The Illinois Appellate Court has followed this analysis in cases involving the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 10, par. 101 et seq.). In Monical v. NCR Corp. (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 790, 467 N.E.2d 644, the court concluded that an arbitration clause which stated that any controversy or claim arising out of the agreement shall be settled by arbitration was sufficiently broad to require the issue of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract to be arbitrated. ( Monical, 126 Ill. App.3d at 791, 467 N.E.2d at 645.) Similarly, in Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No. 1 (1986), 142 Ill. App.3d 533, 491 N.E.2d 1322, the court held that an arbitrator must decide the fraudulent inducement issue when the arbitration clause encompassed "all disputes `arising out of or regarding this Agreement or the Property * * *.'" ( Kostakos, 142 Ill. App.3d at 538, 491 N.E.2d at 1324.
In any event, Illinois courts have followed the Supreme Court's analysis of the Federal statute in interpreting the Illinois provisions when a claim of fraud in the inducement is raised against a motion to compel arbitration. Konewko v. Kidder, Peabody Co. (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 939, 528 N.E. 1; Monical v. N C R Corp. (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 790, 467 N.E.2d 644. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin Manufacturing Co. (1967), 388 U.S. 395, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270, 87 S.Ct. 1801, the United States Supreme Court held that under the United States Arbitration Act of 1925, a broad arbitration clause requires the arbitrator(s) to decide a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract.