Opinion
22A-CR-401
10-24-2022
James L. Monet, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Matthew J. McGovern Fishers, Indiana. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Courtney L. Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Judge Trial Court Case No. 82D03-2106-F5-3164
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Matthew J. McGovern Fishers, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Courtney L. Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Baker, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Asserting his constitutional right to self-representation, James Monet discovered that proceeding pro se is rife with perils. Monet now appeals his conviction after representing himself at his jury trial on criminal charges, claiming the trial court failed to ascertain whether his decision to proceed pro se was knowing and intelligent. Concluding that Monet made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Monet was charged with two counts of stalking, one as a Level 5 felony and one as a Level 6 felony. Following a jury trial at which Monet represented himself, he was convicted of both counts. At sentencing, the trial court vacated the Level 6 felony conviction, entered judgment of conviction on the Level 5 felony, and sentenced Monet to four years, executed. Monet now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶3] Monet seeks a reversal of his conviction and claims the trial court allowed him to proceed pro se without determining that his waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.
[¶4] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel. McBride v. State, 992 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied. This right encompasses a defendant's right to self- representation. Id. Nevertheless, before a defendant waives his right to counsel and proceeds pro se, the trial court must determine that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Jackson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 926, 932 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied. We review de novo the trial court's determination that a defendant waived his right to counsel. McBride, 992 N.E.2d at 917.
[¶5] It is indisputable that in most criminal actions the defendant could better defend with guidance from counsel than by his own unskilled efforts. Hopper v. State, 957 N.E.2d 613, 617-18 (Ind. 2011). Therefore, the defendant who waives his right to counsel and asserts his right to self-representation should be informed of the dangers and disadvantages of doing so. Parish v. State, 989 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). Our Supreme Court has stated that there are no prescribed "talking points" a trial court is required to include in its advisement to defendants. Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. 2001). Rather, the information that must be conveyed to defendants will depend upon case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily-grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. Hopper, 957 N.E.2d at 618. The Court directed trial courts to come to a "considered determination" that a defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1126. On review of the trial court's determination, we consider four factors: "(1) the extent of the court's inquiry into the defendant's decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, (3) the background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant's decision to proceed pro se." Id. at 1127-28. The trial court is in the best position to assess whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel, and its decision will most likely be upheld where it has made the proper inquiries, conveyed the proper information, and reached a reasoned conclusion. Id. at 1128.
[¶6] At Monet's initial hearing, the court asked if he had someone to represent him. Monet responded that he has the right to represent himself and that he wanted to do so. The court explained to Monet that if he were to represent himself, he would not be given special aid or consideration, and he would be held to the same rules of evidence and procedure as trained counsel, including preparing and filing all appropriate pleadings and finding and questioning witnesses. The court also informed Monet that the State would be represented by an experienced legal professional and that the decision to represent oneself "is almost always an unwise one" and in doing so Monet was "making a huge mistake." Tr. Vol. II, p. 20. The court then took Monet's request for self-representation under advisement.
[¶7] At Monet's next hearing, the court appointed a public defender to represent him when Monet stated he wanted to speak to an attorney. At his next court appearance, at which he was represented, Monet expressed his desire for a speedy trial. When counsel advised the court, he was not adopting that request, Monet stated that if his counsel did not approve of his request, he wanted to fire his counsel and represent himself. At that, the court again informed Monet that he would not be given any special consideration, that he would be held to the same rules of evidence and procedure as trained legal counsel, that an attorney has skills, expertise, and training not possessed by a non-lawyer, and that the decision to proceed pro se is almost always unwise and may do more harm than good.
[¶8] Following several interruptions and unrelated rants by Monet, this exchange occurred:
THE COURT: We're gonna get a trial date. You want a speedy trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: Well, you're gonna have to listen to the rest of this then.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, let's get it goin' then.
THE COURT: You're, uh, -- State will be represented by an experienced, professional legal counsel throughout the entire trial.(Defendant clapping)
THE COURT: You cannot -
THE DEFENDANT: (Interrupting) Wonderful.
THE COURT: --Receive any special treatment.
THE DEFENDANT: They're not in this room, are they?
