Here, the defendants satisfied their prima facie burden of establishing that they neither created the alleged hazardous condition nor had actual notice of it (seeGriffin v. PMV Realty, LLC, 181 A.D.3d at 913, 119 N.Y.S.3d 876 ). In opposition, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants created the condition by negligently maintaining or repairing the roof (seeMonaco v. Hodosky, 127 A.D.3d 705, 707, 7 N.Y.S.3d 197 ). Additionally, the defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether they had constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition (seeGriffin v. PMV Realty, LLC, 181 A.D.3d at 913, 119 N.Y.S.3d 876 ; Hanney v. White Plains Galleria, LP, 157 A.D.3d 660, 68 N.Y.S.3d 522 ).

The Supreme Court denied the Village's motion, and the Village appeals."A municipality that has enacted a prior written notice statute may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a defective condition in a sidewalk unless it either has received written notice of the defect or an exception to the written notice requirement applies" ( Monaco v. Hodosky, 127 A.D.3d 705, 706, 7 N.Y.S.3d 197 ; seeAmabile v. City of Buffalo, 93 N.Y.2d 471, 474, 693 N.Y.S.2d 77, 715 N.E.2d 104 ; Barnes v. Incorporated Vil. of Port Jefferson, 120 A.D.3d 528, 529, 990 N.Y.S.2d 841 ; Simon v. Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook, 116 A.D.3d 692, 983 N.Y.S.2d 308 ). Here, pursuant to section 117–3 of the Village Code, no civil action could be maintained against the Village for injuries arising from a sidewalk defect unless prior written notice of the defect had been given either to the Village Clerk or to the Village Superintendent of Public Works.

Although the City demonstrated that it did not receive prior written notice of the allegedly dangerous condition of the sidewalk, it failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not create the allegedly dangerous condition. The City's evidentiary submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether its work on the sidewalk immediately left it in a condition that was dangerous to pedestrians and bicyclists (seeKiernan v. Thompson, 73 N.Y.2d 840, 841–842, 537 N.Y.S.2d 122, 534 N.E.2d 39 ; Lewak v. Town of Hempstead, 147 A.D.3d 919, 920, 47 N.Y.S.3d 412 ; Kelley v. Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 138 A.D.3d 931, 933, 30 N.Y.S.3d 277 ; Monaco v. Hodosky, 127 A.D.3d 705, 707, 7 N.Y.S.3d 197 ; cf.Yarborough v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.3d at 728, 853 N.Y.S.2d 261, 882 N.E.2d 873 ). Since the City did not establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden never shifted to the plaintiff to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (seeWinegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d at 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the City's cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

"[T]he affirmative negligence exception ‘is limited to work by the City that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition’ " (Yarborough v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.3d 726, 728, 853 N.Y.S.2d 261, 882 N.E.2d 873, quoting Oboler v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 888, 889, 832 N.Y.S.2d 871, 864 N.E.2d 1270 ). Where, as here, the plaintiff has alleged that the affirmative negligence exception applies, the City was required to show, prima facie, that the exception does not apply (see Abreu–Lopez v. Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 142 A.D.3d at 516, 36 N.Y.S.3d 492 ). Although the City established that it did not receive prior written notice of the alleged defect, it failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not create the alleged defect when its Sewer Maintenance Department opened up the street in the area of the plaintiff's fall prior to the accident (see Kelley v. Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 138 A.D.3d 931, 933, 30 N.Y.S.3d 277 ; Monaco v. Hodosky, 127 A.D.3d 705, 707, 7 N.Y.S.3d 197 ). Since the City did not establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden never shifted to the plaintiff to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Where, as here, the plaintiff has alleged that the affirmative negligence exception applies, the City was required to show, prima facie, that the exception does not apply (see Abreu-Lopez v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 142 AD3d at 516). Although the City established that it did not receive prior written notice of the alleged defect, it failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not create the alleged defect when its Sewer Maintenance Department opened up the street in the area of the plaintiff's fall prior to the accident (see Kelley v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 138 AD3d 931, 933; Monaco v Hodosky, 127 AD3d 705, 707). Since the City did not establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden never shifted to the plaintiff to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

