Opinion
3:00-CV-2278-AH
January 14, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to the consents of the parties, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and the District Court's Order of Reassignment filed on April 5, 2002, came on to be considered Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on November 27, 2002; Plaintiff's response filed on December 16, 2002; Defendant's reply thereto filed on December 31, 2002; and Plaintiff's second response filed on January 13, 2003. Having considered the relevant pleadings, including the parties' summary judgment briefs and appendices, as well as applicable authorities, the court, for the reasons stated herein, GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Although this submission is titled Appendix in Support of its Pleading for the Trial to Continue, the court construes the same to be Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, the court will refer to the same as Plaintiff's "Response."
This submission bears the same title as discussed in note 1, however, it is enumerated as #2.
I. Factual Background
LaShunda Montgomery (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff" or "Montgomery") brought suit against Defendant Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant" or "CCE") alleging that she was subjected to discriminatory workplace practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. ("Title VII"). Specifically, Montgomery claims to have been subjected to discrimination on the basis of her African-American ethnicity and her gender based upon the following allegations: (1) having to perform three different positions without any additional compensation; (2) by the fact that CCE only hired African-Americans to work in Plaintiff's department; and (3) because Defendant monitored her business phone without her knowledge. (Pl.'s Am. Compl.). In addition, she claims that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for making complaints to the CCE "Hotline" and because she allegedly witnessed one of her co-workers "slip and fall" at the workplace. ( Id.). Montgomery has satisfied all administrative prerequisites to filing a claim under Title VII, including filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, and filing suit within ninety days thereafter.
At her deposition, Plaintiff expressly withdrew her allegation that her witnessing of the workplace accident served as a basis for her retaliation claim. See pg. 7, infra. However, in her response filed on January 13, 2003, she appears to re-urge the same. Her affidavit attached to her January 13, 2003 response is insufficient to give rise to an inference of retaliation, particularly where the slip and fall incident was unrelated to any activity protected under Title VII.
Plaintiff filed her "Charge of Discrimination," alleging racial discrimination and retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII, with the EEOC on July 17, 2000. (Charge No. 310A01936, attach. to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire to Plaintiff dated December 27, 2000).
Montgomery began her employment with Defendant in August 1997 as a temporary customer service representative ("CSR") at its Dallas call center. (Def.'s App., Tab A at 37). The following month she was upgraded to a full-time CSR. ( Id. at 38). As a CSR, Montgomery was required to make and receive phone calls to and from both business and individual customers of CCE. (Def.'s App., Tab B (Affidavit of Debra Washington) (hereinafter "Washington's Aff.") at ¶ 5). During Montgomery's tenure as a CSR, her superiors included Mr. Rob Snoga, Operations Manager; Ms. Pattie Sims, Call Center Supervisor from October 1, 1999 to June 16, 2000; and Ms. Jacquie Smaistrla, Call Center Supervisor from June 16, 2000 through the end of Plaintiff's employment with CCE. ( Id. at ¶ 13).
On May 15, 2000, Ms. Montgomery and other CSR's were required to sign a "Consent and Acknowledgment" form pertaining to the monitoring of the phone equipment used at the Dallas call center. (Pl.'s App. Ex. 027). Montgomery expressed her disagreement with the implementation of this monitoring policy by noting that she "[s]trongly [d]isagree[d]" with the same. ( Id). Later that day she placed between four and five phone calls to CCE's "Hotline" in Atlanta, Georgia. (Def.'s App., Tab A (Deposition of La Shuanda Montgomery) ("Pl.'s. Dep.") at 63; Washington's Aff. at ¶ 14) and complained about the following: implementation of the phone monitoring policy; that she was forced to sign the "Consent and Acknowledgment" form evincing her consent to the policy; that she had to perform three jobs at once; the lack of promotional opportunities; that all CSRs at the Dallas call center were African-Americans; that she had not received various incentives, including raises and bonuses; and that Ms. Patti Sims lacked the qualifications and the abilities to supervise the customer service department. (Pl.'s Dep. at 111-12; Def.'s App. at 63-64). Thereafter, CCE officials contacted Ms. Debra Jefferson, CCE's Human Resources Manager for its North Texas Division, and asked her to investigate the various complaints voiced by Ms. Montgomery. (Washington's Aff. at ¶ 16).
