Opinion
Nos. 3D14–1551 3D14–2109.
03-18-2015
Jose R. MONTEAGUDO, Appellant, v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION, et al., Appellees.
Erwin Rosenberg, for appellant. Louis A. Gutierrez, Assistant Court Chief, Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission (Tallahassee), for appellees.
Erwin Rosenberg, for appellant.
Louis A. Gutierrez, Assistant Court Chief, Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission (Tallahassee), for appellees.
Before, SUAREZ, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.
Opinion PER CURIAM.
Jose R. Monteagudo appeals to this Court from two separate, final administrative orders of the Florida Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission (“RAAC”).
In Order No. 14–01733 (case no. 3D14–2109), RAAC, upholding a Referee's decision, found that Monteagudo did not qualify for unemployment benefits because he was not discharged from employment.
In Order No. 14–02313 (case no. 3D14–1551), RAAC, upholding a second Referee's decision, found that Monteagudo's appeal of the state's decision that Monteagudo must repay to the state disqualified unemployment benefits in the amount of $1925 was properly dismissed.
We consolidate cases 3D14–2109 and 3D14–1551 for the purposes of this opinion. We find that both RAAC orders, and the factual findings underlying them, are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Therefore we must affirm. Heifetz v. Dep't. of Bus. Regulation, Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 475 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) ; Perez v. State, Dep't. of Labor and Employment Sec., Appeals Comm'n., 377 So.2d 806, 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (“Our affirmance is based primarily upon the familiar principle that this court lacks the authority to interfere with an administrative decision based upon an acceptable view of the evidence.”); § 120.68(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014).
Affirmed.