Opinion
1 CA-CV 23-0137
05-23-2024
Gerald Montgomery, Lancaster, California Plaintiff/Appellant Jones Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix By Donn C. Alexander, Kathleen S. Elder, Ashley E. Caballero-Daltrey Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Kingman Regional Medical Center
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County No. S8015CV202200935 The Honorable Lee Frank Jantzen, Judge
Gerald Montgomery, Lancaster, California Plaintiff/Appellant
Jones Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix By Donn C. Alexander, Kathleen S. Elder, Ashley E. Caballero-Daltrey Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Kingman Regional Medical Center
Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CRUZ, JUDGE
¶1 Gerald Montgomery appeals the superior court's dismissal with prejudice of his claims against Kingman Healthcare, Inc. ("KHI"). For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In December 2019, Jeanette Patterson-Watson was a patient at Kingman Regional Medical Center ("KRMC") and received emergency medical care. Montgomery was Patterson-Watson's fiance and held medical power of attorney for her. Montgomery advised the healthcare providers that Patterson-Watson was having an allergic reaction and requested that she be given an epinephrine shot. The healthcare providers did not administer the shot.
¶3 In May 2020, Montgomery and Patterson-Watson advised KRMC of their intent to sue. Montgomery and Patterson-Watson filed suit in July 2022 against KHI. KHI moved to dismiss the case, arguing the two-year statute of limitations barred Montgomery's and Patterson-Watson's claims. After the oral argument, the superior court granted KHI's motion to dismiss, finding the statute of limitations barred the claims. The superior court also found that the complaint failed to state a legal claim for an independent cause of action on behalf of Montgomery. The superior court reasoned even if Montgomery was a proper plaintiff, his claims arose from Patterson-Watson's medical treatment and would be similarly barred by the statute of limitations.
¶4 Montgomery timely appealed. During this appeal, the court was notified of Patterson-Watson's death. Patterson-Watson was dismissed from the appeal, leaving only Montgomery's claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶5 We review the dismissal of a claim de novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 356, ¶ 7 (2012).
¶6 As a preliminary matter, Montgomery's opening brief fails to comply with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure ("ARCAP") 13. ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A) requires arguments to include "contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the . . . record." "[W]e consider waived those arguments not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or authority." In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64-65, ¶ 6 (2013). Montgomery does not support his arguments with adequate explanation, citations to the record, or citations to relevant authority. Accordingly, Montgomery's arguments regarding whether his claims are cognizable are waived.
¶7 Waiver notwithstanding, the superior court did not err when it found the statute of limitations barred Montgomery's claims.
¶8 Montgomery argues the statute of limitations was tolled from the date of alleged tortious conduct until the date on which KHI admitted such conduct. Causes of action for medical malpractice "shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward." A.R.S. § 12-542. The accrual date in medical malpractice claims is subject to the "discovery rule." Kopacz v. Banner Health, 245 Ariz. 97, 100, ¶ 9 (App. 2018). Under the discovery rule, "a claim accrues when the plaintiff has reason to connect her injury with a causative agent such that a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury might result from fault." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶9 Patterson-Watson was treated at KRMC in December 2019. Montgomery knew on the day Patterson-Watson was treated that she had not been given an epinephrine shot. Further, in May 2020, Montgomery submitted a demand and intent to sue KRMC. The demand and intent to sue outlined Montgomery's request that Patterson-Watson be given an epinephrine shot and that KRMC did not administer the shot. It evidenced Montgomery's belief that his cause of action against KHI had accrued. Therefore, at the latest, Montgomery's claims accrued in May 2020 with that notice of intent to sue. But Montgomery did not file a complaint until July 2022. His claims are barred, and the superior court properly dismissed the action.
CONCLUSION
¶10 We affirm.