CCE employees are permitted to call the "Hotline" to, among other things, voice complaints and grievances. (Washington's Aff at ¶ 14).
As part of her investigation, Ms. Washington interviewed all of the CSR employees in the Dallas call center ( Id. at ¶ 17). A number of areas at the call center were found to be in need of attention and were subsequently addressed, including the supervision of employees, employee compensation, and the role of human resources. ( Id. at ¶¶ 18-19). In response to Plaintiff's complaints regarding her lack of promotions and accompanying pay raises, Ms. Washington also discussed career opportunities with Montgomery, even though Plaintiff had an active disciplinary notice in her file, which hindered her ability to be promoted for a period of at least six months. ( Id. at ¶ 20). During her investigation, Washington also learned that Plaintiff appeared to be a source of the low morale and discord which was prevalent among the employees at the Dallas call center. ( Id. at ¶¶ 21-23). Plaintiff's colleagues, most of whom were themselves African-American women, complained to Washington that Plaintiff conducted herself in an unprofessional and rude manner by making hurtful comments to other employees, gossiping instead of working, arguing with other employees, and dressing inappropriately. ( Id. at ¶¶ 24-25). These comments were made subsequent to a performance evaluation of Plaintiff, dated May 12, 2000, wherein Ms. Sims, Plaintiff's supervisor, inter alia, rated Plaintiff's ability to adapt to changes in the CSR script as "need[ing] improvement" and her teamworking skills as "unsatisfactory." (Def.'s App. at 47-49). Otherwise, Plaintiff received "fully satisfactory" ratings on all other skill classifications, including her appearance, and Ms. Sims noted that Plaintiff "is a joy to work with." ( Id. at 50).
On January 24, 2000, Plaintiff received a "First and Final Warning" following a verbal altercation with Ms. Teresa Hollie, a co-worker. (Def's. App. 60). Plaintiff noted upon the document that she desired to speak with a human resources representative and, further, that she could not sign the same because "it" — presumably the allegations contained therein — was "untrue." ( Id. at 61). Various recollections detailing the incident between Plaintiff and Hollie have been submitted by Defendants. ( Id. at 51-59).
On May 26, 2000, Ms. Washington and Mr. Rob Snoga, the Operations Manager for the Dallas call center, met with Plaintiff to discuss some of the measures that were being implemented to address the complaints she had made to the CCE "Hotline" as well as to discuss the comments and complaints from her co-workers regarding her attitude and general demeanor. (Washington's Aff. at ¶¶ 26-27). The two advised Plaintiff that she needed to make significant changes in these areas. ( Id. at ¶ 28).
On July 5, 2000, Ms. Washington and Mr. Snoga again met with Plaintiff due to a perceived deterioration in her attitude and performance level. ( Id. at ¶¶ 29-30). In addition to the fact that during the intervening time since their May 26th meeting with Plaintiff, two CSR's had reported that they were considering early retirement so that they would not have to work with Plaintiff any longer ( Id. at ¶ 31) and another CSR had submitted a letter of resignation citing working with Plaintiff as a major factor in her decision to leave CCE ( Id. at ¶ 32), Ms. Washington had received customer complaints about Plaintiff with respect to her telephone etiquette (Def.'s App. at 69). Plaintiff allegedly responded to these allegations in a defensive manner and denied needing to change her conduct or behavior. (Washington's Aff. at ¶ 33). Plaintiff was asked to consider two questions (1) whether she wanted to continue her employment with CCE and, if so, (2) whether she would commit herself to changing her ways. ( Id. at ¶ 35). Plaintiff was further advised that she could contemplate these questions overnight.
