Opinion
H051058
03-26-2024
In re H.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. M.C., Defendant and Appellant. MONTEREY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES & EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 23JD000024)
Wilson, J.
On April 24, 2023, the Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services (Department), filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging the failure of the mother, M.C. (Mother) and the father, H.C. (Father) to protect and provide support for their minor child, H.C., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The Department alleged that H.C. did not feel safe in Mother's care for a number of reasons, including that: (1) she and Mother were homeless and lived in a car; (2) Mother had hit her; (3) Mother was not feeding her properly; and (4) Mother would not allow her to regularly attend school. The Department also alleged that Father was unable to care for H.C. as he was struggling with alcohol abuse and had recently suffered a relapse. On April 26, 2023, the juvenile court ordered that H.C. be detained and placed in protective custody.
As the father and the minor child share the same initials, we shall only refer to the minor child by her initials to avoid confusion.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On May 16, 2023, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition and ordered that H.C. be removed from Mother and Father's (the parents) care, while granting them reunification services.
On appeal, Mother contends that there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings or its disposition to remove H.C. from her care. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Petition and Detention (April 2023)
1. Petition and Allegations
On April 24, 2023, the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging that 11-year-old H.C. came within the juvenile court's jurisdiction because she had suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm "as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or legal guardian to supervise or protect the child adequately." (See § 300, subd. (b).) The Department alleged that since January 2023, both Monterey and Alameda County had received four referrals regarding H.C., alleging general neglect and emotional abuse by both parents, as well as physical abuse by Mother. The Department indicated that three of these referrals had been evaluated out as legally insufficient, but noted there was other welfare history from Santa Clara County that was not accessible.
The Department alleged that on April 20, 2023, it received a report of concern alleging that Mother had physically abused H.C. H.C. reported that she did not feel safe with Mother because Mother" 'beat[] her.'" At the time, H.C. and Father were temporarily residing in a church in Seaside, and H.C. was reportedly doing well in Father's care.
The Department spoke to police officers after arriving at the church, who indicated that Mother had an order from Santa Clara County granting her temporary custody of H.C., as well as a restraining order against Father resulting from an incident on March 30, 2023. The officers indicated the restraining order prevented Father from being near or having contact with H.C. or Mother. Father left the church as a result. During their visit, H.C. made a statement to the officers that she did not feel safe with Mother because she was afraid Mother would hit her again. H.C. also disclosed that Mother previously had not provided her with food for periods of time. As a result, the officers felt uncomfortable enforcing the custody orders.
The Department then spoke with Mother, who indicated that she obtained the restraining order because Father had thrown things at her and pushed her after he had been drinking. Mother also claimed that Father and the church's pastor, Pastor Lusk, had locked H.C. in the church to prevent Mother from taking H.C. with her. Mother contended that law enforcement was "corrupt" because they would not enforce the custody orders and allow her to take H.C. home with her; she also claimed that H.C. was being manipulated by Father and Pastor Lusk into saying that Mother did not feed her.
The Department subsequently spoke with Pastor Lusk, who stated that Father had been living at the church since February as part of a faith-based substance abuse treatment program. Pastor Lusk indicated that Mother and H.C. stayed with Father at the church during periods of time between February and March. Pastor Lusk noted that on March 30, 2023, a hose broke and accidentally sprayed water on Mother, and Mother" 'lost it.'" Mother began yelling things such as" '666' and [that] 'Pastor Lusk [led] a cult.'" Mother later overflowed the toilets inside the church and began throwing things. At that time, Pastor Lusk and other church personnel locked the church doors and advised Mother she could no longer stay there. Mother came back to the church on April 19, 2023, to serve Father with the restraining order. Pastor Lusk also reported that H.C. expressed being afraid of Mother.
The Department next spoke with H.C., who indicated she had been staying with Father as she did not want to stay with Mother. H.C. reported that when she was with Mother, she lived in their car and would sleep on the sides of roads or in parking lots. She also stated that Mother would occasionally drop her off at places with people she did not know. H.C. indicated that Mother would often keep her out of school by finding something wrong with the school and refusing to let H.C. return. Mother would frequently not feed H.C., resulting in H.C. eating at her adult sibling's home. Lastly, H.C. stated that Mother had previously hit her with an open palm on the arm and the face.
