The trial court subsequently instructed the jury, after which both parties stated that they were satisfied with the instructions.In Molton v. State, 651 So.2d 663 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), this Court held that when, at the charge conference, a defendant clearly objects to the trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction and states specific reasons for that objection, the defendant is not required to renew his or her objection at the close of the oral instructions to preserve that issue for appellate review. Here, Morris requested the jury instruction on more than one occasion and stated his grounds for the request.
United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d [1494,] 1502 [ (10th Cir.1990) ].”Molton v. State, 651 So.2d 663, 668–69 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (emphasis added). See also Wynn v. State, 804 So.2d 1122, 1132 (Ala.Crim.App.2000).
In Molton v. State, 651 So.2d 663 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), we stated the following regarding successive legal representation and the potential for conflict: "It is 'a basic constitutional precept' that those prosecuted for criminal offenses have a right to the assistance of counsel during the proceedings.
Rule 21.2, A.R.Crim.P., provides: "No party may assign as error the court's . . . failing to give a written instruction . . . unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection." In Molton v. State, 651 So.2d 663 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), Presiding Judge Bowen, writing for the Court, emphasized that Rule 21.2 requires only that objections be made "before the jury retires." Judge Bowen further stated in Molton: "[W]here . . . a defendant clearly objects at the charge conference to the trial court's refusal to give a written requested charge and states specific reasons for that objection, he is not required to renew his objection at the close of the oral instructions to preserve that issue for appellate review.
Knight admits that defense counsel cross-examined Bryant about his prior criminal record, but suggests that he could have cross-examined Bryant about his drug use and its possible effect on his perception. This Court addressed conflicts of interest in Molton v. State, 651 So.2d 663 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) : "It is ‘a basic constitutional precept’ that those prosecuted for criminal offenses have a right to the assistance of counsel during the proceedings.
"Molton v. State, 651 So. 2d 663, 668-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (emphasis added). See also Wynn v. State, 804 So. 2d 1122, 1132 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
"Molton v. State, 651 So. 2d 663, 668-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (emphasis added).See also Wynn v. State, 804 So. 2d 1122, 1132 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
However, Alabama has never adopted such a rule. As we stated in Molton v. State, 651 So.2d 663 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994): "It is 'a basic constitutional precept' that those prosecuted for criminal offenses have a right to the assistance of counsel during the proceedings.
In order to show that the collateral challenge to the Fayette County conviction based on a conflict of interest would have been successful, Perkins "must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); see also Molton v. State, 651 So. 2d 663, 669 (Ala. Crim. App.1994)("The appellant did not raise the matter of a conflict of interest on the part of his trial counsel until well after the trial. Consequently, in order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, he must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."
"`[Attorneys are officers of the court and "` when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath.'"`" Molton v. State, 651 So.2d 663, 670 n. 6 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)); see also Ex parte Owen, 860 So.2d 877, 880 (Ala. 2003) (citing Molton). Accordingly, we will review with a presumption of correctness those portions of the trial court's decision based on the representations of counsel made at the November 20, 2008, hearing.