Opinion
33959.
DECIDED APRIL 11, 1952.
Complaint; from Fulton Civil Court — Judge Lowe. December 12, 1951.
Lipschutz, Macey Franklin, for plaintiff in error.
Dunaway, Howard Embry, contra.
Code § 97-102 defines a "dealer" as used in Title 97 of the Code as one "who deals in futures or differences in market quotations of prices or values of securities or accepts margins on purchases or sales or pretended purchases or sales of securities." (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, one who deals in commodity futures such as cotton futures is not a dealer in securities as defined by Code § 97-102, and is not required to be licensed under Title 97 of the Code in order to carry on the business of trading in cotton futures; and, in view of this, the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to and in striking the plea in bar and cross-action, and in allowing the case to proceed to trial and judgment for the plaintiffs.
Judgment affirmed. Sutton, C. J., and Worrill, J., concur.
DECIDED APRIL 11, 1952.
Irving Weis Company, a partnership composed of Irving Weis, Alexander Cycleman, Joseph Mark, and Morris Weis, sued The Monarch Company, Incorporated, for $620, due on open account for commissions on cotton purchased and sold by the defendant through the plaintiffs as brokers. The defendant filed a plea in bar, alleging: that the commissions sued for were due for sales by the plaintiffs, as brokers for the defendant, of cotton futures contracts; that the plaintiffs were thereby dealing in securities; that, during the period in which the sales were made, the plaintiffs were not licensed as dealers in securities as provided by Title 97 of the Code of Georgia; that at the time the defendant did not know that the plaintiffs were not so licensed; that dealing in securities without having first obtained a license as provided by the Code constituted a crime in Georgia, and that therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to any commissions. The defendant also filed a cross-action for the commissions already paid to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' demurrer to the plea in bar and the cross-action was sustained, the plea and cross-action were dismissed, and the defendant excepted pendente lite. On the trial of the case the jury found for the plaintiffs, and a judgment was entered accordingly. The defendant assigns error on its exception pendente lite and on the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.