"A municipality that has enacted a prior written notice statute may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a defective condition in a sidewalk unless it either has received written notice of the defect or an exception to the written notice requirement applies" (Monaco v Hodosky, 127 AD3d 705, 706; see Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d 471, 474; Barnes v Incorporated Vil. of Port Jefferson, 120 AD3d 528, 529; Simon v Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook, 116 AD3d 692). Contrary to the Town's contention, it failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

In an order dated January 24, 2013, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the Town's motion. “A municipality that has enacted a prior written notice statute may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a defective condition in a sidewalk unless it either has received written notice of the defect or an exception to the written notice requirement applies” (Monaco v. Hodosky, 127 A.D.3d 705, 705, 7 N.Y.S.3d 197 ; see Amabile v. City of Buffalo, 93 N.Y.2d 471, 474, 693 N.Y.S.2d 77, 715 N.E.2d 104 ; Barnes v. Incorporated Vil. of Port Jefferson, 120 A.D.3d 528, 529, 990 N.Y.S.2d 841 ; Simon v. Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook, 116 A.D.3d 692, 692, 983 N.Y.S.2d 308 ). “ ‘The only two recognized exceptions to a prior written notice requirement are the municipality's affirmative creation of a defect or where the defect is created by the municipality's special use of the property’ ” (Gonzalez v. Town of Hempstead, 124 A.D.3d 719, 720, 2 N.Y.S.3d 527, quoting Forbes v. City of New York, 85 A.D.3d 1106, 1107, 926 N.Y.S.2d 309 ). The affirmative negligence exception is limited to work done by a municipality that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition (see Yarborough v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.3d 726, 728, 853 N.Y.S.2d 261, 882 N.E.2d 873 ; Oboler v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 888, 889, 832 N.Y.S.2d 871, 864 N.E.2d 1270 ; Methal v. City of New York, 116 A.D.3d 743, 743–744, 984 N.

Preliminarily, however, whether a duty of care is imposed upon the defendant in favor of the plaintiff under the circumstances alleged is an issue of law for the court to decide (See Church v. Callanan Indus., 99 N.Y.2d 104 [2002]). It is well settled that a municipality that has enacted a prior written notice statute may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a defective condition in a sidewalk unless it either has received written notice of the defect or an exception to the written notice requirement applies (see Wolin v. Town of N. Hempstead, 129 A.D.3d 833, 834 [2d Dept. 2015], quoting Monaco v. Hodosky, 127 A.D.3d 705, 706 [2d Dept. 2015]; Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 N.Y.2d 471, 474 [1999]). Prior written notice statutes are strictly construed and only two exceptions are recognized, 'namely, where the locality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence and where a special use confers a special benefit upon the locality'" (Chirco v City of Long Beach, 106 A.D.3d at 942, quoting Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 N.Y.2d at 474 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Wolin v Town of N. Hempstead, 129 A.D.3d at 834, [2d Dept. 2015] (an affirmative negligence exception is applicable where work done by a municipality immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition).

It is well settled that "a municipality that has enacted a prior written notice statute may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a defective condition on a sidewalk unless it either has received written notice of the defect or an exception to the written notice requirement applies" (Monaco v. Hodosky, 127 AD3d 705 at 706 [2d Dept. 2015]). Thus, the Administrative Code of the City of New York §7-201(c) "limits the City's duty of care over its municipal streets and sidewalks by imposing liability only for those defects or hazardous conditions which its officials have been actually notified exist at a specified location" (Katz v. City of New York, 87 NY2d 241, 241 [1995] [internal citations omitted]).

It is well settled that a municipality that has enacted a prior written notice statute may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a defective condition in a sidewalk unless it either has received written notice of the defect or an exception to the written notice requirement applies (See, Wolin v. Town of N. Hempstead, 129 A.D.3d 833, 834 [2d Dept. 2015], quoting Monaco v. Hodosky, 127 A.D.3d 705, 706 [2d Dept. 2015] (citations omitted); Amabile v. City of Buffalo, 93 N.Y.2d 471, 474 [1999]). "Prior written notice statutes are strictly construed and only two exceptions are recognized, 'namely,