I. Evidence as to Consideration. Appellant claims that the Nunez evidence was designed to show the entire absence of any consideration paid by Kelly to Nunez and was inadmissible, since evidence may show real consideration but not entire absence of consideration; and appellant cites such cases as Leake v. Garrett, 167 Ark. 415, 268 S.W. 608; Tandy v. Smith, 173 Ark. 828, 293 S.W. 735 Hampton v. Haneline, 125 Ark. 441, 189 S.W. 40; and Moncrief v. Miller, 178 Ark. 1069, 14 S.W.2d The holding of these cases is not applicable. Here, it was not attempted to show entire absence of consideration; rather, the offered evidence was designed to show that the actual consideration was,. e., that Kelly was a conduit of title or a mere trustee and never a bona fide or beneficial owner of the property.

In the case of Lollis v. Lollis, 191 Ark. 199, 85 S.W.2d 732, this court held (headnote): "Parol evidence is competent to show the amount of consideration for a deed is different from that recited therein and to contradict the recital of payment thereof." Other cases in which the same rule is announced are: Barnett v. Hughey, 54 Ark. 195, 15 S.W. 454; Davis v. Jernigan, 71 Ark. 494, 76 S.W. 554; Mewes v. Mewes, 116 Ark. 155, 172 S.W. 853; St. Louis North Arkansas Railroad Company v. Crandell, 75 Ark. 89, 86 S.W. 855, 112 Am. St. Rep. 42; Morton v. Morton, 82 Ark. 492, 102 S.W. 213; Bass v. Starnes, 108 Ark. 357, 158 S.W. 136; Hockaday v. Warmack, 121 Ark. 518, 182 S.W. 263; Wade v. Texarkana Building Loan Association, 150 Ark. 99, 233 S.W. 937; Howard v. Howard, 152 Ark. 387, 238 S.W. 604; Whitlock v. Barham Duncan, 172 Ark. 198, 288 S.W. 4; Moncrief v. Miller, 178 Ark. 1069, 14 S.W.2d 227; Moon v. Gilliam, 187 Ark. 581, 61 S.W.2d 64, and Rowland v. Ward, 178 Ark. 851, 12 S.W.2d 785. The lower court did not err in permitting the introduction of oral testimony to vary the recitals of the deed as to the consideration, and as to the payment thereof. The petition for rehearing is overruled.

But the question here is, Not what is the effect of payment, but was there a payment, and if not, was oral testimony admissible to show that no payment was made? In Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, v. 9, 2433, it is said that a recital of consideration received is, like other terms, disputable so far as concerns the thing actually received, but so far as the terms of a contractual act are concerned the writing must control whether it uses the term "consideration," or not. This rule was cited in Williams v. Chicago, Rock Island Pacific Railway Company, 109 Ark. 82, 158 S.W. 967. Likewise, in Moncrief v. Miller, 178 Ark. 1069, 14 S.W.2d 227, there was the holding that in deeds grantors may show what the consideration was and its value, ". . . but [such grantor] cannot show that there was no consideration, or that the consideration failed, for the purpose of defeating the conveyance." Mr. Justice HART, in Sims v. Best, 140 Ark. 384, 215 S.W. 519, said that a clear statement explaining the rule permitting oral evidence to be introduced to show the true consideration of a written instrument, as well as the limitation of the rule, is given by Judge Robertson in Gully v. Grubbs, 1 J. J. Marsh. 387, and that a brief and correct condensed statement of his reasoning was given in Baum v. Lynn, 72 Miss. 932, 18 So. 428, 30 L.R.A. 441, the statement being: "Wherever in a deed, the consideration, or an admission of its receipt, is stated merely as a fact, that part of the deed is viewed as a receipt would be, and the statement is subject to be varied, modified, and explained; but, if the stated consideration is in the nature of a c

STATEMENT BY THE COURT. This is the second appeal in this cause, a full statement of which appears in Moncrief v. Miller, 178 Ark. 1071, 14 S.W.2d 227. The court held there that a grantor in a deed could show what the consideration was, although not expressed therein, and also he may show the value of this unexpressed consideration, but could not show, for the purpose of defeating the conveyance, that there was no consideration or that the consideration had failed, and said: "So here appellee may show what the consideration for the deed was and the value thereof, and may recover judgment for the value of such portion of the consideration as he failed to receive, but the deed stands as a valid conveyance of the title to the land. The decree of the court below will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.