When the Department relayed these concerns to Mother, she reiterated that H.C. was being manipulated and the statements she made were not true. The Department attempted to coordinate a safety plan with Mother, but Mother refused to agree to a plan involving H.C.'s paternal relatives or Pastor Lusk. As Mother would not allow H.C. to stay with Pastor Lusk, and maternal relatives were unavailable to pick H.C. up until the following day, the Department placed H.C. in protective custody.
On April 21, 2023, the Department held separate Emergency Response Child and Family Team meetings with Mother and Father. Mother did not take accountability for her actions, claimed the Department was making false accusations and retaliating against her, and argued that H.C." '[knew] she [was] safe'" with Mother. However, the Department noted that H.C. was present at the meeting and reported she was worried about her safety. At Father's meeting, he admitted he struggled with homelessness and alcohol use, but provided a sobriety date of September 10, 2022, which he later indicated was the start date of a recovery program. During the meeting, the Department had difficulty understanding Father due to his slurred speech, and Father admitted he had relapsed the previous day when H.C. was taken into protective custody.
Based on its observations, the Department concluded that Mother had not demonstrated insight into how her actions were affecting H.C. and instead believed H.C. was being manipulated into saying untrue statements. The Department also noted Mother continued to claim the Department and law enforcement were retaliating against her by removing H.C. from her care. The Department also found that Father could not properly care for H.C., based on his struggle with alcohol abuse and recent relapse. As a result, the Department recommended out-of-home placement and court intervention to "ensure the health, safety, and well-being of the child."
2. Detention Hearing
An initial detention hearing was held on April 25, 2023. At the hearing, Mother requested a continuance in order to have her counsel present. The Court granted the request and continued the matter to the following day.
A further detention hearing was held on April 26, 2023. At the hearing, Mother "vigorously object[ed]" to H.C.'s continued detention and asked the court to review the petition for sufficiency of the detention. The court found that prima facie showing had been made with respect to the allegations in the petition and ordered that H.C. be detained and remain under the Department's care, custody, and control.
B. Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing and Orders (May 2023)
1. Department Report and Recommendations
A jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was scheduled for May 16, 2023. In anticipation of the hearing, the Department's report recommended that the court sustain the petition, adjudge H.C. as a dependent of the court, remove her from the parents, and offer reunification services to Mother and Father. H.C. had been placed with Pastor Lusk and his wife, whom the Department described as "near-kin."
The Department reported that while the family had no prior dependency cases, Mother had prior child welfare history dating back to 1990 in Santa Clara County. According to this history, the Santa Clara County Department of Social Services had received reports of general neglect regarding concerns of Mother not providing for H.C.'s basic needs, the home being unsanitary, the children being exposed to domestic violence, and Mother hitting her children. Multiple reporting parties also expressed concerns that Mother may have mental health issues impairing her ability to meet H.C.'s needs. Furthermore, during a child abuse and neglect investigation initiated in Santa Clara County in 2022, the maternal grandmother informed the investigating social worker that Mother had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and would not listen to advice from family members to take medication and stay on top of her mental health.
The Department indicated that it met with Mother three separate times in May in an effort to engage her in discussing the circumstances of H.C.'s removal and case plan services to ensure H.C. was receiving safe and proper care. During all of the meetings, Mother continued to assert that H.C. was being manipulated to lie and that the Department and social workers were corrupt and being investigated. Mother also repeatedly expressed that H.C. was not doing well at her current placement. At a meeting on May 1, 2023, Mother expressed concerns that H.C. did not have socks and proper hair products at her placement, which the caregivers later provided after being alerted by the Department. At another meeting on May 3, 2023, Mother expressed concerns about H.C.'s placement and educational setting but could not articulate what her concerns were and again claimed that H.C. was being manipulated by Pastor Lusk. Finally, at a third meeting on May 8, 2023, the Department reviewed the case plan with Mother, who agreed with the goal of having H.C. return home but did not want to participate in a mental health assessment. Mother subsequently refused to sign the case plan.
Mother also was insistent that the Department transfer the instant case from Monterey County to Santa Clara County and provided her adult daughter's address when the Department requested proof of residency. When the Department spoke with the adult daughter, she confirmed Mother had been temporarily staying with her while she" 'got her act together[,]'" but she had recently asked Mother to leave after discovering Mother was using her address. The daughter had also informed her apartment complex management that Mother did not live with her and to ask Mother to leave if she was seen attempting to enter the residence. The daughter did not wish to discuss Mother's problems but only stated that H.C. should not be allowed to live with her.
