Opinion
282 CAF 19-02312
03-19-2021
CHARU NARANG, BROCKPORT, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. JOHN P. BRINGEWATT, COUNTY ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (CAROL L. EISENMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. MAUREEN N. POLEN, ROCHESTER, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN.
CHARU NARANG, BROCKPORT, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
JOHN P. BRINGEWATT, COUNTY ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (CAROL L. EISENMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
MAUREEN N. POLEN, ROCHESTER, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, respondent mother appeals from an order denying her motion to vacate a prior order entered on her default that terminated her parental rights with respect to the subject children on the ground of permanent neglect. We affirm.
Initially, the mother contends that her motion should have been granted because she was deprived of her right to due process for a number of reasons, including that Family Court proceeded to conduct a trial in her absence and that the record is unclear whether she received notice of the trial. The mother's contentions relating to due process, however, are unpreserved inasmuch as they are raised for the first time on appeal ( see Matter of Atreyu G. [Jana M.] , 91 A.D.3d 1342, 1342, 938 N.Y.S.2d 686 [4th Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 801, 2012 WL 1502691 [2012] ; see generally Matter of Anastashia S. [Tonya R.] , 96 A.D.3d 1442, 1442-1443, 945 N.Y.S.2d 893 [4th Dept. 2012] ).
The mother further contends that her motion should have been granted because she had multiple reasonable excuses for her failure to appear and a meritorious defense to the petition. We reject that contention. We conclude that the court properly determined that the mother's purported reasonable excuses were unsubstantiated and based only on conclusory allegations that, inter alia, she was too ill to attend the trial and lacked transportation ( see Matter of Elysia R.M. [Shamaya M.] , 161 A.D.3d 870, 871, 75 N.Y.S.3d 594 [2d Dept. 2018] ; Matter of Zabrina M. , 17 A.D.3d 1132, 1132, 794 N.Y.S.2d 255 [4th Dept. 2005] ). Furthermore, the mother did not establish a meritorious defense to the petition based on her decision to enroll in an inpatient drug treatment program because she did not submit any factual support for her claim that she was making progress in that drug treatment program ( see Matter of Isaac Howard M. [Fatima M.] , 90 A.D.3d 559, 560, 936 N.Y.S.2d 11 [1st Dept. 2011], lv denied in part and dismissed in part 18 N.Y.3d 975, 944 N.Y.S.2d 476, 967 N.E.2d 701 [2012] ; Matter of Devon Dupree F. , 298 A.D.2d 103, 104, 747 N.Y.S.2d 501 [1st Dept. 2002] ).