Opinion
Civil No. 99-1498 (JAC-SEC)
September 25, 2000
Luis A. DeMier-LeBlanc, Esq., for Appellant.
Lilliam E. Mendoza, Assistant U.S. Attorney, for Appellee.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff is a 36-year-old individual at the onset date of alleged disability, with limited education and past relevant work as a maintenance worker. He filed an application for a determination of a period of disability and benefits thereof on May 10, 1995, alleging inability to work since December 31, 1992, due to a mental condition, head problems, high blood pressure, and epilepsy.
The above plaintiff's application was initially denied and thereafter the requested administrative hearing was held on June 18, 1997. The presiding Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an opinion, adopted as the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) concluding claimant was not under disability. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of this final decision. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).
Section 205(g) provides:
"[t]he court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcripts of record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing".
The ALJ found the medical evidence refers to an automobile accident suffered in 1993 wherein claimant injured his right foot, but there was no residual after treatment. As to the claims of hypertension, there is no medical evidence or treatment of end-organ damage or limitations from said condition. Having examined the psychiatric treatment record, a consultant evaluation indicated claimant suffered from personality disorder that imposed slight restrictions on activities of daily living and slight difficulties in social functioning. The patient was able to perform simple work tasks, maintain attention and concentration for two-hours intervals, and relate to others. There was no evidence to show any neurological deficit that limits claimant's exertional capacity in any significant way for which he could perform work at all exertional levels. Insofar as the non-exertional limitations, the ALJ gave claimant the benefit of the doubt that he could not perform complex work. Claimant was able to take care of his own personal needs, use public transportation and had a renewed driver's licence, in addition to carrying out house chores and doing errands. He was found able to perform his previous work as a maintenance worker. This work is one unskilled and from medium to heavy in exertion, and within his ability to perform simple, not complex, kind of work.
To establish entitlement to benefits, claimant has the burden of proving that he became disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Disability is determined in §§ 216(i)(1) and 223(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. 416(i)(1) and 423(d)(1). See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n. 5 (1987); Deblois v. Secretary of H.H.S., 686 F.2d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 1982). Claimant may be considered disabled if he is unable to perform any substantial gainful employment because of a medical condition that is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. The impairments imposed by the condition or combination of conditions must be so severe as to prevent him from working in his usual occupation and in any other substantial gainful employment upon further taking in consideration age, education, training, and work experience. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A).
Once claimant has established he is unable to perform his previous work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the existence of other jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that claimant is still able to perform. Goodermote v. Secretary of H.H.S., 690 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982); Torres v. Secretary of H.H.S., 677 F.2d 167 (1st Cir. 1982). See Vazquez v. Secretary of H.H.S., 683 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982); Geoffrey v. Secretary of H.H.S., 663 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981).
During the administrative hearing, plaintiff testified in regard to his epilepsy that he had the condition since he was eight-years-old and is controlled with pills. He can remain sitting for a while until he gets anxious and has some limitation to walk out of his house because he gets tired. He would so some house chores, get water from the well by the gallon, and go downtown by himself, since he lives in the country side. He also plays and moves the small herd of lambs and chickens raised in the land they own. He used to drink liquor until some eight months before the administrative hearing.
The medical record shows plaintiff was treated in March of 1993 for a foot injury upon trauma to the right foot. He received local cure and was released. He had blood pressure of 130/80. In June 1993 he had foot edema, with blood pressure of 130/80 and was alert and coherent. In 1995 he had complaints of being anxious and not sleeping well. He received Buspar and Vistaril from the Health Center. He had a diagnosis in Axis I of alcohol abuse and in Axis II of personality disorder. A reevaluation form refers to showing intellectual level at low average and abstraction is described as difficulty with similarities. Insight is poor. The relation with the interviewer was good. The diagnosis was of anxiety disorder in Axis I and histrionic personality in Axis II. The Mental Health Unit refers the patient is alert, spontaneous, who denied perceptual disorders, suicidal or homicidal ideas. He was oriented in the three spheres and had a history of alcohol abuse. The mental examination showed the patient had good personal hygiene and good nutritional status. His attitude was pleasant and cooperative with appropriate behavior and normal motor activity. The language was spontaneous, with clear and normal tone, articulation and fluency. The affect and mood were normal. Thought was organized and logical and impulse control was good.
To review the final decision of the Commissioner, courts must determine if the evidence of record meets the substantial evidence criteria to support the Commissioner's denial of plaintiff's disability claim. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and such, as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938). The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact are conclusive, if supported by the above-stated substantial evidence.
Falu v. Secretary of H.H.S., 703 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1983).
The undersigned magistrate considers that an examination of all the evidence in the record as a whole shows there is substantial evidence to support the final decision issued by the Commissioner and thus it is AFFIRMED.
The Clerk is to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.