The Department also spoke with H.C.'s maternal grandmother. The grandmother confirmed that Mother frequently pulled H.C. out of school if she thought there was a problem at the school, and expressed concern that Mother was not meeting H.C.'s educational needs. The grandmother expressed interest in H.C. being placed with her and indicated that she would be able to enforce boundaries with Mother and not allow her to visit if H.C. was placed in her care.
Following her removal and placement with Pastor Lusk, H.C. again expressed that she wanted to live with Father and did not feel safe living with Mother. H.C. indicated that Mother made her feel uncomfortable by speaking badly about people and being rude to them, including calling law enforcement on them. When H.C. tried to tell Mother to stop, Mother became upset and hit her. H.C. also stated that Mother would not let her attend school. Mother would regularly pull H.C. out after one or two months of enrollment and keep her out for the remainder of the school year. The Department noted that H.C. appeared developmentally on track and did not present any mental and emotional challenges in placement. After being placed with Pastor Lusk, H.C. was now regularly attending school. H.C. expressed that she felt safe and was happy living with Pastor Lusk, whom she referred to as her uncle, because his family was close to Father, and he had known Father and his family for many years.
The Department also spoke again with Father, who claimed that Mother was lying about the incident in March 2023 that led to her obtaining a restraining order against him. Father also indicated that H.C. only told him in February 2023 that Mother was hitting her and not feeding her, and did not allow her to go to school; as a result, Father enrolled H.C. in school and filed a petition to obtain joint custody of H.C. Father stated he was still working on his sobriety and remained homeless but was doing occasional work for the church for pay.
As part of its report, the Department provided an investigative narrative providing additional information about the circumstances leading up to H.C.'s removal in April 2023. In this narrative, Father informed the Department that according to H.C., Mother was not treating her well and would destroy or throw away any gifts Father bought for her, and often ate food in front of H.C. without offering her any. Pastor Lusk had also indicated that while H.C. and Mother were residing in the church in February 2023, H.C. ended up crying on multiple occasions because Mother would "completely change" from one moment to another. Pastor Lusk believed Mother was not in the right mental space, and that this resulted in H.C. being afraid of her.
In citing the basis for continued removal, the Department indicated that both parents were homeless, and that Mother may have untreated mental health issues that may be hindering her ability to care for H.C. The Department therefore believed that H.C. would be at "high risk" for neglect and physical abuse if she were returned to the parents' care, particularly since they had not exhibited behavioral changes to mitigate the concerns that resulted in the petition and initial detention.
The Department concluded that H.C. could not be safely placed with Mother due to her refusal to engage in discussions regarding H.C.'s removal and appropriate reunification services. Mother instead continued to believe H.C. was being manipulated by Father and Pastor Lusk and accused the Department of being corrupt and mishandling the case. With respect to Father, while the Department acknowledged H.C.'s desire to live with him, the Department expressed concern that Father could not provide a stable living environment and he continued to struggle with addiction issues, including a recent relapse. The Department therefore recommended that H.C. continue to remain in out-of-home placement and that the parents participate in reunification services, while noting that Father was already engaged in services and demonstrated his motivation and openness to participate in services that would help him.
2. Hearing and Court Orders
The juvenile court held an uncontested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on May 16, 2023. At the hearing, while Mother submitted to the recommendations in the Department's report, her counsel indicated she had "serious objections" to the content therein. Mother then made a statement on her own behalf, where she claimed there was nothing in the report to indicate she needed a mental health evaluation. Mother also objected to the references in the report to prior inconclusive reports that had been made to the Department and claimed that such reports reflected a pattern of "retaliation and harassment." Mother finally expressed concerns about H.C.'s placement and claimed that H.C.'s caregivers were making her say things she was not comfortable with, such as lying about her age, and influencing her into not attending visits with Mother.
