Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-846.
June 3, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts II and IV of Plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED as to Count II and DENIED as to Count IV.
I. BACKGROUND
Dennis R. Money ("Plaintiff") worked for Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company ("Provident") from July 1981 to July 2002. In early 2002, Provident's administration hired a security guard, Donald Hiles ("Mr. Hiles"). According to Plaintiff, Mr. Hiles exhibited a racially discriminatory attitude toward the Plaintiff by referring to the Plaintiff as "HNIC," which is known to mean "Head Nigger in Charge." Plaintiff alleges that on July 1, 2002, Plaintiff was attacked by Mr. Hiles as Plaintiff was exiting Provident's building. Plaintiff alleges hitting Mr. Hiles in self-defense. The incident was reported and Plaintiff learned of his discharge on July 11, 2002. Provident alleges that Plaintiff was terminated for punching Mr. Hiles. On April 24, 2003, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that he was terminated based on the his race. The April 24, 2003, complaint to the EEOC makes no mention of any adverse employment action taken by Provident against Plaintiff because of his age. Plaintiff did not make mention of his age discrimination claims until January 22, 2004, when he sent this second complaint to the EEOC. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court, including Counts II and IV. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Provident terminated him because of his age. In Count IV, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages alleging that Provident engaged in an intentional discrimination against Plaintiff with malice or reckless indifference. On April 21, 2004, Provident moved to dismiss Count II and IV of Plaintiff's complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is granted where the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This motion "may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2000). While the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, it "need not accept as true `unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences.'" Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greater Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2000), citing City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 n. 13 (3d Cir. 1997). In a 12(b)(6) motion, the defendant bears the burden of persuading the Court that no claim has been stated. Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant seeks to dismiss Counts II and IV of Plaintiff's complaint. Count II is an age discrimination claim that Defendant alleges Plaintiff failed to bring to the EEOC in a timely manner, and that the claim was not reasonably related to the timely claim of racial discrimination. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 57-69). Count IV is a claim for punitive damages based upon an allegation that "the actions of the Defendant complained of were intentional, [and] malicious." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 81).
A. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT II OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS GRANTED
In Count II of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff charged Provident with age discrimination against Plaintiff in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 57-69). In order to sustain a claim under the ADEA, however, a Plaintiff must file a timely charge alleging age discrimination with the EEOC prior to filing a claim for age discrimination in federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Additionally, ADEA requires Plaintiff to have filed their complaint with the EEOC within 300 days following the alleged incident. Id. In this case, Plaintiff did not raise his age discrimination allegations until January 22, 2004, exceeding the 300 day requirement. (Pl. Rep. Br. at 10). The EEOC time requirements are not dismissed upon the establishment of the prima facie factors giving rise to an age discrimination claim.Harris v. Smithkline Beecham, 27 F. Supp.2d 569 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Therefore, Plaintiff was time-barred from bringing any age discrimination claims that had not been timely brought to the EEOC, regardless of the establishment of a prima facie age discrimination case.
A timely complaint to the EEOC charging discrimination may be enlarged to include other alleged discrimination that is reasonably related to the discrimination set forth in the original timely complaint to the EEOC. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. St. Michaels Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters Milwaukee, Inc., 6 F. Supp.2d 809 (E.D. Wis. 1998). If the alleged discrimination is within the same subject matter as the original EEOC charge then the alleged discrimination may be deemed to be "reasonably related to the EEOC charge" and "growing out of the allegations" allowing the related alleged discrimination to be included with the original charged discrimination provided to the EEOC. Id. at 817. Therefore the issue becomes one of content and not timeliness as the alleged age discrimination must relate back to the original EEOC charge of racial discrimination. Zezulewicz v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 290 F. Supp.2d 583 (W.D. Pa. 2003). Courts must broadly interpret the original EEOC charge, because the charge is filled out by a layperson and is not designed to be a hurdle to adjudication. St. Michaels Hosp., 6 F. Supp.2d at 817. The purpose of the EEOC is to resolve claims by conciliation and give notice to the defendant. Id. at 817. Furthermore, the purpose of such a broad interpretation of the EEOC charge is to effectuate a remedial purpose, which is not satisfied in this case, as the age discrimination claim is not reasonably related to the race discrimination charge to the EEOC. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff's charge to the EEOC on April 24, 2003, does not make mention of any age based discrimination and does not give Provident notice as to an impending age discrimination claim. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A). The EEOC charge does not reasonably relate to any subsequent charge of age discrimination and does not provide any notice that an age discrimination claim could grow out of the racial claim. Id. The subsequent claim of age discrimination does not fall within the reasonable scope of the original EEOC racial discrimination charge. Harris v. Smithkline Beecham, 27 F. Supp.2d 569 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Therefore, this Court dismisses Count II with prejudice.
B. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT IV OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS DENIED
In Count IV of Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 75-81). Title VII requires that Provident conduct an investigation into the incident and Plaintiff alleges that Provident did not make any such investigation but simply terminated him without a proper investigation "due to his race." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 30). Punitive damages may be imposed upon an employer for the discriminatory practices of its employees. Kolstad v. American Dental Assn., 527 U.S. 526 (1999). Furthermore punitive damages are prescribed in Title VII cases in which the employer acts with an intentional malice, which is alleged by Plaintiff's Complaint. Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 81. Plaintiff may not rely upon Provident's alleged refusal to conciliate Plaintiff's charge of discrimination as evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). However, Plaintiff has alleged that the actions taken by Provident were "intentional" and with "malice or reckless indifference" against Defendant, which satisfies their claim for punitive damages. Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 81.
Therefore the allegations are sufficient to establish a claim for punitive damages and the Court denies defendant's motion to dismiss Count IV.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff did not raise his age discrimination allegations until January 22, 2004, exceeding the 300 day requirement and therefore are time barred from raising age discrimination allegations in federal court. Furthermore, Plaintiff's claim of age discrimination is neither related nor growing out of Plaintiff's timely racial discrimination charge filed with the EEOC and therefore is not within a reasonable scope of the racial discrimination charge. Plaintiff's complaint does allege sufficient facts to bring forth a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff may not use the refusal to settle by Provident as evidence to establish punitive damages, however punitive damages may be established by evidence of intentional malice. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Count II and DENIED as to Count IV.
An appropriate order follows.