Where inclosed land suitable for grazing and pasturage is occupied each year during the full period of the season therefor, in the instant case from May until late October or November, possession is continuous within the meaning of the statute. ( Montgomery v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 P. 402]; 1 Cal. Jur. 533, and cases there cited.) [3] The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that D.B. Park entered upon lot 2 under the mistaken impression that the deed to him for adjoining lands in fact transferred lot 2, and that he, and after him members of his family, claimed to own said lot.
This is the plain meaning of the clause "for the ordinary use of the occupant"; it means a use appropriate to the location and character of the property, each case resting upon its own peculiar facts. ( Andrus v. Smith, 133 Cal. 78 [ 65 P. 320], and cases there cited; Montgomery Mullen LumberCo. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 P. 402]; Goodrich v. Mortimer, 44 Cal.App. 576 [ 186 P. 844]; Weyse v. Biedbach, 86 Cal.App. 712, 721 [ 261 P. 1086], and cases there cited.) [3] The fact that access to the land was gained by the bridge of a stranger and that his cattle as well as the cattle of others on occasions strayed on the land is immaterial in this particular case, for the evidence shows that in 1917, when they had the county records searched, if not before, appellants had actual knowledge of the adverse claim of respondents to these tules; that during the entire period said land was held by respondents as their own, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and in a manner hostile and not in subordination to the claim of any other person, said trespasses being clearly without intent to oust them or assert any claim hostile to their own.
It depends on the character of the property and the use to which it is adapted." ( Montgomery Mullen Lbr. Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250, 253 [ 128 P. 402].) (10b) We hold that the requirement of continuous and uninterrupted possession for five years has been met.
The general rule as to continuity is stated as follows: "The element of continuity is satisfied by necessity rather than regularity of use, so that an omission to use the driveway when not needed does not disprove continuity of use shown by using it when needed." ( Fobbs v. Smith, supra, 202 Cal.App.2d 209, 213; see also Ross v. Lawrence (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 229, 233-234 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 135] ; Medina v. Brown (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 208, 211 [ 342 P.2d 353]; Scott v. Henry (1925) 196 Cal. 666, 670-671 [ 239 P. 314]; Irrigated Valleys Land Co. v. Altman (1922) 57 Cal.App. 413, 429 [ 207 P. 401]; Myers v. Berven, supra, 166 Cal. 484, 490; Montgomery Mullen Lbr. Co. v. Quimby (1912) 164 Cal. 250, 253 [ 128 P. 402]; Hesperia Land etc. Co. v. Rogers (1890) 83 Cal. 10 [ 23 P. 196, 17 Am. St. Rep. 209]; and Webber v. Clarke (1887) 74 Cal. 11, 15 [15 P. 431].) Ante, pp. 224-225 and 229-230.
The fact that the buildings in some instances may not have been occupied continuously after their completion, would not, standing alone, destroy the continuity of the possession, so long as there was no intrusion by any other person upon the land or disturbance of the claimants' possession thereof. ( Montgomery Mullen L. Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250, 253 [ 128 P. 402].) [13b] The descriptions in certain deeds in the chain of title of some of the cross-complainants commenced on the "westerly" line of Masonic Avenue.
On August 24, 1928, Bordges conveyed to Collin H. Dong. From that date on there is evidence of adverse possession by the plaintiff and her grantors for a period exceeding five years, and a full compliance with the law. ( Montgomery Mullen L. Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 P. 402].) But the defendant asserts the plaintiff's possession was interrupted.
It is enough that the property be devoted to the ordinary use of the occupant, and temporary abandonments or periods of vacancy which evince no intention of abandonment of possession do not interrupt the possession. ( Montgomery Mullen L. Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 P. 402]; Botsford v. Eyraud, 148 Cal. 431 [ 83 P. 1008]; Goodrich v. Mortimer, 44 Cal.App. 576 [ 186 P. 844].) [7] Furthermore, any visible act which clearly demonstrates an intention to claim ownership and possession, and either puts the legal owner upon inquiry or conveys actual notice, is sufficient.
upation is not required ( Weyse v. Biedebach, 86 Cal.App. 712 [ 261 P. 1086]; Dodge v. Yates, 76 Cal. 251 [18 P. 323]). [3] To establish adverse possession it is only necessary that land be put to such use as can reasonably be made thereof, and such a use is sufficiently continuous if, during the required time, it be so used at all times when it can be used for the purpose to which it is adapted ( Myers v. Berven, 166 Cal. 484 [ 137 P. 260]; Posey v. Bay Point Realty Co., 214 Cal. 708 [ 7 P.2d 1020]). [4] It is well settled in this state that pasturing during the entire grazing season of each year during which feed is available, if done to the exclusion of others, is a sufficient use and occupation of land, which is reasonably fit only for pasturage purposes, to constitute the occupation and possession necessary to establish a title by adverse possession ( Webber v. Clarke, 74 Cal. 11 [15 P. 431]; Marshall v. Beysser, 75 Cal. 544 [17 P. 644]; Andrus v. Smith, 133 Cal. 78 [ 65 P. 320]; Montgomery Mullen Lumber Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 P. 402]; Gibbons v. Yosemite Lumber Co., 190 Cal. 168 [211 P. 4]; Posey v. Bay Point Realty Co., supra; Berry v. Cohn, 47 Cal.App. 19 [ 189 P. 1044]). In Webber v. Clarke, supra, the leading case in this state, the court said:
It is enough if he is present at all times and seasons appropriate to the regular and usual cultivation of the land. ( Montgomery etc. Co. v. Quinby, 164 Cal. 250, 254 [ 128 P. 402]; Myers v. Berven, 166 Cal. 484, 490 [ 137 P. 260].) The manner in which appellant held possession, and his payment of taxes levied against the property, establish the adverse character of his possession.
It is enough that the property be devoted to the ordinary use of the occupant, and temporary abandonments or periods of vacancy which evince no intention of abandonment of possession do not interrupt the possession. ( Montgomery Mullen L. Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 P. 402]; Botsford v. Eyraud, 148 Cal. 431 [ 83 P. 1008]; Goodrich v. Mortimer, 44 Cal.App. 576 [ 186 P. 844].) [4] Furthermore, any visible act which clearly demonstrates an intention to claim ownership and possession, and either puts the legal owner upon inquiry or conveys actual notice, is sufficient.