The following day — July 6, 2000 — Plaintiff met with Ms. Jacquie Smaistrla, call center supervisor, and Mr. Snoga. (Def.'s App., Tab C (Affidavit of Rob Snoga) ("Snoga's Aff.") at ¶ 4). During this meeting, Plaintiff answered the first question affirmatively; however, with respect to the second question, she refused to accept that she needed to adjust her attitude or change her behavior. ( Id. at ¶¶ 5-6). Plaintiff was then presented with a "Memorandum" outlining the specific areas in which she needed improvement, which she signed and, contemporaneously, penned a note indicating her disagreement with the allegation that she was causing problems in the call center ( Id. at ¶ 7; Def.'s App. at 68-69). After providing Plaintiff an opportunity to accept responsibility for her conduct and attitude, which she refused to do, and concluding that she would therefore not commit to improving any of these allegedly deficient areas, Mr. Snoga terminated Plaintiff's employment with CCE as of July 6, 2000. (Snoga's Aff. at ¶¶ 8-12).
II. Analysis
A. Summary Judgment — Standard of Review
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that judgment should be entered as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10 (1986). The materiality of facts is determined by substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. An issue is "material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510). Once the moving party has made an initial showing, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not merely rely on her pleadings, but must come forward with competent evidentiary materials that establish a genuine fact issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986). Neither conclusory allegations nor hearsay statements are competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports the opponent's claim. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support a nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992)). The court must resolve any factual controversies in favor of the non-moving party. Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Thus, in reviewing all of the evidence, the court must consider it in a light most favorable to Ms. Montgomery's claims, drawing all factual inferences therefrom and making all credibility determinations related therefrom in her favor. However, summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Applicable Law 1. Title VII
Montgomery alleges that she was not selected for/promoted to other positions; that she was subjected to derogatory racial references; and that only African-American employees were hired as CSRs by Defendant. (Pl.'s Dep. at 111-12, 133, lns. 2-14). Montgomery further alleges that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for calling the CCE "Hotline" to complain about various issues. (Pl.'s Dep. at 290, lns. 2-7).
Based on Plaintiff's allegations in her charge filed with the EEOC ( see n. 3, supra) and the lack of indication otherwise in her Amended Complaint, the court assumes that Plaintiff's causes of action have been brought under the applicable provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. ("Title VII").
Title VII prohibits covered employers from discriminating against "any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
2. Analytical Framework
A plaintiff can prove discriminatory animus by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). If the plaintiff elects the former approach, the plaintiff must offer "direct" evidence of discrimination, defined as "evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of intentional discrimination without inference or presumption." Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hospital, 92 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Alternatively, a plaintiff may prove intentional discrimination via indirect or circumstantial evidence. The indirect approach is governed by the familiar, tripartite burden-shifting scheme established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Standstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 202) (citation omitted).
Because Montgomery relies on circumstantial evidence, the court applies the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. Id. Preliminarily the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000). Once a prima facie case is made, a presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden of production shifts to the employer to respond with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 935 S.Ct. at 1824. If the employer carries its burden, the presumption of discrimination dissipates and the burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's articulated reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511-12, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749-50 (1993). Although the McDonnell Douglas framework shifts the burden of production between the plaintiff and the defendant, "the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981) (citation omitted).
This burden on the employer is only one of production, not persuasion, involving no credibility assessments. See Tex. Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094-95 (1981).
An employer is entitled to summary judgment "if the plaintiff create[s] only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there [is] abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination occurred." See Pratt v. City of Houston, Texas, 247 F.3d 601, 606 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. at 2109); see also Vadie v. Mississippi State University, 218 F.3d 365, 372 (5th Cir.) (an employer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law "if the evidence taken as a whole would not allow a [fact-finder] to infer that the actual reason for the [employer's decision] was discriminatory"), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1113, 121 S.Ct. 859 (2001).
C. Plaintiff's Claims 1. Failure to Promote
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on failure to promote under Title VII, Montgomery must show that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job she sought; (3) she was not promoted; and (4) the position she sought was filled by someone outside her protected class. Blow v. City of San Antonio, Texas, 236 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
It is undisputed that Montgomery, an African-American, is a member of a protected class and that she was not promoted from her CSR position. However, Defendant claims that Montgomery cannot establish a prima facie case of failure to promote on the basis of racial discrimination because she did not apply for any other positions at the call center, except for a senior CSR position for which she was not qualified. Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (where an employee failed to establish that he applied for, and was qualified to do, the job which formed the basis of his failure-to-promote claim, the court held that a prima facie case of racial discrimination was not made).
