Opinion
10-02-1908
MONMOUTH COUNTY ELECTRIC CO. v. EATONTOWN TP. IN MONMOUTH COUNTY.
John M. Enright, for the motion. James Steen, opposed.
Suit by the Monmouth County Electric Company against the township of Eatontown, in the county of Monmouth. Motion for injunction, heard on bill, answer, and affidavits, denied.
John M. Enright, for the motion.
James Steen, opposed.
STEVENSON, V. C. My conclusion is that no case is made out for a preliminary injunction. The bill is filed to restrain the defendant from entering final judgment against the complainant in the Monmouth county circuit court, upon a finding of the judge of that court, who tried the cause, byconsent, without a jury, and from issuing execution or taking any action or proceeding for the recovery of the amount found by the court to be due. A great deal contained in the bill appears to be directed toward the exhibition of various alleged errors of law committed by the learned judge who tried and decided the cause in the law court. All such allegations of course must be disregarded.
The first question is whether the complainant shows that it has an equitable defense which could not be pleaded and proved in the action at law. The only suggestion of any defense cognizable in equity is the defense of an equitable estoppel. It is well settled that equitable estoppels at the present time, as a general rule, are cognizable at law as well as in equity. 2 Pom. Eq. 802. Ruckelschaus v. Oehme, 48 N. J. Eq. 436, 443, 22 Atl. 184; Kronson v. Lipschitz, 68 N. J. Eq. 367, 60 Atl. 819. No pretense is made that this is a peculiar and complicated case where equity ought to intervene, and transfer the trial of the equitable estoppel, which of course involves the trial of the whole cause, from the law court to this court, in accordance with the procedure which was approved by the Court of Errors in Society v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 329. The conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff in the legal action, which it is argued constitutes an equitable estoppel prohibiting the defendant from enforcing the claim which it advanced in its lawsuit, seems to be extremely simple, and fully as capable of investigation and comprehension by a jury, under the direction of a law court, as by an equity judge. Nor is this a case where the equitable estoppel has been erroneously excluded from consideration by the law court, in the mistaken belief that such defense was cognizable only in equity. Borcherling v. Ruckelschaus, 49 N. J. Eq. 340, 24 Atl. 587; Headley v. Leavitt, 65 N. J. Eq. 748, 755, 55 Atl. 731. In such case the party, whose equitable estoppel has been erroneously disregarded in the law court, is not obliged to take a writ of error, but may come into a court of equity to have his equitable estoppel recognized and tried, and thereupon the inability of the law court to take cognizance of the equitable estoppel will be deemed res adjudicata between the parties.
In the present case the equitable estoppel was not specially pleaded. If such a defense cannot be proved under the general issue, the complainant has merely lost its case at law because of the inadequacy of its pleadings—a predicament in which parties to lawsuits frequently find themselves. If, however, the complainant's equitable estoppel was available under its pleadings in the lawsuit, then it follows, either that the law court erroneously held that it could not take cognizance of an equitable estoppel, or adjudicated, either erroneously or correctly, that the equitable estoppel was not, in point of fact, established by the proofs. Evidence tending to establish the alleged equitable estoppel was plainly presented to the law court in this case. There is absolutely no indication, in the motion papers in this cause, that the learned judge of the Monmouth circuit court erroneously held that he could not take cognizance of the defendant's alleged equitable estoppel. If the defense in question was presented to the law court by the pleadings, the presumption is that the law court held that such defense was not established. It is unnecessary to point out that this court will not review the decision of the law court in regard to that matter. The bill, in describing the course of the action in the circuit court, sets forth certain contentions of the complainant before that court, one of which was that the conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff in the law court, set forth in the bill, constituted an estoppel which barred the defendant from any recovery. The bill then alleges that the court "overrules such contention in an opinion or finding," a copy of which opinion is annexed to the bill. In the opinion or finding above referred to the court considers the claim of estoppel, and holds that it cannot be sustained, for reasons which are stated. While this opinion of the law court subsequently was substituted by another, which I understand does not refer to the claim of estoppel, the fact still remains that there is no evidence in this case that, if this equitable estoppel was properly presented by the pleadings and the evidence to the law court for its determination, that court did not take cognizance of it and adjudicate upon it.
It seems to me quite clear that, if the complainant will suffer any injustice by the entry and enforcement of the judgment against it in the Monmouth circuit court, its remedy is by writ of error.