Thus, although a recorded subdivision plat creates a "presumption that `reasonably necessary use,' `fair,' or `reasonable enjoyment' of the easement requires the full use of the right-of-way or street as platted and dedicated," that presumption is rebuttable. see Montana v. Blount, 232 Ga. App. 782, 784 (1) (a) ( 504 SE2d 447) (1998). (Citations and punctuation omitted.)

Chapman v. Cassels Co., 180 Ga. 349, 354 (2) ( 179 SE 91) (1935).Montana v. Blount, 232 Ga. App. 782, 786 (1) (b) ( 504 SE2d 447) (1998). 2.

In Bagley, supra, although the trial court originally adopted the jury's factual findings and entered judgment in accordance with those findings, we upheld the subsequently granted judgment n.o.v., which the trial court entered after observing the advisory nature of the jury's verdict and the lack of evidence to support the jury's finding. In Montana v. Blount, 232 Ga. App. 782 (1) (b) ( 504 SE2d 447) (1998), after empaneling an advisory jury to hear the evidence, the trial court exercised its prerogative to assess the facts independently and arrive at its own conclusions regarding the entitlement to equitable relief. "It was not error for the trial court either to determine that there existed nothing for which the jury could render an advisory verdict, or to decide to try the case without the jury and find that Montana was not entitled to equitable relief." Id. at 786 (1) (b).

Such rights remain with him because they are not granted. Ga. Power Co. v. Leonard , 187 Ga. 608, 610-611 (2), 1 S.E.2d 579 (1939) (citations omitted); accord Kiser v. Warner Robins Air Park Estates , 237 Ga. 385, 387 (3), 228 S.E.2d 795 (1976) ; Folk , 218 Ga. at 249, 127 S.E.2d 298 ; see also Huckaby , 272 Ga. App. at 750 (1), 612 S.E.2d 810 ; Montana v. Blount , 232 Ga. App. 782, 785 (1) (a), 504 S.E.2d 447 (1998). Accordingly, Georgia courts consistently hold that "[t]he owner of the fee has the right to continue to use the land in any manner not inconsistent with the [rights granted by the easement], or which does not impair the enjoyment of the easement."

(Emphasis supplied.) Montana v. Blount, 232 Ga. App. 782, 784-786 (1) (a) ( 504 SE2d 447) (1998). In Montana, this Court held that an express grant of an easement for ingress and egress over streets or rights-of-way (by recorded plat and deeds for the benefit of subdivision lot owners) gave the grantees the right to full use of the right-of-way or street, not limited by a showing of necessity.

Thus, the grantor had to convey all subsequently sold lots subject to such earlier express easements. See Deas v. Hughes, 264 Ga. 9, 10-11(1) ( 440 S.E.2d 458) (1994); Montana v. Blount, 232 Ga. App. 782, 784-786 ( 504 S.E.2d 447) (1998); Central of Ga. v. DEC Assoc., supra at 790-791. More importantly under OCGA § 44-9-6, an easement may be lost by abandonment or forfeiture by non-use of the possessor of the easement for a term sufficient to raise the presumption of release or abandonment.

The Court foresaw that the forces of nature could affect the property rights of both the lot and underlying fee owners. Montana v. Blount, 232 Ga. App. 782, 785 (1) (a) ( 504 S.E.2d 447) (1998). Having found no abuse of discretion, we uphold the trial court's injunction requiring that the easement holders receive permission from the owners of the underlying fee before making any alterations to the property beyond what is required to ensure beach access.

The grantor, Watkins, may create covenants that run with the land that bind their grantee, Burnette; either a deed or plat mentioned in a deed can create a covenant that runs with the land. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-39; Jones v. Lanier Dev. Co., 190 Ga. 887, 891 ( 11 S.E.2d 11) (1940);Montana v. Blount, 232 Ga. App. 782, 784 ( 504 S.E.2d 447) (1998). Such covenant accrues to the benefit of all other grantees from the grantor whose land abutts upon the easement.

See Smith v. Bruce, 241 Ga. 133, 143, 244 S.E.2d 559 (1978) (“All persons claiming under the first subdivider are forever estopped to deny the existence of the streets ... designated for the common good of all purchasers of lots in the subdivision.”). 4. The Goodsons argue that if their interest is in the nature of an easement, as it is, then the trial court erred in limiting it to a 20–foot–wide strip for ingress and egress down the centerline of Carol Street from the end of their driveway to Highway 32. The Goodsons correctly note that the recording of the Allen Acres subdivision plat “create[d] a legal rebuttable presumption that ... reasonable enjoyment of the easement requires the full use of the ... street as platted.” Montana v. Blount, 232 Ga.App. 782, 786, 504 S.E.2d 447 (1998) (punctuation omitted). However, the special master and the trial court found that the entire platted 60–foot–wide strip of land running the full length between the Goodson and Eller Properties was not required for the Goodsons' reasonable enjoyment of the easement.