In response to Mother's comments, the court acknowledged that she may have a certain perspective and viewpoint on things, but that this did not prevent others from having a different perspective or render their observations as false. However, the court noted that there was a "compelling need" for all of the family members, including Mother, to attend therapy in order to assist and help them in assessing their needs. The court also informed Mother the "avenue" she was taking reflected that her concern was more about what was wrong with the other parent, as opposed to focusing on how she could become a better person and parent and follow her case plan.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found the allegations of the petition true and that H.C. came within the jurisdiction of the court under section 300, subdivision (b). The court sustained the dependency petition and declared H.C. as a dependent of the court. It ordered H.C. to be removed from custody of her parents, granted the parents reunification services, and adopted the case plan recommended by the Department.
Mother timely appealed.
In her opening brief, Mother acknowledges that the jurisdictional findings against Father alone, which he does not challenge on appeal, are sufficient as to both parents. (See In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397.) However, Mother contends that this court should still reach the merits of the instant appeal for a number of reasons, including that the jurisdictional finding "serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal." (See In re D.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 911, 917.) We agree and shall exercise our discretion to consider the merits of the appeal.
A. Sufficiency of Evidence to Establish Jurisdictional Findings
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the court may exercise jurisdiction over a child who has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure of the parent adequately to supervise or protect the child or to provide regular care for the child. This includes, among other things, if the parents' failure to provide adequate supervision or protection, or provide regular care, is the result of "the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse." (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D).)" 'The basic question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.' [Citation.]" (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) In the trial court, the relevant child welfare authority must establish jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id.; see also § 355, subd. (a).)
"When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court's jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence." (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)
" 'On appeal, the "substantial evidence" test is the appropriate standard of review for both the jurisdictional and dispositional findings. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (In re J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.) Therefore," 'we must uphold the [trial] court's [jurisdictional] findings unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support the findings. [Citation.]'" (Ibid.) "To be sufficient to sustain a juvenile dependency petition the evidence must be' "reasonable, credible, and of solid value"' such that the court reasonably could find the child to be a dependent of the court … . [Citation.]" (In re R.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 986, 988.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Court's Jurisdictional Findings
Mother argues that the court's jurisdictional findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Mother first claims that the Department's allegations regarding H.C.'s inconsistent meals, living in Mother's car, and inconsistent schooling were all the results of Mother's homelessness due to poverty, and therefore were not actionable under section 300, subdivision (b)(2). In its response, the Department contends that there was substantial evidence reflecting that Mother's unresolved mental health issues, not her homelessness and poverty, were the cause of her inability to properly care for H.C.
This section provides, in relevant part, that "[a] child shall not be found to be a person described by this subdivision solely due to any of the following: [¶] (A) [h]omelessness or the lack of an emergency shelter for the family[;] [¶] (B) [t]he failure of the child's parent or alleged parent to seek court orders for custody of the child[;] [¶] [or] (C) [i]ndigence or other conditions of financial difficulty, including, but not limited to, poverty, the inability to provide or obtain clothing, home or property repair, or childcare." (§ 300, subd. (b)(2).)
a. There Was Substantial Evidence Demonstrating that Mother's Inability to Provide H.C. With Proper Housing, Schooling, and Meals Were the Result of Mother's Mental Illness
As a preliminary matter, Mother contends that any evidence of her mental health should be deemed irrelevant because the petition did not contain any allegations to this effect, and the Department never requested to amend the petition to include Mother's "outstanding mental health issues." We acknowledge that the Department did not specifically allege in its petition that Mother's inability to properly care for H.C. was the result of mental illness, nor did the court make any findings regarding Mother's mental health in its jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (See § 300, subd. (b)(1)(D).) However, if the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence, the adequacy of the petition is irrelevant unless the parent contends the petition did not provide her with adequate notice. (See In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 626-627.)
We further note that nothing in section 300, subdivision (b), requires a formal diagnosis of a mental illness before the court can exercise jurisdiction based on a parent's mental health issues. So long as a parent's mental health issues place the children at a substantial risk of harm, section 300, subdivision (b) is satisfied and no formal diagnosis is required. (See In re Khalid H. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 733, 737 [rejecting fixed definition of mental illness in § 300, subd. (b) because goal of provision is "to interfere with parental rights in order to protect children, assist the parents in eliminating the risk to their children through a reunification plan, and subsequently reunite the family"].)
