Opinion
Index No. EF005303-2019
11-16-2020
GEORGE L. MONDELLO, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD H. PRICE JR., WHEELS INC., and NEW YORK STATE ELECTRIC AND GAS CORPORATION, Defendants.
Unpublished Opinion
Motion Date: November 13, 2020
To commence the statutory time period for appeals as of right (CPLR5513[a]), you are advised to serve a copy of this order, with notice of entry, upon all parties.
Present: HON. CATHERINE M. BARTLETT, A.J.S.C.
HON. CATHERINE M. BARTLETT, A.J.S.C.
The following papers numbered 1 to 2 were read on Plaintiffs unopposed motion for partial summary judgment on liability:
Notice of Motion - Affirmation / Exhibits .......................................1-2
Upon the foregoing papers it is ORDERED that the motion is disposed of as follows:
This is a personal injury action arising out of an accident that occurred at about 2:00 p.m. on June 19, 2018 at the intersection of State Route 17A and Quarry Road in the Town of Goshen, New York. Route 17A, at this intersection, is a through highway with one lane in each direction. Quarry Road is governed at the intersection by a stop sign. Plaintiff George L. Mondello was traveling northbound on Route 17A at a speed of approximately 25 miles per hour. Defendant Richard H. Price Jr. was traveling eastbound on Quarry Road, stopped at the stop sign, and then turned left onto Route 17 A, whereupon the front passenger side of his vehicle struck the rear driver's side of Mr. Mondello's vehicle.
A. Defendant Price Was Negligent As A Matter Of Law
Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") §1172(a) provides in pertinent part:
...every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, then shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection...and the right to proceed shall be subject to the provisions of section 1142.VTL §1142(a) provides in pertinent part:
...every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop as required by section 1172 and after having stopped shall yield the right of way to any vehicle which has entered the intersection from another highway or which is approaching so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when such driver is moving across or within the intersection.
Plaintiff established prima facie that Defendant was negligent as a matter of law by proving that he failed to yield the right of way to Plaintiffs vehicle in violation of VTL §§ 1172(a) and 1142(a). The governing legal principles are concisely set forth in the New York Pattern Jury Instructions:
The failure of a motorist to yield the right of way in violation of the statute is negligence as a matter of law and cannot be disregarded by the jury [cit.om.]. A driver is entitled to anticipate that a motorist facing a stop sign will yield the right of way [citom.]. [T]he motorist is under a common-law duty to see what is there to be seen [cit.om.]. Further, the fact that the motorist may have initially stopped at the stop sign does not negate his liability if he subsequently fails to yield the right of way [cit.om.].1A NY PJI 3d 2:80, at 509-510 (2020).
In Miller v. County of Suffolk, 163 A.D.3d 954 (2d Dept. 2018), the
A "driver who fails to yield the right-of-way after stopping at a stop sign controlling traffic is in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1142(a) and is negligent as a matter of law" (Fuertes v. City of New York, 146 A.D.3d 936, 937...[cit.om, ]. The driver with
the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the other motorist will obey traffic laws that require him to yield (see Romero v. Brathwaite, 154 A.D.3d 894...[cit.om.].... In support of their motion for summary judgment, Gil and Hampton Outdoor established, prima facie, that Miller was negligent as a matter of law because she proceeded into the intersection without having a clear view of northbound traffic on Newtown Road and without yielding the right-of-way, and that her negligence was a proximate cause of the accident (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §1142[a]; Aiello v. City of New York, 32 A.D.3d 361, 362...; Gonzalez v. Schupak, 19 A.D.3d 367...; McClelland v. Seery, 261 A.D.2d 451, 452...).Miller v. County of Suffolk, supra, 163 A.D.3d at 956-957. See also, Murchison v. Incognoli, 5 A.D.3d 271 (1st Dept 2004); Weiser v. Dalbo, 184 A.D.2d 935 (3d Dept. 1992); Pahler v. Daggett, 170 A.D.2d 750, 751-752 (3d Dept. 1991); Olsen v. Baker, 112 A.D.2d 510, 511 (3d Dept.), Iv. denied 6b N.Y.2d 604 (1985).
Here, Defendant stopped at the stop sign on Quarry Road but entered Route 17A without yielding the right-of-way to Plaintiffs vehicle. He thereby violated VTL §1142(a), and consequently was negligent as a matter of law. This negligence was unquestionably a proximate cause of the collision between Plaintiffs and Defendant's vehicles. See, Miller v. County of Orange, supra; Enriquez v. Joseph, 169 A.D.3d 1008, 1009 (2d Dept. 2019) (operator violated VTL § 1142 [a] when "after stopping at the stop sign, she made a left turn into the path of oncoming traffic without yielding the right-of-way"). Defendants, having proffered no opposition to Plaintiffs motion, have failed to demonstrate the existence of any triable issue of fact on that score.
B. Plaintiff Was Not Contributorily Negligent
Since there may be more than one proximate cause of a motor vehicle accident, Defendant's negligent failure to yield the right-of-way does not preclude as a matter of law a finding that negligence on Plaintiffs part also contributed to the accident. See, Romano v. 202 Corp., 305 A.D.2d 576, 577 (2d Dept 2003). See also, Gezelter v. Pecora, 129 A.D.3d 1021, 1023 (2d Dept. 2015); Arias v. Tiao, 123 A.D.3d 857, 859 (2d Dept. 2014); Espirhu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789 (2d Dept. 2014). Although a driver with the right of way is entitled to anticipate that the other vehicle will obey the traffic laws requiring it to yield, he may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if he did not use reasonable care to avoid it. See, Rabenstein v. Suffolk County Dept. of Public Works, 131 A.D.3d 1145 (2d Dept. 2015); Gezelter v. Pecora, supra; Arias v. Tiao, supra; Romano v. 202 Corp., supra.
However, as the Second Department has repeatedly observed, "[although a driver with the right-of-way has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid a collision, ...a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle that has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision." See, Enriquez v. Joseph, supra, 169 A.D.3d at 1009; Yu Mei Liu v. Weihong Liu, 163 A.D.3d 611, 612 (2d Dept. 2018); Shashaty v. Gavitt, 158 A.D.3d 830, 831 (2d Dept. 2018); Giwa v. Bloom, 154 A.D.3d 921, 921 -922 (2d Dept. 2017); Fuertes v. City of New York, supra; Smith v. Omanes, 123 A.D.3d 691 (2d Dept. 2014); Bennett v. Granata, 118 A.D.3d 652, 653 (2d Dept. 2014); Barbato v. Moloney, 94 A.D.3d 1028, 1030 (2d Dept. 2012); Socci v. Levy, 90 A.D.3d 1020, 1021 (2d Dept. 2011).
Here, Plaintiff was traveling within the speed limit, in his own lane, when Defendant struck the rear driver's side of his vehicle, and the testimony of both driver confirms that this accident happened so suddenly that Plaintiff had no meaningful opportunity to take evasive measures. Once again, Defendants, having proffered no opposition to Plaintiffs motion, have failed to demonstrate the existence of any triable issue of fact. Under the circumstances presented, this case is governed by the rule, cited above, that a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle that has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision.
C. Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on liability as against Defendants.
It is therefore
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.