THE COURT: Concerning the conduct of the case, I cannot help you or aid you in any way that help and aid is not also given to the Prosecutor. You will be solely responsible for preparing a proper defense. This includes but is not limited to preparing all appropriate pleadings, investigating and questioning witnesses. If you're in custody, that's gonna to be [sic] extremely difficult for you to do. Uh, you must identify and gather all -
THE DEFENDANT: (Interrupting) Uh, I, I know a man who can -
THE COURT: --Please be quiet. You must identify -
THE DEFENDANT: (Interrupting) Or what, we're gonna set if off farther?
THE COURT: --And gather all appropriate evidence that -
THE DEFENDANT: (Interrupting) Next year or somethin'?
THE COURT: --May help your case. Sir, I can tell you right now, if you're gonna act this way during your trial, you stand virtually no chance of -
THE DEFENDANT: (Interrupting) Set a trial, Your Honor. This, this, this is a tragedy. This is the color of law. This is a game in your Court.
THE COURT: --Believe it or not, jurors actually listen-
THE DEFENDANT: (Interrupting) You gotta be kiddin' me.
THE COURT: --To what the Judge says. Jurors who judge-
THE DEFENDANT: (Interrupting) Uh, uh, okay.
THE COURT: --Your case will listen to what I say. If you're--
THE DEFENDANT: (Interrupting) Well, than [sic], judge it, Your Honor.
THE COURT: --Gonna argue with me and carry on like this, like a, uh, you're, you have no chance of acquitting yourself.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: All right. You're responsible for -
THE DEFENDANT: (Interrupting) I, I, I would like to request all video from courts too. Of all the proceedings.
THE COURT: --You are responsible for preparing, filing, and arguing pre-trial motions. If the trial is to a jury, you'll be responsible for questioning prospective jurors and challenging
jurors that you don't want to sit on your case. You'll be responsible for presenting an opening statement and a closing argument. You'll be responsible for examining and cross-examining witnesses at the trial. If the trial is to a jury, you'll be responsible for preparing any written instructions you want the Court to give. Most importantly, you'll be responsible for recognizing objectionable, prejudicial, or harmful evidence in testimony and making the appropriate legal objections to those items of evidence. You understand all of that?
THE DEFENDANT: I comprehend what you said, Your Honor. Yes, I did comprehend that.
THE COURT: Okay. You still want to represent yourself?
THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry, did, did you hear me say otherwise?
THE COURT: I need you to say, you want to represent yourself after you fully understand your rights.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I, I, I'm, I'm pretty sure that if you rewind the tape back, you'll see that I've said that. Already. More than one time. On more than one occasion.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: My yes will be yes. My no will be no. Id. at 38-40.
[¶9] The first two Poynter factors focus on whether the defendant had sufficient information about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Jackson, 992 N.E.2d at 933. On two different occasions, the court advised Monet of the dangers and responsibilities involved in representing oneself in contrast to the skills and expertise possessed by trained counsel. Presumably, Monet was aware of some of these differences because he was represented by counsel for a short time. In addition, the trial court warned Monet that he would receive no special treatment as a pro se litigant, that he would be solely responsible for preparing his defense, including but not limited to preparing pleadings, investigating and questioning witnesses prior to trial, identifying and gathering all evidence, arguing pre-trial motions, questioning/challenging prospective jurors, examining and cross-examining witnesses at trial, making appropriate legal objections to evidence, presenting opening statement and closing argument, and preparing jury instructions. The court further warned Monet that these tasks would be extremely difficult to perform from jail.
[¶10] The third Poynter factor concerns a defendant's background and experience. A defendant's technical legal knowledge is not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Nonetheless, Monet demonstrated that perhaps he is not a newcomer to the criminal justice system and its proceedings. He made it clear he was aware of his right to represent himself, his right to a speedy trial and the approximate timeline in which he was to be brought to trial, and the necessity of convincing only a single member of the jury of his innocence.
[¶11] Finally, the fourth Poynter factor examines the context of a defendant's decision to proceed pro se. Monet insisted on representing himself from the outset and exercised his right to self-representation at his initial hearing. The court warned him of the perils of self-representation and then allowed the idea to simmer. Although Monet chose to be represented for a short time, he terminated the relationship as soon as appointed counsel disagreed with his course of action, stating: "I do not want my lawyer. He's not competent enough ta, ta to speak for me. He has not been in my best interest." Tr. Vol. II, p. 34.
Conclusion
[¶12] Based on the foregoing, we conclude the facts and circumstances of this case properly led the trial court to a considered determination that Monet made a knowing and intelligent decision to proceed pro se.
[¶13] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.