Obviously she cannot recover any part of the fund unless the deposit is an asset of his estate. This action calls into account defendant's distribution of the estate and therefore involves her official acts as executrix. Montford v. Simmons, 193 N.C. 323, 136 S.E. 875. This cannot be done in an action to which the executrix is not a party and making the individual who also happens to be the personal representative a party will not suffice. In Clark v. Schindler, 43 Ind. App. 269, 87 N.E. 44, the auditor of Marion County, alleging that the property of S had not been listed for taxes from 1893 through 1900, brought an action to set aside the final account of M (Margret Schindler) executrix of S. M. had distributed the estate to the heirs of whom she was one.
" In Montford v. Simmons, 193 N.C. 323, 136 S.E. 875, cited and stressed by defendant, the record shows the action was instituted in Harnett County against J. W. Burton, Administrator of the estate of William Montford, deceased, and certain individuals. Burton was a resident of and qualified as such administrator in Onslow County.
In the case of Stanley v. Mason, Admr., 69 N.C. 1, Justice Reade, in speaking for the Court, said: "The object of the statute was to have suits against these persons, whether upon their bonds or not, in the county where they took out letters, and where they make their returns and settlements, and transact all the business of the estates in their hands." The statute has been similarly construed in Foy, Admr., v. Morehead, et al., Admr., 69 N.C. 512; Bidwell v. King, 71 N.C. 287; Wood v. Morgan, 118 N.C. 749, 24 S.E. 522; Farmers State Alliance v. Murrell, 119 N.C. 124, 25 S.E. 785; Thomas v. Ellington, 162 N.C. 131, 78 S.E. 12; Lumber Co. v. Currie, 180 N.C. 391, 104 S.E. 654; Montford v. Simmons, 193 N.C. 323, 136 S.E. 875; Thomasson v. Patterson, 213 N.C. 138, 195 S.E. 389; Godfrey v. Power Co., 224 N.C. 657, 32 S.E.2d 27. Cf. Latham v. Latham, 178 N.C. 12, 100 S.E. 131. The appellees are relying upon Clark v. Peebles, 100 N.C. 348, 6 S.E. 798; Smith v. Patterson, 159 N.C. 138, 74 S.E. 923, and the statement contained in the opinion in Lumber Co. v. Currie, supra, as follows: "It is well settled in this State that an administrator or executor must be sued in the county in which he took out letters of administration or letters testamentary, provided he, or any one of his sureties, lives in that county, whether he is sued on his bond or simply as administrator or executor."
C. S., 469. Craven v. Munger, 170 N.C. 424, 87 S.E. 216. The cases of Perry v. Perry, 172 N.C. 62, 89 S.E. 999; Lumber Co. v. Currie, 180 N.C. 391, 104 S.E. 654; and Montford v. Simmons, 193 N.C. 323, 136 S.E. 875, upon which defendant relies, are distinguishable from the case in hand. Affirmed.
C. S., sec. 465, is as follows: "All action upon official bonds or against executors and administrators in their official capacity must be instituted in the county where the bonds were given, if the principal or any surety on the bond is in the county; if not, then in the plaintiff's county." Montford v. Simmons, 193 N.C. 323. The question of venue is not now before us. There is an old maxim of the law, "No wrong without a remedy."
Affirmed. Cited: Latham v. Latham, 178 N.C. 14; Young v. Davis, 182 N.C. 203; Vaughan v. Fallin, 183 N.C. 322; Montford v. Simmons, 193 N.C. 325; Palmer v. Lowe, 194 N.C. 707; Lawson v. Langley, 211 N.C. 530; Godfrey v. Power Co., 223 N.C. 650; Godfrey v. Power Co., 224 N.C. 660; Wiggins v. Trust Co., 232 N.C. 396. (523)
Affirmed. Cited: Curlee v. Bank, 187 N.C. 125 (2c); Montford v. Simmons, 193 N.C. 325 (1c); Power Co. v. Klutz, 196 N.C. 359 (2cc); Rose v. Patterson, 218 N.C. 214 (1d); Indemnity Co. v. Hood, Comrs., 225 N.C. 362 (2cc).
Affirmed. Cited: Ludwick v. Mining Co., 171 N.C. 62 (1f); Whisnant v. Price, 175 N.C. 614 (2g); Snipes v. Monds, 190 N.C. 192 (2p); Montford v. Simmons, 193 N.C. 325, 326 (2b); Causey v. Morris, 195 N.C. 534 (1d); Howard v. Coach Co., 212 N.C. 204 (1f); Rose v. Patterson. 218 N.C. 214 (2f); Indemnity Co. v. Hood, Comr., 225 N.C. 362 (1f).