 30. A minority of courts, however, have held that the phrase "furnished to," nowhere defined by the standard ISO CGL form, creates an ambiguity and thus have sent the issue to a factfinder to divine the parties' intentions.

Id. at 9. It also cites a 2005 Massachusetts Appeals Court case, Monticello Insurance Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 486 N.E.2d 1112 (2005). Even though Crum & Forster concedes that Stolberg and Monticello did not rely on exactly the same exclusion as here, Crum & Forster maintains that “the outcome should be the same.”