In response to Defendant's contention that she did not apply for other positions at the Dallas call center, Plaintiff claims she had an interest in applying for a position in the account settlement department, but that she was discouraged by Ms. Sims from completing an application for the position due to a lack of skills and experience (Pl.'s Dep. 71-72, 75, 77). Plaintiff also claims to have had an interest in applying for a position in the equipment control department, but again, after inquiring about the position, she was likewise informed by Ms. Sims that Mr. Snoga felt that Plaintiff lacked the necessary skills for the job. ( Id. at 77-79). Plaintiff claims that she eventually completed and submitted an application for a position in the settlement department. However, she was later personally notified that she lacked the skills for the position ( Id. at 80-81).
Further, as discussed above, Plaintiff contends that she submitted an application for the position of senior CSR, which was ultimately filled by Ms. Brenda Carr, another African-American female. ( Id. at 93, 95). With respect to the senior CSR position, Plaintiff conceded, during her deposition, that the position required a minimum of 3 to 5 years of experience, which she did not have. ( Id. at 94-95; Washington's Aff. at ¶ 40). Plaintiff further conceded that Ms. Carr possessed such experience. ( Id.)
Although under some circumstances a Title VII plaintiff's failure to apply for a vacant position may not be fatal to the complainant's failure-to-promote claim, see, e.g., Shackelford v. Deloitte Torche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 363-66, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), the less than encouraging remarks attributed to Ms. Sims fall far short of that which is necessary to draw an inference that Defendant maintained a known and consistently enforced discriminatory policy, particularly where it is undisputed that Montgomery did submit an application for the senior CSR position. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to make a colorable showing that she was either qualified for the positions for which she did not submit applications or that the positions were filled by persons outside her protected class.
With respect to the senior CSR position for which Plaintiff did apply, she clearly did not meet the minimum qualifications for the job. Additionally, Defendant hired Ms. Carr, a women within Plaintiff's protected class, whose over 3 years of experience more than satisfied the minimum requirement for the senior CSR position. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of failure to promote and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
2. Derogatory Racial References
Plaintiff also claims that she was subjected to derogatory racial references while at work due to the fact that Mr. Snoga collectively referred to her and her African-American co-workers as "Y'all." This claim is patently frivolous. Although in some contexts the use of racial epithets or ethnic slurs may support an inference of race discrimination, no reasonable person could attribute racial animus to the use of the race-neutral, colloquialism "Y'all."
3. Racial Discrimination — The employment of only African-Americans at the Dallas call center
Plaintiff contends that Defendant exhibited racially discriminatory animus by only employing African-Americans at its Dallas call center. Accepting Montgomery's representation as being an accurate description of the ethnic makeup of the Dallas call center's workforce, the same does not give rise to a cognizable claim on her behalf since Title VII pertains only to discriminatory actions directed against an aggrieved person in the nature of an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 629 (5th Cir. 2000).
3. Retaliation claim
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Montgomery must establish that: (1) she participated in statutorily protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between her protected activity and the subsequent adverse action. See Shackelford, supra, 190 F.3d at 407-08; see also Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996) (describing the third element of a prima facie retaliation case as a "causal link") (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit applies the McDonnell Douglas, supra, burden-shifting framework in addressing unlawful retaliation claims under Title VII. See McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983).
Montgomery contends that she was discharged in retaliation for calling the CCE "Hotline" to complain about the work environment at the Dallas call center.
It appears that Montgomery's retaliation claim satisfies the first and second elements of her prima facie case. First, to the extent that Plaintiff "filed" a complaint with Defendant — by calling the "Hotline" — opposing and questioning some of its employment practices at the Dallas call center — which she maintained were discriminatory — the same is clearly a protected activity. Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1995); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2001) (protected activity is defined as opposition to any practice rendered unlawful by Title VII, including making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII). Secondly, Montgomery's termination constituted an adverse employment action — i.e., an "ultimate employment decision." See id., 77 F.3d at 781-82; see also Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir.) (ultimate employment decisions involve, inter alia, employment discharges), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932, 118 S.Ct.