While Mother does not specifically claim notice was inadequate, she argues in reply that the Department could have amended the petition prior to the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, or, in the alternative, the court could have amended the petition to conform to the proof presented regarding her mental health. However, the record does not reflect that Mother objected to the sufficiency of the petition in the trial court. "Allowing parties to challenge the facial sufficiency of a petition for the first time on appeal conflicts with the emphasis on expeditious processing of these cases so that children can achieve permanence and stability without unnecessary delay if reunification efforts fail. [Citation.] Enforcing the forfeiture rule requires parties to raise such issues in the juvenile court where they can be promptly remedied without undue prejudice to the interests of any of the parties involved. [Citations.]" (In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1640.) As the appellate court similarly noted in David H., if Mother had raised a challenge to the sufficiency of the petition in the trial court, the court could have allowed the Department to amend the petition to conform to the proof offered at the hearing, which is generally favored absent a showing of prejudice. (See In re David H., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1640.) As Mother did not challenge the sufficiency of the petition in the trial court, we find that she has forfeited this argument on appeal and will not address it herein.
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that there was evidence presented regarding Mother's ongoing mental health issues in the investigative narrative that led to the Department's initial petition and the Department's jurisdiction and disposition report, including in its final recommendation. Further, as discussed above, the court specifically indicated there was a "compelling need" for all family members, including Mother, to attend therapy. We also note that the Department's petition was brought pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), which does provide for jurisdiction based on the "inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse." (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D).) This is not a case where the Department is requesting us to affirm the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under subdivisions of section 300 not found in the petition at all. (Compare with In re V.M. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 245, 253 [finding that the Department could not claim jurisdiction existed under a subdivision of section 300 not alleged in the petition or made in the trial court].) Accordingly, we disagree with Mother's claim that any evidence of mental health should be deemed irrelevant in our determination of whether there was substantial evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings.
In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Department, we find there was substantial evidence demonstrating that Mother's failure to provide adequate care for H.C. was largely the result of her unresolved mental health issues, not homelessness or poverty. The Department noted in its report that multiple family members had previously expressed concerns regarding Mother's mental health, including her prior diagnosis for bipolar disorder, and its impact on her ability to care for H.C. In addition, the investigative narrative reflected Pastor Lusk's observations on approximately seven to eight occasions that Mother would "completely change" from one moment to another while she and H.C. lived at the church. The evidence also reflected that Mother was unwilling to address any potential mental health concerns, as she informed the Department that she did not agree to participate a mental health assessment. Contrary to received reports from family members and Pastor Lusk, Mother repeatedly told the court at the hearing that she did not have any mental health issues. Therefore, there was substantial evidence for the court to reasonably infer that Mother had mental health issues that had not been fully addressed or treated.
With respect to the parties' living situation, Pastor Lusk reported that Mother and H.C. had been able to reside in the church at various periods of time in February 2023 and March 2023. The evidence established it was Mother's outburst in March 2023, when she violently reacted to being accidentally sprayed by the hose, began yelling and throwing objects, and overflowed the toilet, that resulted in this housing situation no longer being an option for her. Given the severity of Mother's unwarranted and unpredictable conduct, on numerous occasions, the court could have reasonably inferred and there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Mother's conduct was the product of unresolved mental health issues, which led to her inability to provide regular care for H.C.
Lastly, we find no merit to Mother's contention that jurisdiction was established solely due to her homelessness or poverty. As previously discussed, there was evidence demonstrating that H.C.'s school attendance and lack of proper food reflected willful decisions by Mother to not provide proper care. The record reflects that Mother pulled H.C. out of school within one or two months of attendance because she believed there were "problems" with the school, not because of the family's living situation. Similarly, the investigative report demonstrated that Mother often ate food in front of H.C. and purposefully did not provide her with any. Accordingly, the trial court could have reasonably inferred and there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Mother's inability to provide H.C. with regular meals and schooling was a deliberate choice and not the result of homelessness or poverty.
b. Substantial Evidence Supported the Court's Finding that Mother's Conduct Placed H.C. at Risk of Physical Harm
Mother next claims that the Department failed to demonstrate that any of the allegations in the petition resulted in a risk of physical harm or illness to H.C. We disagree. We note that in the petition, the Department alleged that H.C. had reported that she felt unsafe in Mother's care, partly because Mother occasionally left her in the care of people H.C. did not know. Apart from claiming that H.C. had been manipulated into lying, Mother did not refute these claims or provide any evidence disproving H.C.'s statements.
