Monroe v. Red River Valley Farms, Inc.

Full title: CHARLES O. MONROE, Plaintiff, v. RED RIVER VALLEY FARMS, INC., and HARVEY…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: Apr 30, 2002

Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-0094-M (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2002)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-0094-M

April 30, 2002

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BARBARA M.G. LYNN, U.S. District Judge

Before this Court are Defendants' separate Motions to Dismiss, both filed on March 22, 2002. Having considered the Motions, and noting that Plaintiff did not file a Response to either Motion, the Court is of the opinion that both Motions should be GRANTED, as the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over either Defendant.

On January 11, 2002, Plaintiff instituted suit against Defendants, alleging failure to allow review of corporate books and records, real estate fraud, stock fraud, common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and malpractice. Defendant Red River Valley Farms ("Red River") is an Arkansas corporation not registered to do business in Texas. Defendant Harvey Bell, the majority stockholder of Red River, is also a nonresident of Texas. While he maintains an office address in Arkansas, Bell purports to be a legal resident of Florida, and actually resides in the Phillippines. Plaintiffs claims stem from Plaintiff's status as a shareholder of Red River, which owns a tract of land in Arkansas used as a vacation spot for hunting, camping, and similar activities, and from his attempt to buy a certain portion of the Arkansas property from Red River.

In a diversity suit, "the law of the forum state, subject to the constitutional limits imposed by the Due Process Clause, controls the ability of a district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants." Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 396 (5th Cir. 2001). The Texas long-arm statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.042 (Vernon 1997), "reach[es] as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow." Guardian Royal Exchange Assur., Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). Therefore, to determine whether assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant complies with the dictates of the long-arm statute, a court need only consider whether jurisdiction is proper according to "federal constitutional requirements of due process." Id.

Under the Due Process Clause, a court may not force a defendant to appear within its jurisdiction unless the defendant has established a sufficient connection with the forum state. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). The Fifth Circuit, in Latshaw v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999), succinctly summarized the applicable Supreme Court standards on the subject of personal jurisdiction as follows:

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when (1) that defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing "minimum contacts" with the forum state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." To comport with due process, the defendant's conduct in connection with the forum state must be such that he "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in the forum state.

Id. (citations omitted). Two types of minimum contacts with a state allow a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant: specific and general jurisdiction. Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 866 (5th Cir. 2001). Specific jurisdiction exists when "a nonresident defendant has "purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.'" Id. Contrastingly, general jurisdiction inheres "where the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state, although not related to the plaintiffs' cause of action, are continuous and systematic." Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 854 (5th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff bears the burden of presenting a prima facie case establishing that a Court has either type of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211.

In this case, Plaintiff did not allege either general or specific jurisdiction in its Complaint. Moreover, Monroe averred no facts from which the Court could infer that it has general or specific jurisdiction over Defendants. The only jurisdictional facts in the Amended Complaint consist of Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant Red River is an Arkansas corporation that owns vacation property in Arkansas, and that Defendant Bell is a resident of Arkansas. It contains no facts that even hint at a course of contact between either of the Defendants and the state of Texas. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss should be GRANTED, and Plaintiff's suit is therefore DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction, with costs taxed to Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.