A reading of Defendant's Memorandum of Law In Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment reflects that CCE has, apparently, conceded this point as its discussion regarding Plaintiff's retaliation claim focuses singularly on her inability to satisfy the causality element thereof.
As for the third prong of a prima facie case, "a plaintiff need not prove that [her] protected activity was the sole factor motivating the employer's challenged decision in order to establish the `causal link' element of a prima facie case." Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Long, supra); see also Montemayor v. City of San Antonio, 276 F.3d 687, 692 (5th Cir. 2001) (the causation showing at the prima facie stage is much less stringent than the "but for" standard).
Examining the temporal proximity, or lack thereof, between an employee's protected activity and an adverse action against her may provide insight into the existence of a causal link. See Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 948, 118 S.Ct. 366 (1997). An inference of proximate causality may be drawn when the adverse employment action follows close on the heels of a plaintiff's protected conduct. Id. at 1188 (citation omitted).
In the instant case, the evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff was terminated less than 2 months after she called the CCE "Hotline" to voice her complaints. In light of the relatively close temporal proximity between Plaintiff's call to the "Hotline" and her termination as well as the permissible inference which may be drawn therefrom, the court finds that she has made a prima facie showing under the third element of a retaliation claim. As such, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies and the burden is shifted to the Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Plaintiff's termination. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d at 308.
In Clark Co. School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1511 (2001), the Supreme Court took cognizance of case law permitting such an inference to be drawn, but noted that intervening periods of 3 months and 4 months, respectively, between the protected activity and the alleged retaliation, were insufficient to permit application of the inference. Id. at 273-74, 1511.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff was terminated based on the complaints Ms. Washington received from Plaintiff's co-workers regarding her unprofessional and rude behavior toward them as well as the fact that Plaintiff refused to commit to remedying her allegedly deficient attitude and demeanor.
To the extent Defendant based its decision, in part, on Plaintiff's inability to conduct herself in a professional manner with respect to her co-workers, it is clear that such a rationale constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating her employment. Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2002) (where proffered reason for not selecting plaintiff for job was that defendant believed that plaintiff would not be able to get along with other employees, based upon negative feedback from his co-workers, the same constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for such action); Shackelford v. DeLoitte Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d at 408 (where an employee was discharged due to an inability to "get along poorly with her co-workers" the same constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for such action); Christiason v. Hilite Indus., Inc., Civ. No. 3:98-CV-2479-D, 2000 WL 963449, *2 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2000) (decision not to promote plaintiff based on a perceived inability to cooperate with co-workers, following disagreements between the same, constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for such action).
In light of Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, the inference of discrimination raised by her prima facie case dissipates and summary judgment is appropriate unless Plaintiff can prove that Defendant's rationale is pretextual. Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 408 (citing McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 801-803, 93 S.Ct. 1817).
As mentioned above, Plaintiff contends that she was terminated in retaliation for having called the CCE "Hotline." (Pl.'s Dep. at 290, lns. 2-7). However, to the extent that Plaintiff has merely proffered her subjective belief regarding the rationale which motivated Defendant's decision to terminate her, the same is insufficient to create a jury issue in the face of proof showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for such action. Molnar v. Ebasco Constrs., Inc., 986 F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Houser v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 627 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980)). In other words, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant's proffered reasons for her termination are pretextual — i.e., that she would not have been discharged in the absence of her having engaged in protected conduct. Shackelford, at 408-09 (citing Long, supra, 88 F.3d at 304 n. 4 ("ultimate determination in an unlawful retaliation case is whether the conduct protected by Title VII was a `but for' cause of the adverse employment decision")). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this issue. See Pratt v. City of Houston, Texas, supra, 247 F.3d at 606.
III. Conclusion
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. A copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff and to counsel for Defendant.