Moreover, in evaluating the current risk of harm, a court may consider "present circumstances, which might include, among other things, evidence of the parent's current understanding of and attitude toward the past conduct that endangered a child, or participation in educational programs, or other steps taken, by the parent to address the problematic conduct in the interim[.]" (In re J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1025-1026.) There was substantial evidence demonstrating that Mother did not take any responsibility for her conduct or believe she had done anything wrong. The petition and the jurisdictional/dispositional report reflected Mother's refusal to acknowledge H.C.'s concerns about her safety while in Mother's care; instead, Mother repeatedly claimed that H.C. was being manipulated into lying. Apart from agreeing to the goal of H.C. being returned to her care, Mother refused to sign her case plan or agree to any other recommended services, including a mental health assessment. As noted by the court during the May 21, 2023, hearing, Mother's overall focus appeared to be more on blaming those around her, including the Department, police officers, and church personnel, for H.C.'s removal. The court contrasted her behavior to what it characterized as "the best approach," where Mother should have been focusing on improving herself as a parent, addressing her issues, and providing H.C. with a safe environment.
Given the uncertainty and potential dangers of Mother and H.C.'s living situation, as well as Mother's refusal to acknowledge that H.C. did not feel safe in her care or address the Department's concerns, the court could reasonably infer that: (1) H.C. was at substantial risk of physical harm; and (2) such harm could reoccur due to Mother's unwillingness to change her conduct. The fact that serious physical harm had not yet occurred does not necessarily compel a contrary finding." 'The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.'" (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
In conclusion, we find there was substantial evidence to support the allegations in the petition regarding the substantial risk of physical harm posed to H.C. as a result of Mother's failure to provide her with consistent meals, housing, or schooling.
As we find that there was substantial evidence to support the court's finding of jurisdiction on the aforementioned basis, we need not address Mother's contention that substantial evidence did not support the other allegations in the petition. (See In re Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.)
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Disposition Findings
Mother also challenges the dispositional order removing H.C. from her care. She claims that even if the jurisdictional findings are affirmed, there was no substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding under section 361, subdivision (c) that there was a substantial danger to H.C. if she were to be returned to her parents, and there were no reasonable means by which she could be protected without removal from her parents.
"Before the court may order a child physically removed from his or her parent, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and that there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without removal. [Citations.] The jurisdictional findings are prima facie evidence that the child cannot safely remain in the home. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed for removal to be appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citations.] In this regard, the court may consider the parent's past conduct as well as present circumstances. [Citation.]" (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.) As discussed above," '[o]n appeal, the "substantial evidence" test is the appropriate standard of review for both the jurisdictional and dispositional findings. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (In re J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.)
We have already determined there was substantial evidence supporting the court's jurisdictional finding that H.C. was placed at a substantial risk of harm based on Mother's inability to properly supervise her and provide her with a stable living situation. The Department repeatedly noted Mother's lack of acknowledgement about the dangers of such behavior or desire to find a safer living situation; instead, as noted by the court, Mother's statements at the May 16, 2023, hearing did not reflect any intent to improve her parenting. Therefore, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that H.C. would be at risk of harm if returned to Mother's custody, which is consistent with the goal of section 361, subdivision (c) to prevent harm to children.
Mother also contends that that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to prevent removal, because: (1) she could have continued living with H.C. at the church, with "a little more cooperation by church personnel[;]" or (2) H.C. could have been placed with a maternal relative so that Mother could have resided there as well. We find this contention without merit. According to the evidence, the maternal relatives only indicated they were willing to have H.C. live with them, not Mother; indeed, H.C.'s adult sister expressly stated that she did not want Mother to live with her or be around H.C., and the maternal grandmother indicated she would not allow Mother to be present if H.C. were to live with her. Regarding the church, given the manner in which Mother was asked to leave, as well as Mother's statements that Pastor Lusk was manipulating H.C. and not properly caring for her, the Department and the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Mother would not have been allowed to resume living there. Based on these circumstances, the evidence supports the court's finding that there were no reasonable means available to protect H.C. without removing her from Mother's care.
III. Disposition
The juvenile court's jurisdictional and disposition orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Greenwood, P.J. Bamattre-Manoukian, J.